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ABSTRACT 
 
Land deals can involve multiple and nested claims by communal groups, traditional 
authorities, households and individuals. Inclusive decision making regarding natural resource 
management and large scale land transactions can enhance positive community outcomes. 
Such decision making can also boost the sustainability of results. Our research focuses on 
village-level factors that influence negotiation processes and shape responses within and 
among communities. 
Our study draws on group and individual interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015 with 
members of four rural communities in Cameroon. We examine the information and institu-
tional capabilities that communities access to accept or reject land transactions and effective-
ly negotiate terms. Bebbington’s pioneering work exploring the role of community capitals 
as assets—his ‘capitals and capabilities’ framework—informed our analysis. So, too, did Ri-
bot and Peluso’s ‘theory of access’——their emphasis, that is, not merely on property own-
ership but on people’s ability to derive benefits from resources. We use Schwalbe et al.’s ge-
neric processes that create and reproduce gender inequality to examine the negotiation pro-
cess and Cornwall’s categories of ‘participatory governance’ to understand how participation 
is defined within a smaller stakeholder group. 
Our analysis indicates that land investors are complying with the procedures and 
guidelines specified in Cameroonian law for community consultation and negotiations. 
Nonetheless, we found serious obstacles to meaningful informed consent. Such obstacles in-
cluded uncertainty regarding decision making authority over the transfer of land, low or non-
existent community assets, and deficiencies in structural and relational mechanisms. We also 
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found that current processes of transferring land-use rights are gendered and negatively affect 
women in particular and the communities to which they belong. We highlight negotiating 
opportunities for communities within an innovative policy space. And find that land transfer 
negotiation processes reflect differentials in power within these emerging spaces for decen-
tralized governance. We argue that decision-making within this forum is geared towards le-
gitimizing investor strategy with limited integration of community needs. Place-based varia-
tions are thus crucial in understanding negotiation processes over the transfer of land. 
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CHAPTER 1: AN INTRODUCTION TO LARGE-SCALE AG-
RICULTURAL LAND DEALS 
Agriculture is the primary source of food, clothing, and the materials used for fuel 
and housing for a growing world population (FAO 2012). According to World Bank Report 
(2008), agriculture is recognized as a vital development tool in achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), especially for 
contributing to food security, raising the incomes of the poor, facilitating economic transfor-
mation and providing environmental services. Modernization in agriculture has focused on 
ways in which traditional or subsistence agricultural economies become modern through pro-
cesses of improved technological transfer, dissemination of innovative agricultural tech-
niques, and education to stimulate economic growth and change in social, political and cul-
tural structures (Vago 1980; Arnon 1987; Todaro and Smith 2011). According to Arnon 
(1987), subsistence agriculture is self-perpetuating and simply increasing the input of tradi-
tional factors of production (land and labor) will reap low rates of return. Since traditional 
agriculture cannot itself supply the capital required to make its own transformation from tra-
ditional to modern production possible (Arnon 1987), some kind of intervention is essential. 
However, foreign investment in agriculture, especially land-based investments, has differen-
tiated impacts on stakeholders at the local, national, and international levels, including inves-
tors. Investment in agriculture could range from agricultural inputs (high yielding and disease 
resistant seeds, chemical fertilizers, pesticides, equipment) and infrastructure such as irriga-
tion services to large-scale commercial farming, food processing and distribution, and mar-
kets. Increased investment in the agricultural sector in the Global South might be the trigger 
to jump-start economic growth and enhanced well-being within these countries. Given the 
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fiscal inability of most developing country governments to invest in agriculture and the ur-
gent need for such investments in rural areas, foreign investments in agriculture can be a 
means to fill this gap.  
This dissertation examines the topic of foreign investment in agriculture in the Global 
South with emphasis on Africa, and Cameroon in particular. The dissertation is organized in 
five major chapters: introduction; three focused journal articles which each present theory, 
methods and results; and conclusion.  I will explain the organization of chapter 1, the Intro-
duction to the dissertation and will elaborate more on the general organization of the disserta-
tion, at the end of this chapter.  The Introduction has four sections. First, an introduction of 
large-scale agricultural investments in the Global South with an emphasis on Africa, and 
Cameroon in particular. This section includes the most common processes/scenarios of the 
transfer of land rights from local communities to foreign investors, and the potential opportu-
nities and risks derived from such investments. Second, a section on the theoretical and con-
ceptual frameworks that guide the discussion of large-scale agricultural land investments, and 
community participation processes. This section includes a discussion of contextual and insti-
tutional factors that structure local participation in the transfer of land rights. Third, a re-
search design and methods section that describes the study area, operationalizes key con-
cepts, and explains data analysis. This section contains the major research question and ob-
jectives regarding community participation in the transfer of land rights process. Fourth, a 
description of the dissertation chapters. 
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Agricultural Investments as Opportunities 
Increased foreign investment in agriculture would boost productivity of agricultural 
systems in the Global South, resulting in improved domestic food security and exports to 
world markets (Cheru and Modi 2013). For rural communities, investment in agriculture is 
the most important and most effective strategy for poverty reduction (World Bank 2008). In-
vestments can potentially increase productivity at the farm level, which can also result in in-
creased availability of food on the market, decrease in food prices, and increased food acces-
sibility for rural and urban consumers (Hallam 2009). Lower priced staple foods enable con-
sumers to supplement their diets with a more diverse array of foods, reducing the vulnerabil-
ity of food supplies to shocks, and promoting stability in consumption (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 2013). The improvements in technology and training 
brought about by foreign investment in agriculture are important in enhancing community 
resilience to natural (extreme weather variability) and other types of (market mechanisms) 
shocks.  
The enhancement of farm productivity and income causes a multiplier effect within 
society (Todaro et al. 2011) by generating demand for other rural goods and services, creat-
ing employment and incomes for the people who provide them. Foreign agricultural invest-
ments can enhance know-how for agricultural production, technology transfer, access to fi-
nancial resources, wage employment, incorporation in agri-food regimes through value chain 
development, development of transportation infrastructure, health care services, provision of 
educational services and basic utilities (De Shutter 2011; Mackey 2011; McCarthy 2010). 
These opportunities to the rural economy create ripple effects, transmitting these benefits to 
the broader national economy. 
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In Brazil, FDI has resulted in an increase in agricultural production and Gross Do-
mestic Product (GDP) (FAO 2013). In 2010, foreign investment in the agricultural sector in 
Brazil totaled $35 billion (excluding extraction) (FAO 2013). Due to the presence of transna-
tional corporations1 at all stages of the supply chain, agriculture in Brazil has become mod-
ernized, and integrated upstream (institutions within each chain – banks, technology) and 
downstream (source to consumer) supply chain participants. Major investments in the Brazil-
ian Savanna (Cerrado) in particular have transformed this region into one of the world’s most 
important food producing regions in the world. This process involved the adoption of highly 
productive technologies and training of local people to improve labor productivity (FAO 
2013:29-54).   
The benefits of foreign agricultural investments are not only found at the national and 
local level of developing countries, but also have benefits for foreign investors and the global 
economy (Hallam 2009). For investors, ‘investment in farmland and agricultural infrastruc-
ture offers the following attractions as an emerging asset class: strong long-term macroeco-
nomic fundamentals; attractive historical returns on land investment; a mix of current income 
and capital appreciation; uncorrelated returns with the equities market and a strong hedge 
against inflation’ (FAO 2013:3). In other words, it is a stable investment option with a poten-
tial for capital gains in the long run. There is also a huge positive impact on global trade from 
the increased production of food crops for national and international markets and future 
global price stability (von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009). However, the current commercial, 
                                                
1 TNCs are suppliers of agriculture and forest inputs (e.g., Monsanto), machine and equipment producers, agriculture or forest output pro-
ducers, processors and industrial firms (e.g., Louis Dreyfus Commodities Brazil), wholesalers, retailers, and exporters (e.g. Archer Daniels 
Midland Company). 
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industrialized model of production that follows foreign investments in the Global South re-
sults in systems that could be unsustainable (Bowler 2002a; Gliessman 2007; Shiva 2002). 
Agricultural Investments as Risks 
Critics of modernization theory, e.g. dependency theorists, hold that well developed 
countries exploit the weak countries in the global south for their own benefit (Frank 1966) 
and the principal mechanism for this exploitation is through international trade and FDI in 
particular. Globalization principles of trade liberalization, capital flows, and diffusion of 
technology have resulted in furthering ‘the development of underdevelopment’ (Frank 1966; 
Shiva 2002). According to Shiva (2002), trade liberalization leads to growth of profits for 
global agribusiness corporations and a decline in food production, and food and economic 
security for farmers. Evidence from Tanzania suggests that the impact of FDI on agriculture-
related industries is very complex (FAO 2013). According to the Tanzanian Board of Trade, 
FDI has instigated growth within the mining industry with a resultant increase in gold ex-
ports, which amounted to $703.7 million in 2006 (42% of the total national export value) 
(FAO 2013). However, the increasing growth in capital-intensive production has mixed im-
plications for the entire economy, with severe consequences for local economies. Emphasis 
on extractive industries has caused a migratory effect from agriculture, deepening poverty 
(unemployment) since investment is concentrated on capital-intensive sectors (FAO 2013). 
The transformation of agricultural landscapes from subsistence mixed-
cropping/smallholder farming to large-scale/commercial mono-cropping systems can result 
in increased economic vulnerability for smallholder farmers and landlessness in rural areas of 
the Global South (Spieldoch et al. 2013; Shiva 2002). The loss of control over agricultural 
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production is detrimental for local development since local ownership and place-based 
knowledge and connection are crucial for long term sustainable management of community 
resources (Gliessman 2007:14). The modern productive systems that are derived through FDI 
could have harsh consequences on the erosion of ecological security at the local and global 
scale (Shiva 1997, 2002; Bowler 2002a, 2002b; Gliessman 2007; Byerlee 2013; German et 
al. 2013). From an agroecological2 perspective, the agroecosystems3 that emerge from large-
scale commercial agriculture with key elements of intensification, concentration and special-
ization, accrue a range of disbenefits for local communities and the world in general (Bowler 
2002a, 2002b). These costs include diminished biodiversity, removal of natural and semi-
natural habitats, rising soil erosion and salinity, reduced water tables, pollution of water 
courses, global warming and growing reliance on an excessively narrow range of crops and 
livestock. 
In Uganda, FDI is concentrated in the supply of inorganic agricultural inputs, coffee 
processing and export, floriculture, and fish processing and export. Large transnational com-
panies especially in the rice sector have contributed considerably to an increase in food pro-
duction.4 Paradoxically, the introduction of the DEKALB hybrid maize variety by Monsanto 
has not only increased yields, it has resulted in increased farmer dependency on the seed - 
since they need to purchase every season to maintain consistent high yields. Another example 
of this paradox is evident in how overfishing5 in response to domestic and export demand, 
has led to the depletion of Nile perch fish stock in Lake Victoria resulting in a disruption of 
                                                
2 It is a systems approach linking ecology, culture, economics and society in designing and managing agricultural systems that are sustaina-
ble. 
3 An agroecosystem is a dynamic association of crops, pastures, livestock, other flora and fauna, soils, water, and the atmosphere. Acroeco-
systems are contained within larger landscapes, which include uncultivated land, drainage networks, rural communities, and wildlife (US 
Environment Protection Agency 2014). 
4Tilda Uganda Ltd a subsidiary of Tilda Limited, United Kingdom has been actively engaged in sustaining a consistently positive increase 
in rice production. 
5 The quantity of fish harvested exceeds the new fish bred in a given season. 
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livelihoods for local fisherfolk and potential food insecurity.  Furthermore, even though theo-
retical research suggest that agricultural modernization will result in technology transfer to 
local communities, agricultural households in Uganda that utilize labor and non-labor tech-
nologies6 range from 7.1% to 23.2% and only 7.3% reported any interaction with extension 
workers7 (Uganda National Household Survey – Uganda Bureau of Statistics 2005 in FAO 
2013). 
FDI can become a catalyst for modernizing Africa’s low-technology subsistence agri-
culture, however this should be embedded within a national strategy that focuses on im-
proved productivity of local farmers and facilitates transition to a sustainable model of pro-
duction (Cheru and Modi 2013).  
Large-scale Agricultural Land Investments 
Foreign investment in land connotes the lease or outright purchase of land by a for-
eign corporate or state investor for agricultural production (food or cash crop) or extraction 
(minerals, rear earth etc.). Large-scale agricultural land investments involve multiple and 
nested claims by communal groups, traditional authorities, households and individuals. There 
are differing processes through which transfer of agricultural land use rights is planned and 
implemented in the Global South. These processes involve multiple stakeholders depending 
on the statutory provisions, customary laws, and social, political and legal institutions within 
a particular society (Lewis 2008; Cotula 2009). 
                                                
6 For example - soil fertility management, crop protection, disease control, farm management, on-site storage, and improved agricultural 
inputs 
7 Knowledge-sharing or training is conducted mainly for the low- and mid-level workforce in crop harvesting, general safety and cleanliness 
standards. Top-level management receives training specialized training in International Organization for standardization (ISO) certification, 
production handling and quality control.  
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The late 2000s have witnessed a surge of FDI in the agricultural sector of developing 
countries (Hallam 2009; FAO 2013). The main driver of this surge is diverse and complex, 
but it can be linked to the rise in commodity prices between 2007 and 2008. This rise in food 
prices prompted countries that are heavily dependent on food imports such as China, United 
Arab Emirate and Saudi Arabia, to invest in countries where land and other natural resources 
were ‘abundant’ with a view of securing their future food supply (Cotula 2013; Landmatrix 
data). Coupled with high energy prices and the move to renewable sources of energy, this has 
triggered an increase in foreign investment in the production of feedstock crops for biofuels. 
Other drivers of this surge in investment in the agricultural sector include the continuing rise 
in global population,8 expectations of future rising prices, increase of consumption rates and 
demand patterns for food, biofuels, and raw materials (Hallam 2009).  
Scale 
While investment in the agricultural sector in developing countries is not new, the 
surge in investment is alarming, given the urgency and scale at which it is occurring. Accord-
ing to the Land Matrix – a global land monitoring initiative which tracks large-scale agricul-
tural land investments, 1,535 recent cross-border land transactions targeting 68,993,380 hec-
tares (ha) have been reported across the globe (www.landmatrix.org 06/16/2016). South East 
Asia has the greatest concentration of reported land deals (307 deals), but Africa is the region 
with the greatest intensity of land acquisition. Land acquisition by sector shows a total of 
37.2 million hectares has been acquired globally for the production of biofuels, with 51% of 
these lands in Africa, 41% in Asia, and 8% in Latin America; 11.3 million hectares has been 
acquired globally for food crop production, with 38% in Africa, 38% in Asia, and 14% in 
                                                
8 Population prediction of 9 billion by 2050 (FAO 2013). 
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Latin America (Kugelman and Levenstein 2013:190). Target countries for land deals include 
Papua New Guinea,9 Indonesia, South Sudan,10 Mozambique, Democratic Republic of Con-
go,11 Liberia, and Sudan. 
Land investors can be domestic or foreign comprised of foreign governments, sover-
eign wealth funds, state owned enterprises/parastatal investors, private investors (agribusi-
ness and agrifood companies), corporate players and private institutional investors (banks, 
mutual, pension, hedge and private equity funds) (Cotula 2009). Data from the Land Matrix 
shows that investment originates from three groups of countries: emerging economies in East 
Asia and South America; Gulf countries; and countries from North America and Europe. Da-
ta from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (HighQuest 
2010) shows that most investment in farmland across the globe is from Europe and North 
America. European companies account for 40% of all land acquired in Africa and North 
American companies account for 13% (Schoneveld 2011). Partnerships are also important 
between investors with 12% of all cases reported by the Land Matrix involved a partnership 
between foreign and domestic companies (Anseeuw et al. 2012). 
Processes 
Land contracts define the terms of an investment project, and distribution of benefits, 
risks, and costs. A land transaction could consist of multiple contracts and relate to bodies of 
law at the local, national, and international level (Cotula 2011). These contracts are typically 
signed between a central government agency (land provider) and an investor (acquirer). Even 
                                                
9 3.8 million hectares of land is subject to interest. 
10 In 2008 Al Ain National Wildlife, a United Arab Emirate company, concluded a land contract over 2,280,000 hectares of land in South 
Sudan to be used for conservation and tourism purposes. 
11 In 2012, 1,900,000 hectares of land was contracted in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and put into production (agroforestry) by 
GroupeBlattnerElwyn, an American Company (Land Matrix 2014). 
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though there are usually only two parties to land contracts, local communities also have a 
stake in the transaction since legal transfer of use rights from the State to the land investor 
means restricting community access to this resource. Sometimes transfer of land use rights in 
Africa involves not only a contract between the investor and national government – as custo-
dian over land, but also involves consultations and sometimes negotiations between foreign 
investor representatives and local communities. Land acquisition processes in the Global 
South vary depending on the politico-legal structures, and community institutions (Moyo 
1998; Banerjee 2006; Colchester et al. 2007; German et al. 2011). Foreign investment in land 
can take the form of purchase, long-term leases, or through multiple contracts with local 
farmers. Long-term leases over land are the most typical arrangement of land transfer, partly 
because several countries have regulations that prohibit the sale of land to foreigners.12 In the 
rare case of a purchase by a foreign investor, a local partner is usually involved (FAO 2013). 
However, the economic and social implications of lease or purchase are very similar given 
that lease contracts are generally over a long period, typically 50 to 99 years (Cotula 2009). 
Tsikata and Yaro (2011) demonstrate the process of land acquisition, ownership and 
management of land relations in Ghana. The Ghanaian land tenure system straddles two vast-
ly different structures of law and practice. An estimated 80% of land in Ghana is held by tra-
ditional authorities under a customary regime, alongside a statutory regime codified in the 
constitution of 1992 and supported by an extensive body of law and regulations dealing with 
ownership and use of land. Under Article 266 of the constitution, foreigners may not own 
land in Ghana, but may lease land for renewable periods of up to 50 years. The inconsisten-
cies between the communal/customary system and the statutory national government regime 
                                                
12 Usually foreign investors might acquire leasehold titles ≤ 50yrs (Ghana), provisional certificates ≤ 5 years (Mozambique), derivative 
rights ≤ 99 years (Tanzania) or a provisional certificate ≤ 14 years (Zambia) (German et al 2013:4-7). 
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have led to rampant land disputes related to securing land for agribusiness purposes. In 2008, 
the government reacted to this inconsistency by enacting the Lands Commission Act, which 
consolidates all the institutions managing and administering land in the country. Despite the 
laws and institutions in place to administer land, Ghana has not succeeded in simplifying the 
process of acquiring land in a safe and transparent manner. The challenges presented in Tsi-
kata and Yaro (2011) are similar across most African countries, revealing processes that are 
diverse, multifaceted and complex across regions, nations and even between local communi-
ties.  
Land-based agricultural investment can take different forms and shapes. Production 
models also vary depending on the contract signed and the production type.13 Production 
models can be categorized as inclusive or non-inclusive depending on its degree of incorpo-
ration of small holders within its model (Cotula 2009). Non-inclusive models of agricultural 
production are undertaken with hired labor and the investor controls all aspects of production 
and processing such as in plantation farming. Inclusive models involve varying partnership 
types between investors and local farmers such as plantation and contract farming coexisting, 
involving a ‘nucleus’ plantation operated by the company and sourcing additional produce 
from outgrowers; and investment in processing and sourcing agricultural produce through 
local farmers (Cotula 2013:7). Such a model could also involve contract farmers and inde-
pendent suppliers— smallholders organize into cooperatives or participate in outgrower 
schemes that are managed by processing investors or plantation estates.  
                                                
13 Production model refers to the size and structure of farming and variations in farming or management techniques (equipment and inputs) 
being implemented (ProForest 2010). 
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Borras and Franco (2010) classified large-scale agricultural land investments into four 
main categories of land-use transformation – food to food, food to biofuel, non-food to food, 
and non-food to biofuel. Investors emphasize the production of basic crops such as soft 
oilseeds, corn, wheat, feed grain, and livestock for export back to the investing country. 
Farmland is also used for the production of permanent crops such as sugar cane, oil palm, 
jatropha, and fruits trees (coconut), for conversion into biodiesel or export to foreign markets. 
Through agricultural investment, investors seek to gain access not only to land but also other 
natural resources, in particular water, to facilitate project implementation (TNI 2013). In 
most cases, investment in the agricultural sector involves the acquisition of land and actual 
production, even though in a minority of cases land is left uncultivated for speculative rea-
sons.14  
Some governments have set up national initiatives to guide land allocations for land-
based investments such as land banks in Ghana, farm blocks in Zambia and Tanzania, and 
Agro-ecological Land Zoning in Mozambique (German and Schoneveld 2012). Typically, 
land investors have to conduct an Economic and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) report to 
determine how the agricultural project will impact local communities and generate risk miti-
gation or alleviation techniques.15 Depending on the national laws of the country, the investor 
might be required to engage in a process of consultation and negotiation with customary land 
users in order to gain local approval and legitimacy for the agricultural project.16 In some 
countries, the project implementation is monitored by a government agency to ensure com-
                                                
14 The expectant increase in the price of land and other natural resources due to future scarcity has also resulted in financial speculation on 
these resources. 
15 The method of identifying land for investment is different across all countries, with government being the instigator in most cases. More 
often than not, negotiations between investor and government agencies are done in secret with or without an ESIA. 
16 Even though the 2006 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIPS) makes provisions on free, prior and 
informed consent (FPIC) with respect to local peoples decision making, the local communities involved in these negotiations usually lack 
the capability to engage in satisfactory bargaining. 
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pliance to the ESIA and impact mitigation mechanisms negotiated through local consultation 
(German et al. 2012). This is complemented by dispute resolution mechanisms, which are 
established within the local community such as in the case of Mozambique, Zambia and Tan-
zania.  
Land Acquisition in Cameroon 
Cameroon17 is located in Central Africa (6 00N, 12 00E), bordering the Bight of Bia-
fra – between Nigeria and Equatorial Guinea. Cameroon is bilingual (English and French) 
and has 10 regions – Adamaoua, Centre, East, Far North, Littoral, North, North-West, West, 
South, and South-West. Cameroon covers a total area of 47,544,000 ha (land 47,271,000 ha, 
and water 273,000 ha), with 13.04% arable land, and 2.94% in permanent crops (palms, co-
coa and coffee). A third of Cameroons Southern 47,544,000 ha is covered by tropical for-
est.18 The climate in Cameroon varies with the terrain, from tropical along the 
coastal/Southern to semiarid and hot in the North/Far North. 
According to The World FactBook17 Cameroon has a total population of 23,130,708 
(July 2014 est.), total median age is 18.3 years, and a 2.6% population growth rate. Life ex-
pectancy is 57.35 years. The urban population makes up 52.1% of total population, with a 
3.23% annual rate of change (2010 – 2015 est.).  
 
                                                
17 Data from The World FactBook. 
18 Cameroon is second in Africa only to Democratic Republic of Congo in the diversity of its forest-dwelling primates. 
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Figure 1. Agricultural Map of Cameroon (Source: 
http://www.fao.org/ag/agp/agpc/doc/counprof/cameroon/figure7.htm) 
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Cameroon has 6 major ethnic groups – Cameroon highlanders 31%, Equatorial Bantu 
19%, Kirdi 11%, Fulani 10%, Northwestern Bantu 8%, and Eastern Nigritic 7% (other Afri-
can and non-African 14%).19 There are more than 24 major native language groups, with 
French and English as official languages. Christians make up 40% of total population, Mus-
lim 20%, and 40% a mixture of indigenous beliefs and Christian or Muslim (The World 
FactBook). 
Cameroon was colonized by the Germans (1884), and under French- and British- ad-
ministered United Nations (UN) trusteeship from 1948 – 1960 (French) and 1972 (British). 
Eastern (French) and Southern (Anglo) Cameroon was reunified in 1972 after a UN plebi-
scite.20 Cameroon has a mixed legal system of English common law, French civil law, and 
customary law. In 1994 Cameroon Forest Code21 laid the foundation for a model of forest 
management based on industrial logging and strict nature conservation. This provided the 
blueprint for a series of subsequent forest laws passed in 2002 as part of the World Bank 
backed major overhaul of the forest sector in the Congo Basin region. The 1995 forest-
zoning plan designated most of forest areas for industrial logging and strict conservation pur-
poses, leaving out only roadside areas up to a maximum of 5,000 hectares available for 
Community forests for a limited period of 25 years.22 
Contextualizing Land Tenure 
Land tenure in the African context refers to mixed tenure regimes – an overlap be-
tween statutory, customary, and communal systems (Cousins 2009). Statutory tenure systems 
                                                
19 Cameroon has as many as 75,000 indigenous Baka, Bagyeli, Bedzang and Bakola (BBBB or 4B) peoples or so called “Pygmies” in the 
rainforest areas of Cameroon. 
20 Plebiscite is contested by the Southern Cameroon National Council (SCNC) see: 
http://www.scncforsoutherncameroons.net/new/index.php/component/k2/item/35-un-resolution-1608-and-the-struggle-for-the-restoration-
of-british-southern-cameroons-statehood 
21 See Code forestier Camerounais - Loi 94/1 - 20.01.1994 
22 See Cameroon Environment Code - Law 96/12 - 05.08.1996 
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include land that is under formal title based on national law such as a land act. Formalization 
could represent actual title of freehold (might include land certificates), or leasehold over a 
specified period. Customary tenure systems may involve clearly defined kin or family rights 
to some type of land or land use as well as common property resources. Customary land 
rights are tied to multiple social relationships that overlap such as household, kinship net-
works, and local communities and ensure shared access. Customary tenure regimes in many 
African countries entail rights to land that are derived from accepted membership of a social 
unit and are acquired through birth, affiliation or allegiance to its political authority, or vari-
ous transactions such as gifts, loans and purchases (Cousins 2009). Communal tenure sys-
tems represent open access, shared common resources. Communal tenure does not always 
mean customary tenure because in some instances communal tenure is as a result of national 
policy and law. However, in this study the concepts will be used interchangeably because in 
the case of Cameroon, which incorporates Civil, Common and Customary law; communal 
land tenure is derived from pre-colonial and customary traditions. As in most African coun-
tries, customary rights of local people over land are not legally recognized in Cameroon but 
because of local claims to land, local involvement in the transfer of land rights is encouraged 
(Wily 2011). 
Cameroon has a long history of land acquisition for agricultural motives as far back 
as during its colonial era. Cameroon’s appeal as a target country for agricultural land invest-
ment has increased due to its agro-ecological diversity, easy access to the Atlantic facilitation 
exportation, huge opportunities for irrigation, and ‘availability’ of land.23 
                                                
23 According to FAO Statistics, Cameroon has approximately 6.2 million hectares of arable land, with only 20% currently under cultivation 
(landportal.info). 
  
 
17 
Land Matrix data show that 133,743 hectares of land was allocated to transnational 
agro-industrial investors between 2006 and 2014 (land deals in which a written or verbal con-
tract exist with the State). According to data from Cameroon’s Ministry of Economy, Plan-
ning and Management (MINEPAT) (2013:78), 400,563 hectares was allocated to domestic 
and transnational agro-industrial investors before 2005. By 2012, Cameroon had issued min-
ing and drilling permits over approximately 10 million hectares of land (Republic of Came-
roon and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 2013). In Cameroon, 67.8% of the in-
vestors in large-scale land transactions are from India, 24.7% from U.S., 4.1% from France, 
and 3.4% from China (GRAIN 2012). I focused on land acquisition for plantation agriculture 
involving feedstock (palm oil) to biodiesel since this scenario illustrates a more contentious 
issue of how communities react when the production goal is non-food for export. In this case, 
the land deal also involves the local people who are considered to have use rights; based on 
customary law, local people have laid claim over the land for generations. I examine the con-
ditions under which communities would have adequate information and institutional capabili-
ties to effectively negotiate terms in land transactions or refuse a land deal. Given that only 
3% of land in Cameroon is formally registered and owned by private individuals (Egbe 
2001), most land is owned and can be disposed of by the State.  
Procedure for Land Acquisition in Cameroon 
Land in Cameroon is classified as public, private, or national. Public land encom-
passes all land which cannot be acquired such as forest reserves, wildlife sanctuaries, etc. 
Public land cannot be the subject of a land transaction. Private land includes land that is 
owned by private persons (covered by land certificate), and land privately owned by legal 
entities such as local communities, regions, and the State. National land is land that is not 
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privately owned and therefore includes all other land that is neither public nor private. Pri-
vately owned land and National land are the main focus of most large-scale land transactions 
in Cameroon. Cameroon does not have a national land-zoning plan that divides the available 
arable land into spaces for agro-industrial activities and/or small-scale farming (Nguifo and 
Watio 2015). 
There are three main channels through which land can be acquired. Firstly, land can 
be acquired from the government through a direct request for a concession. This acquisition 
applies to National land. Secondly, land could be acquired from a company that holds land 
rights to the particular concession. This type of acquisition is infrequent. Lastly, local com-
munities can be consulted as a first step in obtaining legal contract from the State. Based on 
statutory provisions, this latter channel is questionable since the land acquisition should be 
done through divisional land and consultative boards and especially when National land is 
involved in the acquisition since local communities usually have limited (use) rights over Na-
tional land. 
Land identification is mainly investor-driven in Cameroon. The potential investor de-
termines the location and quantity of land needed, and how they plan to use it. Next the in-
vestor requests for a grant of concession through a number of different Ministries depending 
on the intended purpose of the land investment. A request for agricultural land use is pro-
cessed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MINADER) and forwarded to 
the Ministry of Domains, Cadastres and Tenure (MINDCAF), and other Ministries relevant 
to the acquisition (e.g., Ministry of the Environment, Nature Conservation and Sustainable 
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Development – MINEPDED; Ministry of Forestry and Wildlife – MINFOF; Ministry of 
Economy, Planning and Management - MINEPAT). 
Land could be made available through a sale, assignment, or an allocation of rights to 
enjoyment over land. The State has the authority to dispose of, sell, or assign National land to 
an investor.24 Land can be sold to private, natural or legal persons through an auction initiat-
ed by the State or requested by the potential purchaser. The issuing contract provides the pur-
chaser the right to obtain title to the land. Land can be assigned to legal persons under public 
law, and/or attributed as part of company capital. Foreign investors cannot acquire agricul-
tural land through assignment since they are not considered legal persons under public law.25 
Allocation of rights to enjoyment can be given to natural or legal persons through standard or 
long-term leases. Standard leases cover rental of up to 18 years, while long-term leases cover 
a period of 18-99 years. 
The principal actors in the land acquisition process are the investor/purchaser/lessor, 
and the State. When National land is involved, the State engages in a bilateral process with 
the investor with little input from local communities. The investor usually determines the 
amount of land to be assigned with support from the local administration, which in turn is 
supposed to consult with local communities (Land and Consultative Boards). Some investors 
instigate consultation and negotiation processes with local communities during the identifica-
tion phase in order to reduce the likelihood of resistance and conflict during the project im-
plementation phase. There is no legal requirement for investors to consult or negotiate with 
local communities. Thus, the procedures of acquisition vary significantly from one invest-
                                                
24 Decree No. 76-167 of 27 April 1976 determines how National land is managed. 
25 Article 11 of Decree No 76-167 
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ment site to another. The acquisition process can result in a provisional or definitive conces-
sion to the investor.  
Rights-based Approach and Participation in Natural Resource Management in Came-
roon 
Law No. 96/12 of 5 August 1996 relates to environmental management in Cameroon 
and is very important in providing insights to community participation. According to 
Njamnshi et al. (2008) this law requires consultation of local communities in decisions relat-
ing to the environments and resources that they use. It also requires that relevant information 
should be made available to these communities in relation to the consultation process over 
environment and natural resource management decisions.  
An Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) decree (No. 2005/0577/PM) outlines the 
procedure for such an evaluation and requires public consultation throughout the process. 
(Njamnshi et al. 2008). Unfortunately, reports on environmental audits and environmental 
and social impact assessments (ESIAs) are rarely, if ever, published. 
Cameroon’s forest law (1994) provides a community forest concession model which 
recognizes use rights of local communities over specific forest types (usually small and de-
graded areas). Cameroon’s engagement in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and For-
est Degradation (REDD+); a UN program to incentivize developing countries to reduce 
emissions from forested lands by creating a market value for carbon stored in forests, places 
pressure on the State to increasingly include local forest communities in the design and im-
plementation of forest policy. In order to meet the strict safeguards for REDD+, Cameroon 
requires the Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of all forest communities potentially 
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affected by REDD+ activities (Carodenuto et al. 2014). FPIC is a principle based on the col-
lective right of indigenous peoples to participate in decision making and to give or withhold 
their consent regarding activities affecting their lands, territories and resources specified 
within the United Nation Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP). Con-
sent must be given freely, i.e., without coercion or manipulation. It must be obtained before 
activities are implemented. And it must preclude an understanding of the full range of issues 
arising from the activity or decision in question (Colchester and Mackay 2004). Cameroon 
has committed itself to upholding several international and regional agreements related to 
FPIC such as the African Union’s Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa, and 
its Land Policy Initiative that provides best practices in land policy development. 
Article 8 of the Law of 19 January 1994, which sets out how forest, wildlife and fish 
are to be managed, mentions the possibility of compensation for land appropriated for rea-
sons of public utility but makes no provision on how compensation would take place (for 
which resources, and how they would be evaluated). Decree No 2003/418/PM of 25 February 
2003 sets the compensation rates for crops but it has been criticized as being inappropriate 
for the production systems in rural communities since it is based on productive land use (e.g., 
construction or permanent crops) and only related to the land when it is titled (Nguiffo et al. 
2015). Provision for limited compensation exists over the loss of the right to use forest spaces 
and resources, and the right to preserve spaces and resources that are vital to the community. 
Land investors vary considerably in the extent to which they take into account community 
rights and their eventual interactions with local communities. This is due to the vagueness 
and/or shortcomings of the legal and institutional framework with respect to local community 
rights in the participation process. Local community involvement in all aspects of the land 
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acquisition process is essential to instigate sustainable use of natural resources and sustaining 
community livelihood strategies. 
Theoretical and Empirical Literature Review 
Theorizing Local Inclusiveness 
A community denotes a socio-spatial entity (village). It can be defined by tight spatial 
boundaries of jurisdiction and responsibilities, a distinct and integrated social structure and 
common interests (Blaikie 2006:1942). Flora et al. (2008) distinguish between communities 
of place – ‘locality’; and communities of interest - shared similar interests but spatially dis-
persed. Maginnis et al. (2004:331) capture the fluidity in the boundaries by characterizing 
communities as landscapes that represent multiple geographical scales (different land uses), 
and multiple institutional and political scales (administrative units – tribal, local government 
and national ministries) that all overlap. The United Nations (1981:5) defined participation as 
the creation of opportunities to enable all members of a community and the larger society to 
actively contribute to and influence the development process and to share equitably in the 
fruits of development. Agenda 21 (UN 1992:1.3) calls for “broadest public participation and 
the active involvement of the non-governmental organizations and other groups” in environ-
mental decision making.  
Institutional Arrangements, Property Structure and Collective Action 
Community participation connotes the direct involvement of ‘ordinary people’ in lo-
cal affairs (Midgley 1986:23). It requires the voluntary and democratic involvement of stake-
holders in identifying community needs and mobilizing local resources to address those 
needs. Key concepts that shape community participation are institutional arrangements, prop-
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erty structures, and collective action (Cornwall 2002; Ananda 2009). Ostrom (1986) defines 
institutional arrangements as rules and regulations that shape human interactions at multiple, 
nested levels such as who is included in decision making and how information is structured. 
This includes specific rules guiding stakeholder interactions, representation and accountabil-
ity. 
Property rights are a specific type of right assigned to an individual or group to use 
and manage a particular resource (Ananda 2009). It could also be defined as a social relation 
– structure of rights and duties that characterizes the relationship between individuals with 
respect to a specific resource or benefit stream (Vatn 2005 in Ananda 2009). Property rights 
could mean state property, private property, common property, and non-property (open ac-
cess) (Cousins et al. 2000). In the case of state property, ownership is held by the state but 
implies that local communities have use rights since they have state membership. However, 
the state makes decisions concerning resource use, management and transfer of right. Proper-
ty rights to natural resources are the key institutional assets on which rural people build their 
livelihoods (Mwangi et al. 2012). Multiple levels of property rights exist within society such 
as customary law, national legislature, and international treaties and conventions26 – which 
are at the top of the property rights hierarchy (Cousins et al. 2000). With regard to negotiat-
ing transfer of land rights to investors, tenure insecurity over land is an important factor in 
constraining community participation because of uncertainty over their role in the negotia-
tions and insecurity of their authority over decision-making processes (Cousins 2009; Lewis 
et al. 2008; Colchester et al. 2013).  
                                                
26 The 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights stipulates that States should respect, protect and fulfill the 
right to food (Article 11). This provision is reinforced by the 2006 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIPS), which sets forth rules protecting the rights of local peoples to access natural resources and food; protecting land rights; safe-
guarding against forced population transfers; and requiring compensation along with free, prior and informed consent. 
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There is recognition of the importance of collective action as a valuable asset in 
community decision-making over natural resources (Newman 2001; Kooiman 2003; 
Swyngedouw 2005). A good example of such an initiative is Community-Based Natural Re-
source Management (CBNRM). It holds that communities can manage their natural resources 
(common pooled) in an efficient, equitable, and sustainable way based on their local custom, 
knowledge, and technologies. There are two key ideas behind the concept of natural resource 
management; i.e. decentralization and participation. Both imply a movement of decision 
making and real political power from the central to more local levels. New spaces have been 
created for a variety of state and non-state actors to cooperate in governance, giving room for 
actors who had been previously excluded from the policy process to be integrated through 
community participation, depicted in Schumacher’s “Small is Beautiful” (1973).  
Barrow and Mlenge (2005) illustrate the benefits of community participation in forest 
restoration in Shinyanga, Tanzania. The devolution of control and responsibility to the vil-
lage level was an important factor in the success of the project. Local knowledge about the 
values and uses of different tree species, and culturally established practices such as the 
Sukuma practice of ngitili27 grazing and fodder reserves were very instrumental in develop-
ing a resource management plan to counter forest and woodland degradation in the area (Bar-
row and Mlenge 2005). The use of both traditional and scientific knowledge through com-
munity participation in this case facilitated the restoration of forests and improved communi-
ty livelihoods. 
                                                
27 In Shinyanga, the practice of ngitili or ‘enclosure’ conserves rangelands for use during the dry seasons by marinating an area of standing 
hay until the next rains. Ngitili are divided into sections; each section is completely grazed before the next is opened (see Barrow, Fry and 
Lugeye 1992) 
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 In the Global South, researchers have been highly critical of a wide range of partici-
pation initiatives which, despite a rhetoric of decentralization, are characterized by power 
imbalances between participants, explicit and implicit co-option, cost-shifting, and continu-
ing centralization (Leach et al. 1999; Cooke and Kothari 2001; Cornwall 2002; Hickey and 
Mohan 2004; Taylor 2007). The notion of community participation has been criticized for 
ignoring the contradictory tensions in which most forms of governance are embedded 
(Swyngedouw 2005), failing to address issues of power agency and accountability (Newman 
2001; Cooke et al. 2001), and neglecting fundamental inequalities in bargaining positions 
that different partners bring to the table (Hickey et al. 2004). Cornwall (2002) categorizes 
these new governance initiatives or policy spaces as closed, invited, and claimed spaces. 
Community consultation and negotiation over the transfer of land rights can be described as 
an invited space for local governance. These new governance spaces for community partici-
pation are spaces into which communities are invited by various types of authorities - gov-
ernment, supranational agencies or NGOs. Empirical research suggests that the scope for 
communities to exercise real influence in these spaces has been limited and sometimes masks 
new forms of control (Cheyns 2011; Cotula et al. 2008; Taylor 2007). Within these spaces, 
participants are selected to meet a particular need, and the agenda has already been set. These 
new spaces can become closed to the general public - where decisions are made by a set of 
actors behind closed doors, without any pretense of broadening the boundaries for inclusion.  
Community participation invokes images of people coming together to vote, deliber-
ate and plan, or to be consulted in public meetings. Questions about representation and ac-
countability highlight some of the paradoxes of community participation (Cooke et al. 2001; 
Cornwall 2002). There is more evidence of decentralization of administrative functions (and 
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responsibility) away from centrally located agencies than of devolution of power to make and 
implement decisions within particular issue areas. The assumption behind negotiated land-
scapes is that the power to make decisions is meaningfully devolved to participants. This 
does not mean that all participants will achieve their objectives, but that they will have a 
meaningful role in negotiating outcomes and making decisions. According to Cornwall 
(1995) participation can be categorized into six modes: cooption, cooperation, consultation, 
collaboration, co-learning, and collective action.  Cooption has the highest outsider control 
while collective action has not outside control at all. In this context, participation must in-
volve more than token forms of negotiations such as consultation. 
For local participation in decision-making to be possible, local institutions must be 
developed and strengthened, representative and accountable. They need to be accountable 
upward and downward, to the people they represent. In most large-scale land transfer cases 
consultation at the local level is superficial involving only a small group of people with little 
or no access to information regarding what the investment is about and the implications for 
the community (Lewis et al. 2008:23). The power imbalance within traditional/customary 
settings also excludes a large majority of affected people from participating in the land deal 
consultation process (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). Alternatives to these closed spaces are 
claimed or created spaces which emerge out of situations of common concern or identifica-
tion and might be a result of popular mobilization, such as around a shared identity or issue-
based concern (Nesman 1981; Scott 1985; Cornwall 2002:24). The power structure and rela-
tions within a local community is very important in understanding the level and quality of 
community participation that will occur.  
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Power Relations 
While power is derived from positions occupied in various societal institutions, it is 
dynamic and continually negotiated through social interaction (Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1980; 
Gaventa and Cornwall 2006). Power in natural resource management, as in other realms, in-
volves decision making that shapes the distribution of benefits and costs associated with par-
ticular decisions.  
Power can be categorized into three dimensions; decision-making power; non-
decision-making power (setting the agenda); and ideological power (manipulating the mind). 
Influence over the decision making process is an action that represents the first dimension of 
power (Lukes 1974). The second dimension of power entails not only influencing decision 
making processes but also restricting who participates in them (Tsikata and Yaro 2011). In 
Mozambique, the Land Act mandates consultation with the local people; in practice, local 
interests may be undermined through a consultation process that is not inclusive and where 
local people have limited or no effective access to land consultative boards (Nhantumbo and 
Salomao 2010). Even when participation is not overtly restricted, power holders may struc-
ture the definition of what is recognized as a problem and which critical issues are excluded 
from the agenda. In the case of Mozambique and Tanzania, consultation records over the 
transfer of land rights to foreign investors did not adequately reflect local community opin-
ions, and provisions for benefit sharing were vague (Nhantumbo and Salomao 2010; Sulle 
and Nelson 2009). A third dimension of power reflects conscientization about problems and 
the range of possible solutions. Power holders may systematically promote an ideology that 
shapes the consciousness and beliefs of others. Thus, power may involve influencing others 
to act against their own best interests, restricting participation in decision making and exclud-
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ing others’ interests from getting on the agenda, and influencing, shaping or determining the 
very wants of others (Lukes 1974). 
To understand variation in responses to agricultural land investments, research has to 
determine the conditions under which land contracts are negotiated, who is at the negotiation 
table and who is not. All three dimensions of power are critical for research on agricultural 
investments regarding social and cultural factors that influence the creation of consensus 
within communities to resist or consent to land transactions (Smalley and Corbera 2012; Hall 
and Paradza 2012; Mamonova 2012).  
To understand how various mechanisms, processes and social relations create ‘bun-
dles of power’ that define an individual’s or group’s power position in relation to agricultural 
land investments, I utilize theories of power postulated by Lukes (1974) and Gaventa (1980). 
I extend their proposition by including the theory of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003) to ana-
lyze the positionality of power and how this is affected by mechanisms of access which are 
rights-based, illicit, structural and relational. 
From Property to Access 
The ability of local communities to participate effectively in negotiations to exert 
control over natural resources is directly affected by the societal rules and regulations, and 
their vulnerabilities28 (Ribot 1998; Moser 1998; Okali 1989; Ribot and Peluso 2003). The 
different combinations of property rights correspond to the means through which new actors 
and institutions come to gain new powers of decision-making (Agrawal and Ostrom 1999). 
                                                
28 Defined as “insecurity and sensitivity (the magnitude of a system’s response to an external event) in the well-being of individuals, house-
holds and communities in the face of a changing environment, and implicit in this, their responsiveness and resilience to risks that they face 
during such negative changes” (Moser 1998:3). 
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The term property has been characterized as ‘a right in the sense of an enforceable claim to 
some use or benefit of something’ (MacPherson 1978:3).29 In other words, property is the 
right to benefit from a particular resource. It represents a bundle of rights in which each 
strand of right symbolizes a benefit stream to the property holder (Okali 1989). A bundle of 
rights consist of the right to sell, lease, or subdivide; and it could also include the right to tax 
or take for public use (Meinzen-Dick and Mwangi 2009). One of the main themes in com-
munity participation in natural resource decision making is the importance of establishing 
rights to resources. The dominant view amongst practitioners is that people are more likely to 
become involved in social action when they have clear rights to resources. Clearly defined 
rights in the form of full legal ownership provide an incentive for active participation because 
they guarantee access to resources. However, access literature questions this idea and argues 
that confidence about future access, whether based on formal tenure30 or not, is more crucial 
than formal title (Fisher 1995; Ribot 1998; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Legal rights might not 
always be enforced, while informal agreements might be sufficient and effective in different 
circumstance.  
Using property as the only means through which social actors are able to benefit from 
resources has been challenged (Leach et al. 1999; Ribot and Peluso 2003; Sikor and Lund 
2009). For Marx, property is appropriation – to make one’s own (Marx in Tucker 2012 
[1978]). Marx’s characterization of property is akin to the concept of access, which is defined 
as “freedom or ability to obtain or make use of” in the Merriam-Webster online dictionary 
(4/21/2014). Property is to rights as access is to ability (Ribot 1998:310). The term ‘ability’ 
                                                
29 Similarly, Schlager and Ostrom (1992) focused on rights and rules based on law, custom or convention in defining property rights. They 
future categorize property rights as de jure rights – legal rights enforced by formal legal authorities; and de facto rights – rights based on 
rules made among resource users and not recognized by the state (Schlager and Ostrom 1992:254). 
30 Tenure encompasses the rights of secure, long-term access to land and resources, their benefits, and the responsibilities related to their 
rights. 
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encompasses rights and includes the multiple mechanisms, structures and relations that open 
up, influence, hinder and close down access to resources. Access extends the notion of prop-
erty by implying that social actors can derive benefits from resources without holding proper-
ty rights to them. 
Theorizing Access 
Access theory (Ribot and Peluso 2003) posits that households and communities are 
positioned differently in relation to resources at various geo-spatial scales with varying bun-
dles of power, which changes based on shifts and modifications of the strands over time, af-
fecting forms of access to resources. Access analysis identifies and maps the mechanisms 
through which access is gained, controlled and maintained based on the ‘bundles of powers’ 
available to the individual/group within a particular context (Ribot and Peluso 2003:154). 
Social actors are enabled to gain, control, and maintain power through the means, processes, 
and relations derived from the strands that link these ‘bundles of powers’31 into ‘webs of 
power.’ An individual can draw from different ‘bundles of powers’ in any given situation 
within various ‘webs of powers’ that organize access to resources (Meinzen-Dick and 
Mwangi 2009). This is done through the use of access mechanisms that could be rights-
based, illicit, and structural, and relational mechanisms.32  
According to Ribot and Peluso (2003), rights defined by law, customs and conven-
tions that designate power and shape the ability to benefit from a particular resource repre-
sent rights-based mechanisms. These rights could represent the property structure, enabling 
                                                
31 The concept ‘bundles of powers’ represents the mechanisms of power that are available to the actor at a particular time within a specific 
context such as authority, influence, socialization, acculturation, knowledge, etc. 
32 Social relational mechanism include social identity (status based on gender, age, or nobility – Berry 1993:16-17); social relations (friend-
ship, family, lineage, historical ties among individuals and groups – Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; Platteau 1996); coercion and trickery 
(misinformation, threat of violence or even theft); material wealth (financial and material capital); or physical circumstances (location) 
(Ribot 1998:310; Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
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laws and institutions for enforceability of rights. Illicit mechanisms or rights-denied mecha-
nisms operate through coercion and stealth to influence who gains and controls access to re-
sources.33 The structural and relational mechanisms are the socio-political institutions that 
shape the effectiveness of access generated by rights-based and illicit mechanisms. Commu-
nity structural and relational mechanisms may include local infrastructure, knowledge, labor 
opportunities, social relations, and power relations.34 The structural relational mechanisms 
named by Ribot and Peluso (2003) do not comprise an exhaustive list of such mechanism; 
instead, they vary based on the community and particular social action or resource.  
Ribot (1998) provides an illustrative example of the many ways by which social ac-
tors enjoy access to resources. On investigating the distribution of benefits along a charcoal 
commodity chain in Senegal, he portrayed how different actors are able to benefit along the 
supply chain and through different mechanisms. Villages, for example enjoy customary 
property rights to forests, even though forests are legally owned by the state. Migrant cutters 
derived benefits by seeking employment with charcoal merchants, utilizing social factors 
such as shared social identity and social ties with merchants, stigma attached to the work, and 
specialized technical skills. Similarly, merchants derived benefits due to their control over 
labor opportunities and marketing. They utilized social ties with other merchants, govern-
ment officials, and through credit, misinformation, and extraction permits (Ribot 1998:328). 
Likewise, formal property rights do not necessarily imply that social actors holding 
them are able to derive material benefits from the natural resources to which those rights ap-
                                                
33Ribot and Peluso (2003) examined illicit mechanisms as an individual level factor which occurs when individuals cultivate relations with 
or posing counter threats to those who control access, I extend this mechanism to the community level in relation to community mobiliza-
tion – threats, violence, and collective action (Nesman 1981).   
34Ribot and Peluso (2003) describe knowledge, technology, and information as separate structural and relational mechanism, here I have 
aggregated them as mechanisms of power. 
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ply (Ribot and Peluso 2003; Sikor and Lund 2009). Kenya’s experience is a good example 
where land tenure reform involved the transformation of communal land rights to individual 
landholdings. Different social actors internalized benefit outcomes from this formalization of 
tenure, reflecting the influence of differences in household labor capacity and wealth (Mein-
zen-Dick and Mwangi 2009:39-40). It is not uncommon for people to hold property rights to 
some resource but lack the capacity to derive any material benefit from them.35 Therefore, 
property rights may or may not translate into ‘ability to benefit’; and access may or may not 
come about as a consequence of property rights. 
Property is interconnected with authority, and by extension access is, too (Ribot 1998; 
Ribot and Peluso 2003; Sikor and Lund 2009). The rights, privileges, duties, and obligations 
that are derived from ownership of property require support from politico-legal authority or 
legitimate power. While power is derived from positions occupied in various societal institu-
tions, it is dynamic and continually negotiated through social interaction (Lukes 1974; 
Gaventa 1980; Gaventa and Cornwall 2006). Power in natural resource management, as in 
other realms, involves decision-making that shapes the distribution of benefits and costs as-
sociated with particular decisions. Power may involve influencing others to act against their 
own best interests; restricting participation in decision making and excluding others’ interests 
from getting on the agenda; and influencing, shaping or determining the very wants of others. 
The role of power is a core issue in community participation since stakeholders exercise dif-
ferent degrees of power to achieve desired outcomes (Ananda 2009; Cornwall and Coelho 
2007).  
                                                
35Cousins (1997) argues that people lack ‘real’ rights if such rights are promised by law but denied in practice. 
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Tsikata and Yaro (2011) illustrate the salience of power structures in land acquisition 
by Solar Harvest Ltd. in Northern Ghana. During the land negotiations, the company’s nego-
tiator and assistant manager was the grandson of a Chief (Tijo-Na). He organized three 
community meetings in which selected stakeholders were invited to participate and during 
which the benefits of Solar Harvest Ltd. were explained to the participants. After these ‘pub-
lic’ meetings, an initial sum was paid by the investor, of which 40% went to the Regent and 
the remainder was divided amongst the sub-chiefs and divisional chiefs, irrespective of 
whose land was part of the transaction (Tsikata and Yaro 2011). Responses from local com-
munity members pointed to the lack of a consultative process preceding the transfer of land 
rights, and the consequent displacement of a number of families from their sources of liveli-
hood.  
Though underlying power structures shape participation, communities could also uti-
lize illicit or rights-denied mechanisms to control, maintain or gain access to the benefit 
stream from a particular resource. These are rights-denied mechanisms because criminality 
means different things to different people, especially when the particular action is not state 
sanctioned (Ribot and Peluso 2003). These right-denied mechanisms could be characterized 
by peasant mobilization – a gathering of the people to act together, “uniting the people to 
solve a problem or to reach a goal” (Nesman 1981:4). Mobilization could be top-down, im-
posed from the top through outside financing; it could begin on an intermediate level, 
through change agents working with a select few; and it can begin with local communities 
themselves. Similarly mobilization could mean enforced collectives, violent revolution, or 
simply everyday acts of resistance (Scott 1985). Contestations of the transfer of land rights to 
foreign investors may be manifested in social pressures, local resentment, and litigation that 
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can result in outright resistance and violent conflict (Cornwall 2002). The process of land 
acquisition by Solar Harvest Ltd. resulted in tension with the local communities due to the 
imbalance in the power of stakeholders in the negotiation process or lack of a negotiation 
process (Tsikata et al. 2011). The lack of disclosure to local communities on the operation 
plan of Solar Harvest Ltd. led to community uncertainties regarding when there will be a 
harvest, if there will be a processing plant, and the general future of the corporation. This 
coupled with the lack of a cordial relationship with local residents resulted in incidents of 
suspected sabotage such as the burning of a jatropha plantation owned by Solar Harvest Ltd. 
(Yaro and Tsikata 2013). The authors even insinuated that villagers would have resisted more 
overtly if it were not for the reverence they owe to village authorities. Instead, they resorted 
to sabotage and subterfuge similar to Scott’s (1986) description of peasant resistance. 
Through mobilization, local people can become active participants in change rather than pas-
sive objects affected by change (Nesman 1981; Scott 1985; Cornwall 2002).  
Mobilization is most probable when communities are empowered through the social 
relationships and networks within the community. Community social capital – networks, 
norms of reciprocity, and mutual trust amongst and within groups and localities, is a key ac-
cess mechanism and shapes household and community potential to exert power to benefit 
from a particular resource (Putnam 1993; Flora and Flora 2008). Social capital can be catego-
rized into bonding – connections among individuals and groups to enforce norms and en-
courage trust, and bridging – connections among diverse groups within community and out-
side the community. The existence of bonding and bridging forms of social capital are im-
portant in fostering transformative36 community participation. The networks within commu-
                                                
36 Viewing participation as a means and an end 
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nities that have high bridging and bonding social capital include a horizontal dimension (lat-
eral learning within a community and amongst communities); have a vertical dimension 
(community is linked to regional, and national resources and organizations); are flexible (par-
ticipation is not a lifetime commitment) , have permeable boundaries (community of interest 
is expanded and community of place grows larger as new partnerships and collaborations are 
formed (Flora et al. 2008). Social relationships in access theory are both an end and a means 
to an end in shaping community ability to control or exert power over a particular resource.  
Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access maps dynamic processes and relationships 
of access to resources, facilitating analysis of who actually benefits and through what pro-
cesses they are able to do so. I am interested in examining how access is controlled by ex-
cluding others from participating; how community negotiations can maintain inclusive access 
to resources; and how access can be gained or established through social/economic/political 
processes. At a community level of analysis, access theory proposes how struc-
tures/institutions influence the social relations that occur within society. I wish to extend this 
proposition by incorporating a capitals and capabilities framework to analyze how communi-
ty assets or vulnerabilities (access mechanisms) can shape community motivation or ability 
(capabilities) to exert power over the transfer of land rights to foreign investors.  
A Capitals and Capabilities Framework 
To understand the functioning of participation within local communities, we need to 
draw a line to link theory to practice in order to predict variations in community outcomes. A 
capitals and capabilities framework is the first step in understanding how rural communities 
are motivated to act and exert power to articulate and advance their interests. Communities 
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have diverse resources and this stock of resources (capitals) can be invested to generate more 
resources over a period of time (Emery and Flora 2006).  Five important capitals have been 
identified; human, social, financial/built, natural, and cultural capital (Bebbington 1999; Em-
ery et al. 2006; Moser 2006, 2008; Putnam 1993). Human capital characterizes the invest-
ments in education, health, and the nutrition of individuals within a community (Sen 1997). It 
has a direct link to labor and labor opportunities. Social capital is defined as the rules, norms, 
obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures and society’s 
institutional arrangements, which enable its members to achieve their individual and commu-
nity objectives (Moser 2008; Putnam 1993). Financial capital describes the available finan-
cial resources such as savings and supplies of credit (Moser 2008) and can be transformed 
into physical capital – collection of infrastructure, equipment, and other productive resources 
owned within the community. Natural capital refers to the available environmental resources 
a community has such as soil, forests, water, and minerals. The available capitals existent 
within a community represent assets that can be invested and enhanced over time.  
An asset-based framework relies on the premise that people in communities can or-
ganize to exert power to advance their interest by identifying and mobilizing existing assets, 
thereby responding to and creating local opportunities (Mathie and Cunningham 2003). Ac-
cording to Bebbington (1999:2022), “assets are not simply resources that people use to build 
livelihoods: they give them the capability to be and act.” Therefore, capabilities represent the 
different combinations of opportunities available to a community. For example, Sen (1993) 
noted that the possession of human capital not only means that people can produce more, and 
more efficiently; it also gives them the capability to engage more fruitfully and meaningfully 
with the world, and most importantly the capability to change the world. As such, assets are 
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identified as the basis of community power to act to reproduce, challenge, or change the rules 
that govern the control, use and transformation of resources.  
Contextualizing Land Acquisitions    
Large-scale agricultural land investments raise complex issues across various dimen-
sions; legal, economic, social, environmental, ethical, and cultural.37 Transactions involving 
transfer of land use rights may restrict access of local communities to critical livelihood re-
sources and undermine their food security. In a context of uncertainty regarding decision 
making authority over transfer and acquisition of agricultural and forest land, local communi-
ties’ informed and voluntary consent in this process is questionable and meaningful compen-
sation is uncertain. Beyond its economic value, land has social, cultural and religious value in 
many countries in the Global South. In Africa, the government owns most of the land within 
national territories except when it is titled, which is rare. Land tenure and titling of land has 
become a key factor in the negotiations over land deals since this involves the legal transfer 
of land use rights, which are currently held by local communities through customary law 
(Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi 2004). Involving local people as parties to land deal negoti-
ations may be a sensitive matter. When consultation of local communities does occur, 
timeframes are typically very short (Sulle and Nelson 2009; Nhantumbo and Salomao 2010), 
allowing little opportunity to establish local associations to build social capital and its deriva-
tive agency, and to develop an information network to strengthen their negotiation capabili-
ties.  
                                                
37 For an in-depth view on the socio-economic impacts of large-scale land investments see Answeeuw et al. (2011); Borras and Franco 
(2010);  Borras et al (2010); Vermeulen and Cotula (2010). 
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Many of these agricultural investments, coupled with structural factors (policy defi-
ciencies regarding land tenure systems and property rights) and personal greed have generat-
ed changes in land use, rural livelihoods and property relations (elimination of small- and 
medium-scale farming, restricted access to natural resources, land tenure conflicts, displace-
ment and resettlement of communities in new areas) (Cotula et al. 2009; Dauvergne and Ne-
ville 2010; White et al. 2012).  
In other instances, land transactions can enhance know-how for agricultural produc-
tion (Mackey 2011), technology transfer, access to financial resources, wage employment, 
and incorporation in agri-food regimes through value chain development, development of 
transportation infrastructure, health care services, provision of educational services and basic 
utilities. This is especially true when indigenes are fully informed and consulted during Envi-
ronmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA), participatory mapping of customary lands, 
inclusion in negotiating the terms of the land transaction (what quantity of land is involved, 
where, sale or lease, and for how long) in order to generate inclusive incorporation such as 
cooperative, contract farming, out-grower schemes, that reflect the needs of local people 
(McCarthy 2010). The extreme pros vs. cons of the ‘land grab’ argument may obscure some 
of the key socio-structural and politico-economic institutions and processes that define inter-
actions at household and community levels (Oya 2013a; Edelman, Oya and Borras 2013). 
Thus, there is a need to reflect, challenge and reframe existing narratives, portraying differen-
tiation that exists within the local context and their interaction with government and private 
business sector. 
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Globally, debates over large-scale land transactions for biofuel production are 
prompted by concerns with biodiversity conservation and climate change. In the local con-
text, the emphasis is on economic and social development. Borras, McMichael and Scoones 
(2011) urge empirical research to examine interactions within local communities and local 
economies in order to provide suggestions for improved outcomes of land transaction. The 
highly differentiated character of local communities gives rise to a wide range of attitudes 
toward land transactions (Borras et al. 2011; Pye 2010; McCarthy 2010; Fernandes, Welch 
and Gonçalves 2010). Contrary to the assumption of homogeneity, local people are affected 
and experience diverse reactions to the socio-political process of ‘land grabbing.’ Responses 
of local people are influenced by socio-ecological factors such as land tenure system, topog-
raphy, perceived value of the land, access to information, local institutions, authority, and 
local politics (Smalley et al. 2012). 
Contextualizing Land Negotiations 
According to Ribot and Peluso (2003), legal/illicit, structural and relational mecha-
nisms are tied to an individual’s or community’s power bundle (bargaining endowment) af-
fecting the ability to benefit from gaining, controlling or maintaining access over a particular 
resource. Rights-based mechanisms in this setting represent the communal and customary 
rights that the villages within the affected area of Southwestern Cameroon have that enhance 
their ability to benefit from access. Because local people within this area only have use rights 
over land, this gives them limited statutory bargaining power for access (Wily 2011).  
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Framing Community Contestation and Consent 
Land deals usually involve multiple and nested claims by communal groups, tradi-
tional authorities, households or individuals (Cotula and Vermeulen 2011). Claims are based 
on unwritten customary tenure systems founded on traditional legitimacy or written land reg-
istration certificate from the State.  Land tenure uncertainty is the central issue faced by in-
vestors (Cotula et al. 2011). Transfer of land rights to an investor can be contested by the lo-
cal community, triggering backlashes that affect project implementation. Contestations may 
be manifested in social pressures, local resentment, and litigation that can result in outright 
resistance and violent conflict. Contestation depends on who is investing – nationals, foreign 
private investors, or foreign State agency. Land-based social relations that are class con-
scious, livelihood-dependent, and rights-securing are dynamic and not static (Borras and 
Franco 2012). Thus, land-based contestations and violence are influenced by social relations 
that are class conscious representing landless peasants, rural laborers, indigenous communi-
ties, and artisanal laborers; gender-sensitive in relation to ownership rights; livelihoods-
dependent reflecting on-farm and off-farm sources of livelihoods; and rights-securing ensur-
ing control and maintenance of access to natural resource.  
In other instances, the response is more positive, ranging from outright support for the 
project (verbal and written agreement with legal force) to acquiescence (verbal or written but 
without legal force). Most partnerships between communities and investors fall within the 
second category (Nhantumbo and Salomao 2010). Consent in the case of Central Africa is 
not a definitive agreement representing a specific time and codified in a signed document. It 
involves an “ongoing relationship of exchange between parties which undergoes revision and 
renegotiation and which is witnessed by evidence of mutual satisfaction with that relation-
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ship” (Lewis et al. 2008:23). Similarly, contestation is multi-dimensional, involving conflict 
and negotiation; a dynamic process based on negotiations for land use rights, land ownership 
rights and favorable terms of incorporation (Borras and Franco 2012; White et al. 2012). In 
this research, responses are expected to be dynamic based on continuous verbal and material 
exchange and involve ongoing ‘negotiation.’ Empirical research has to probe deeply to ex-
amine intra-household and community relationships to understand the roots of local support 
and opposition and reveal differences between and within specific land deals (Borras et al. 
2012). 
The Case of Herakles Farms in South West Cameroon 
In 2009 Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC (SGSOC)38 obtained authoriza-
tion to gain concession over 73,086 hectares (ha) of land in Ndian and Kupe-Manenguba Di-
visions of South West Cameroon under a 99 year lease. The company planned to develop a 
large industrial palm oil plantation and refinery. Despite withdrawing its application to be-
come a member of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) in 2012, Herakles Farms 
pledged to follow best practice principles, especially those of both the RSPO and Internation-
al Finance Corporation (IFC) in the implementation of its project (Nelson and Lomax 2013). 
The company is currently in negotiations with local communities to decide how the project 
will be implemented and what benefits will accrue to local stakeholders. 
Herakles Farms’ first contact was with the government. Based on the investor-driven 
model, they worked with government officials to identify the target project site. The bounda-
ries of the concession were negotiated through a series of meetings and consultations with 
                                                
38 Owned by Herakles Farms, an affiliate of Herakles Capital, an American investment company, henceforth referred to as Herakles Farms 
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Chiefs, notables, and government services through the various divisional land consultative 
boards.  
According to Herakles Farms, they were in compliance of the legal statute since they 
had engaged in public consultations with communities that could be affected by the project in 
developing the ESIA for the project. The finished report (299 pages)39 was made available to 
community members through Herakles Community Development Officers and on their web-
site. 
The finished ESIA report was submitted to the government. According to Herakles 
Farms (2013), the government organized public hearings in Mundemba (Ndian Division) and 
Nguti (Kupe-Muanenguba Dvision) giving community members a chance to review the re-
port. A 17 member inter-ministerial committee examined the report and issued a Certificate 
of Environmental Conformity. The Land Consultative Board created two maps that defined 
the legal concession, each with a block (Block ‘A’ - Nguti block and Block ‘B’ - Mundemba 
and Toko block). However, the actual area to be used by Herakles Farms will be determined 
after Herakles Farms has engaged negotiations with each village over its current and planned 
land uses and establish which land can be made available for the project. 
Herakles Farms engaged in three basic steps in its land negotiation process: a) pro-
duction of a ‘participatory’ sketch map of the area to be negotiated showing sacred sites, 
farmland, settlements, protected areas, and communal land; b) field surveys to geo-reference 
land use type; and c) held negotiation sessions with the villages and signed Memorandums of 
Understanding (MoUs) (Herakles Farms 2013).   
                                                
39 See http://www.heraklesfarms.com/docs/SGSOC-ESIA.pdf 
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According to Herakles Farms, the participatory mapping process involved a discus-
sion between local community members and the company to identify land use (e.g., farm-
land, growth zones, areas of high cultural significance, and other land uses) in particular vil-
lages so that both parties could understand which areas could be made available to the pro-
ject. The mapping process consisted of a series of meetings through which community mem-
bers and the company mapped out village settlements, farmlands, communal lands, areas for 
future community expansion, and areas for the potential plantation. The goal of the process 
was to identify and sign agreements on what land community members will maintain access 
to and what land Herakles Farms will use for its project. According to Herakles Farms, 
“drawn maps are ground-truthed, recreated by Herakles Farms using mapping software, and 
shown to the community for approval. Each community receives a copy of the agreed-upon 
map” (2013:5). These mapping activities have been initiated in communities in/or bordering 
the first phase of field planting and will continue as the company advances into the next 
phases. 
Herakles Farms has signed MoUs and Common Commitments (Cahier des Charges)40 
with administrative and village notables of the two Divisions affected by the concession. 
Within the MoUs, Herakles Farms made provision for payment of monthly stipends to all 
villages that were signatories and continued to express support for the project. The stipend 
payments were to take effect in April 2012 (retroactive), and would be paid quarterly going 
forward.  
Herakles is currently opening the first 2500 ha of land for the plantation block ‘A’. 
Formal negotiations covering the first phase of the project have been carried out in most of 
                                                
40 Sets out specifications that must be respected during the implementation of a project. 
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the project-affected villages while the ‘participatory’ mapping process is still underway. De-
spite Herakles Farm proclamations of following best practice principles prescribed by RSPO 
and IFC in the implementation of its project, serious weaknesses in the consultation and ne-
gotiation process have been identified (Yanggen et al. 2010; Achobang et al. 2013; Dupuy 
and Bakia 2013; Nelson and Lomax 2013; Nguiffo and Watio 2015). According to Nelson 
and Lomax (2013), accusations of the use of intimidation tactics to coerce local community 
members into acquiescence have been reported (e.g., presence of military/armed police offic-
ers during negotiations imprisonment of NGO personnel for distributing information about 
the project; and banning the activities of particular NGOs in the project affected communities 
etc.).  The process is not transparent and differs from one village to another (Dupuy and 
Bakia 2013). The ‘participatory’ mapping process involved mainly the Chiefs and a few in-
fluential decision-makers of the different communities. Agreed maps showing conceded area 
are signed solely by Village Chiefs on behalf of their traditional councils and later by local 
government officials. The technical knowledge required to understand geo-referenced data 
involved in land use mapping is also a serious impediment to local authorities being able to 
adequately understanding the full meaning/implication of ceding specified land area (Nelson 
and Lomax 2013). The MoU terms are vague and intangible, difficult to operationalize in 
terms of quantity, quality and time (when/where/how it will be implemented). For example, 
the MoU states that schools and health units will be built without specifying when, who will 
provide funding to staff these facilities, or who would be permitted to access the facilities and 
at what cost. Usually these services are only available to plantation workers and not the gen-
eral public. The MoU terms are uniform for all project-affected villages despite the fact that 
the communities are heterogeneous and have different development goals and needs. Local 
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community members are ill informed about the negotiation process. Herakles Farms’ conces-
sion blocks overlap with the traditional lands of villages with which they have not consulted 
or negotiated and part of the block overlaps with public land (Korup Reserve) (Dupuy and 
Bakia 2013). Local communities faced with the fait accompli of the MoUs are asking for a 
renegotiation of the terms of the Common Commitment with Herakles Farms. Herakles 
Farms will have to engage in renegotiations on the subsequent phases of its project.  
Project Site 
Data collection was carried out in Southwestern Cameroon in Ndian and Kupe 
Muanenguba divisions. Both divisions are found in the southern tropical area of Cameroon. 
The affected area has an estimated population of 400,000 people who are dependent on forest 
livelihoods – hunting and gathering, and a rural agrarian economy that is based on forest 
products – seeds, leaves, barks and animals for sale and the production of beans, cassava, 
plantains, and cocoa (Oakland Institute 2012). Over 70% of the inhabitants of the region live 
in rural areas and are involved in agriculture as their principal livelihood activity (MINAD-
ER 2013). Village members’ access to land is usually by inheritance through customary 
rights. All farmers except recent migrants ‘own’ their land, usually by customary right. Mi-
grants could purchase land or lease land for cultivation.  
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Ndian 
Ndian is the second largest division of South West Region with an area of 662600 ha. 
The division is comprised of 6 Sub-Divisions: Bamuso, Dikome-Balue, Ekondo-Titi, Idabato, 
Isanguele, Kombo-Idinti, Mundemba, and Toko; this study focuses on Mundemba and Toko 
subdivisions. One third of this region is made up of rivers, swamps, and small islets inhabited 
by fishing communities. Ndian is sparsely populated with poor or non-existent infrastructure 
and markets.41 Villages are usually near a river where dry-season alluvial planting can be 
done. Most Ndian villages are small ranging from 10 to 50 houses. Villages of 20 houses 
                                                
41 Total population in 2012 of 150,550 (Regional Service of Agricultural Development, MINADER, 2012). 
Figure 2. Sub-divisions in Southwestern Cameroon 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Southwest_Region_%28Cameroon%29) 
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might decline to two or blossom into small towns over a ten-year period, depending on the 
local health situation and state of the road network.  
The division is characterized by forested landscapes (Mountain forest zone - Rumpi), 
above-average rainfall and below-average soil fertility (sandy sedimentary zone with low nu-
trient levels). Soils in this division is a sandy sedimentary mix, acidic low-fertility interior 
soils (except after long-term fallow of 20 or more years), and alluvial soils of riverbanks, 
richer in nitrogen and organic matter but available only during the dry season (IITA Report 
1988).  
A majority of farms intercrop cash (cocoa, palm, and coffee) crops with secondary 
(food) crops. Farmers specialize in tree crops such as cocoa and coffee farms (Rumpi area) 
and palm trees in Ekondo Titi area on eastern border. Practice of clear cutting inland fields in 
some villages creates severe erosion problems due to high-rainfall granitic soils, preventing 
the establishment of cash crop plantations. Inland, farmers specialize in cassava, egusi, plan-
tains, banana, taro, maize and yams around urban areas, and leafy vegetables, okra, egusi 
melon seeds, groundnuts, and cowpeas concentrated in the alluvial fields. The Rumpi hills 
zone is a highland acidic-soil area (cocoyam and plantains planted under tree cover to control 
erosion). This area is accessible only by a long and often difficult road, with few marketing 
links to outside areas despite surpluses of crops that feature in markets in neighboring areas. 
The uncertain length of the dry season, and intensity of rainy season flooding influences land 
use decisions in this division and result in unpredictable quantities of crops available for sale. 
Village communities inland, especially in the mountain forest area, rely exclusively on for-
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ested products for nutrition (fruits, and leaves) and commerce (meat, seeds, and barks of 
trees).  
Kupe Manenguba  
Kupe-Manenguba is the third largest division in the South West Region with total ar-
ea of 340400 ha and total population of 136,856 (MINADER 2013). This division is com-
prised of three Sub-Divisions; Bangem, Tombel, and Nguti; this study focuses on Nguti sub-
division. Kupe-Manenguba is dominated by forests and ecologically suitable for agriculture 
given its level terrain. The soils in Kupe-Manenguba are fertile metamorphic and volcanic, 
rich in potassium and other volcanic minerals. Annual rainfall is high and spread over an av-
erage of 156 days (MINADER 2013). 
The main economic activity in Kupe-Manenguba is agriculture - cocoa and coffee are 
the cash crops and plantain, cocoyam, banana, and cassava are the food crops. The main ag-
ricultural system is slash and burn based on shifting cultivation. Local communities engage 
in other livelihood supporting activities such as hunting, fishing, and gathering of non-timber 
forest products especially bush mango (Irvingia gabonensis and Irvingia wombulu), eru 
(Gnetum africana), and seeds. 
Research Framework 
Development research has expanded the concept of community participation, with re-
cent emphasis focused on community participation in natural resource management (Corn-
wall 2002; Hickey et al. 2004; Maginnis et al. 2004). There is an increasing volume of re-
search examining the scale, processes and impacts (with an emphasis on the creation of dif-
ferentiation and contestation post-implementation) of the transfer of land rights from local 
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users to foreign investors (Matondi et al. 2011; Cotula 2013; Edelman 2013; Kugelman et al. 
2013; Scoones et al. 2013; Oya 2013b). Research from CAPRi42 has shown that property 
rights and collective action play key roles in determining agricultural productivity and food 
security, access to natural resources critical to sustaining rural livelihoods, and the likelihood 
that resources will be available to meet future needs. Scholars have investigated local peo-
ple’s lack of access to land to determine the impact of land transfer on their livelihoods. Un-
fortunately, research examining ‘local people’ and ‘local communities’ during the negotia-
tion process has been sparse (Oya 2013a). In order to understand why contestation occurs 
post-implementation of a given project, we need to put all of the pieces together to compre-
hend the local dynamics pre-implementation and the socio-political context within which 
land transfers are negotiated.  
Guided by the assumption that interactions within the local context are key elements 
in understanding responses to land deals, this research will focus on village level factors that 
shape various types of responses within and among communities. Community level factors 
include access to information; nature and extent of network connections to cooperatives and 
civil society organizations; inclusiveness of village decision making process; and influence 
of community leaders and local elites. Emphasis is on how awareness of procedural rights 
and access to legal mechanisms influence responses to land deals rather than the land tenure 
system per se. Understanding negotiation processes and outcomes requires taking into ac-
count the configuration of the negotiation group, relationships among negotiators, and rela-
tionships between negotiators and the constituents they represent (Kramer and Messick 
1995). According to German et al. (2013), the relationship between land investors, govern-
                                                
42System-Wide Program on Collective Action and Property Rights (CAPRi) by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
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ment representatives and village authorities can lead to cooptation, especially when local 
constituents are far removed from the negotiations. The end goal of intergroup negotiations 
also reflects the individual and institutional interests of negotiators, which are divergent and 
sometimes may not reflect local concerns.43 Thus, understanding the norms of the society and 
how they impact negotiation is key in comprehending the process and outcomes.  
Leeuwis (2000) proposes a negotiation approach in reconceptualizing participation in 
land transactions. Community participation in the transfer of land rights is an ongoing, so-
cially constructed and negotiated process (Leeuwis 2000:938). Local communities are heter-
ogeneous, comprising different and sometimes conflicting interests. Communities have di-
verse problem situations (forest management, unsustainable management of fisheries, graz-
ing of land, etc.) and differing community capabilities (community assets). Consequently, 
they interact with foreign land investors differently and realize differing outcomes from land 
transactions. The existence of variability in access mechanisms within local communities 
creates different outcomes for different communities faced with the same situation or social 
action. 
Central Research Question 
To help engender the win-win solutions alluded to by von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 
(IFPRI 2009), this research on community participation in land rights transfer attempts to an-
swer the following question: 
                                                
43 In development research, participation relies on a communicative action approach. The concept communicative action (for the theory of 
Communicative action, see Jürgen Habermas’s The Theory of Communicative Action) means deliberative action that involves argumenta-
tion in order to achieve a common goal. Thus participation is based in collective interest. However, research shows that different stakehold-
ers participate for different reasons based on social interests and practices, which are usually conflicting (Messick and Brewer 1983). In the 
case of transfer of land rights effective consensus among some is frequently based on conflict and competition with others. Thus in reality, 
social actors engage in strategic action; following self-interest (Baron, Kerr and Miller 1992; Messick et al. 1983) 
  
 
51 
How do variations in community structures, capabilities and relationships shape land 
negotiations to implement a transfer of land use rights involving the Cameroonian govern-
ment, communities, and Herakles Farms in Ndian and Kupe-Muanenguba divisions in 
Southwestern Cameroon? 
Specific research objectives associated with this question follow: 
a. Identify key social dimensions – social networks and knowledge – associ-
ated with land deal negotiations and assess how they affect these processes;  
b. Determine the extent to which land deal negotiation processes reflect dif-
ferentials in power within emerging spaces for decentralized governance; and, 
c. Identify social dimensions and power relations that are associated with be-
ing able to negotiate continued access to land. 
Literature suggests that negotiation processes have their own dynamics and character-
istics (Kramer and Messick 1995; Leeuwis 2000).44 Key social factors that shape the negotia-
tion process include the structure of the negotiation parties, social norms and social 
knowledge and goals (Kramer and Messick 1995). Firstly, the configuration of the negotia-
tion group, relationships among negotiators, and relationships between negotiators and the 
constituents they represent can impact the negotiation process and outcomes. Large-scale 
land acquisitions processes in Ghana, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia demonstrate vari-
ability in case study outcomes even though all cases studied had similar rights-based struc-
                                                
44 Negotiation processes can be divided into two broad categories; distributive and integrative (Leeuwis 2000:947). In distributive negotia-
tion processes “the various stakeholders hold on to their own perceptions and positions, and basically use negotiations to divide the cake (or 
the pain).” This represents a zero-sum game – the gains of one party represents the losses of another. Conversely, integrative negotiation 
processes characterize processes in which stakeholders develop new (and often wider) problem definitions and perceptions on the basis of a 
creative collective learning process, resulting in the identification of win-win solutions (positive-sum game) (Leeuwis 2000:947) 
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tures (German, Schoneveld and Mwangi 2013). Secondly, understanding the norms of the 
society and how they impact negotiation is key in comprehending the process and outcomes. 
Negotiation in the African context does not involve a one-time process resulting in a contrac-
tual agreement; it is dynamic and on-going, dependent on verbal and material exchange to 
ensure continuous satisfaction (Lewis et al. 2008). Thirdly, social knowledge and goals re-
flect information that negotiators have about each other and the agricultural project.  
Understanding negotiation processes and outcomes requires taking into account the 
impact of the social actors and situations, and the organizational context (top-down or bot-
tom-top accountability) within which negotiation is embedded (Kramer and Messick 1995). 
Research at the local scale on variations in the means, processes, and relations by which ac-
tors are enabled to gain, control and maintain access to resources is necessary and important 
within the growing literature on transfer of land use rights. 
Methodology 
Research Design 
The research methodology will be based on a case-study design. This is the best re-
search design for investigating the complex and dynamic socio-political processes that are 
inherent and affect the negotiations over the transfer of land rights. According to Yin 
(2009:9-11), a case-study design should be utilized based on three conditions; the type of re-
search question, the extent of control of behavioral events, and the degree of focus on con-
temporary events. Community negotiation process over the transfer of land rights meet all 
three conditions, given that the event is ongoing, out of the researcher’s control, and the goal 
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is to explain ‘how’ and ‘why’ the socio-political context in which land investment occurs 
shapes the negotiation process over transfer of land rights to foreign investors.  
I combine deductive and inductive logic in this qualitative study (Wengraf 2001). 
Deductive logic is derived from access framework that guides the propositions of the study – 
questions were created based on theoretical literature on community participation and access 
– and inductive logic because specific observations will be made and then generalized to the 
existing theories.  
Setting and Participants 
The principal unit of analysis is the community, defined in geographic terms – as an 
incorporated village. The outcome of interest is maintenance of access to natural resources by 
villages involved in negotiations over the transfer of land rights to foreign investors. Since 
the study is focused on the maintenance of access to a particular natural resource, the proce-
dure for selecting a village for study began with identifying those villages within which ne-
gotiation of transfer of land rights to foreign investors is occurring. Information about each 
relevant village was collected, and two villages or ‘cases’ were selected and included in a 
multiple-case study. The evidence from multiple-case studies is often considered more com-
pelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust (Herriott and Fire-
stone 1983).  
A secondary criterion for selecting the case study villages was accessibility of the vil-
lages in terms of transportation infrastructure, and access to gatekeepers to facilitate entry. 
The ‘cases’ were close enough to facilitate access between villages, but far apart enough to 
reduce a spillover effect.  
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Data Collection 
Instruments 
I created six interview guides for this study comprised of open-ended semi-structured 
questions.45 Questions were derived from previous research and theories. A short survey in-
strument was developed to collect demographic information from a small group of partici-
pants for the third paper. Net Mapping46 was used to visualize: implicit knowledge and un-
derstand the interplay of complex formal and informal networks, the degree of influence and 
hierarchical linkages among key actors; patterns of communication and information ex-
change within the community; and uncover sources of conflicts as well as potentials for co-
operation. Data were also collected by observing village meetings, transect walks, and visits 
to the projected site of agricultural investment in order to add new dimensions for under-
standing the context of land rights transfer. 
Documents such as news clippings, formal studies (e.g., ESIA), administrative docu-
ments, memoranda, and correspondence relevant to the specific land right transfer were col-
lected. Copies of archival records such as GIS maps and public land inventories will also be 
collected for analysis.  
Procedure 
This study is compliant with U.S. Department of Health and Human Services code of 
Federal regulations guiding researching involving human subjects.47 I obtained a letter of 
permission to conduct study within the South West Region of Cameroon from the Gover-
                                                
45 See Appendix W – Interview Guides 
46 Net-Map is an interview-based mapping tool that draws on social network analysis (SNA) as described in Schiffer and Waale (2008), 
goes further by including principles of power mapping (Schiffer 2007) and stakeholder analysis approaches (Holland 2007). 
47 See Appendix X – Authorization from Iowa State Internal Review Board (IRB) 
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nor’s Office of the region.48 I used letters of introduction and invitation to solicit participa-
tion of villages, villagers and informed stakeholders in the study. I carried out individual in-
terviews, focus group discussions and Net-Mapping activities to corroborate facts that might 
have been established through interviews or previous empirical research. Interviews were 
audio recorded using a non-intrusive audio recorder and an iPad to lessen any tensions that 
might be caused by the presence of a recording device. During Net-Mapping49 exercises, I 
interviewed groups of 2-3 people (friends or neighbors) to create influence and resource 
maps for each community.  
I carried out semi-structured interviews: with approximately 136 key informants from 
four (4) villages,50 16 members of SGSOC PAV, and 10 interviews with government offi-
cials, civil society and investor representatives. Participants were purposely selected based on 
their role as village authority, or knowledgeable about the negotiation process between local 
communities and Herakles Farms. Sample size was different for each sub-group, depending 
on accessibility of village members, availability and willingness to participate by representa-
tives and villagers. In one village sample size was based on the redundancy criterion, i.e., I 
kept interviewing until I starting hearing the same information from each subsequent re-
spondent (point of saturation). In two other villages, sample size was based on house num-
bering and interviewing an adult in every third house. This is because families usually live in 
multiple houses in a loose compound with strong ideologies shared amongst all family mem-
bers – simply put families will usually dissent or consent regarding the land transfer so this 
was to ensure that I got a variety of opinions and experiences. This does not mean that fami-
                                                
48 See Appendix Y 
49 See Appendix on Net-Mapping – Qualitative data protocol. 
50 I interviewed 85 men and 52 women 
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lies were considered as homogenous; on the contrary, subsets on the study where focused on 
different members of families – women, men, and youths. In one village, sample selection 
and size was based on accessibility of respondents. Most villagers felt uncomfortable talking 
with me and in order to ensure that they did not face any reprisals I preferred to only inter-
view villagers who were willing. 
Table 1. Social Demographics of Community Members Interviewed 
Demographic Categories Totals (N = 162) 
Sex 
 Female 54 
 Male 108 
Role 
 Not Village Authority 105 
 Village Authority 31 
 Government Representative 2 
 Civil Society Representative 5 
 Herakles Farms Representa-
tive 
3 
 SGSOC-PAV Members51 16 
Village   
 A 50 Individuals 
2 Focus Groups (20x2=40) 
5 Net-Map Groups (4x5=20) 
 B 2 Individuals, 1 Net-Map (4) 
 C 7 Individuals, 1 Net-Map (4) 
 D 5 Individuals, 1 Net-Map (4) 
Due to time constraints and accessibility, it was difficult to talk to all government au-
thorities and civil society representatives involved in the negotiation process. While on the 
corporate side, I faced low response rate due to inaccessibility.  
                                                
51 Membership in PAV is made up of all 21 communities affected by the project. 
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Figure 3. Socio-demographic representation of study sample 
Almost all respondents ‘owned’ land based on customary provisions. This meant they 
had land they were farming on for commercial and subsistence purposes. Respondents who 
did not ‘own’ land were recent migrants and based in the area for work. Average age for 
community respondents was 46 years, with median age for the sample population at 47 years. 
Median age for females was 48 years and for males was 46 years. A majority of community 
members interviewed had less than high school education. 
  
 
58 
 
 
Figure 4. Demographics of Study Sample based on level of Education 
I also conducted two focus group discussions with women and youths, respectively, 
since this method facilitated engaging them in conversations about the investment project 
taking into consideration their busy schedules (bush mango season). I conducted eight Net-
Mapping exercises with five in the largest village and one in each of the smaller villages.   
Land is a sensitive issue and ownership of land is even more delicate and complex. A 
number of people did not accept to participate in study the sensitive issue of the transfer of 
land rights, and some willing participants refused to be recorded. I spent at least one month in 
each village in order to gain the trust of the local people. Sometimes I lived in a village that 
was close to other study villages and visited the other villages every other day in order to es-
tablish familiarity with community members. I also relied on community gatekeepers to in-
stigate formal introductions with key informants in order to gain credibility and encourage 
participation in the study.  
 
0 -  No Education 
1 – Primary 
2 – Some Secondary 
3 – High School 
4 – Some College 
5 – College & higher 
Level of Education 
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Data Analysis 
Data from audio recordings of interviews and focus groups was transcribed verbatim 
(individual interviews) and non-verbatim (group interviews). Data were coded52 using NVi-
vo53 for anticipated and emerging (new) themes using open, axial and selective coding based 
on grounded theory (Saldana 2012; Charmaz 2006). The analysis of the data collected was 
based on the theoretical propositions, which frame the case study, particularly access theory 
(Ribot and Peluso 2003) and the community capitals and capabilities framework (Bebbington 
1999). 
Visual illustrations of Net-Maps were generated using VisuaLyzer.54 Audio data from 
Net-Mapping sessions were coded based on the developing themes in the data analysis.  
A cross-case analysis was implemented for the four villages to determine whether vil-
lages followed similar courses (the aim is to reveal major similarities and differences). With-
in-case comparisons were made between negotiating group participants and non-participants 
to identify variations of power.  
Limitations 
There is no single perfect formula for designing a case study (Yin 2009). Because of 
the lack of a specific procedure for developing and implementing a case study, there is the 
possibility that equivocal evidence or my personal biases might influence the findings and 
conclusions. Interviewing within one’s own cultural community – as an ‘insider’, affords the 
                                                
52 Coding method is a procedure for organizing the text of the transcripts, and discovering patterns within the community structure. It is an 
iterative process (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003). 
53 A computer assist software that can determine general trends and patterns within the data set. 
54 VisuaLyzer™ is an interactive and intuitive desktop tool for visualizing and analyzing social network data from imported data or from 
data created in the graphical interface. 
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researcher a degree of social proximity, but it also increases awareness amongst both the re-
searcher and participants of the social divisions that structure the interactions between them 
(Ganga and Scott 2006). This closeness – between researcher and participants – can influence 
my objectivity and affect the social dynamics that shape the research process. My insider sta-
tus can facilitate entry and integration within the local communities, but it can also affect the 
way in which community members perceive me within this relatively ‘close social world’ 
(Ganga et al. 2006:1). My positionality as a female researcher from an American university 
could also have influenced the interview dynamics given the privileges that come with being 
affiliated with a foreign university, and also potentially raise gender, class, and generational 
issues. This could cause respondents to be guarded about what is disclosed to/around me and 
to possibly regard me with suspicion given that the land right transfers being negotiated in-
volve foreign investors. 
In order to reduce distrust, I clearly explained my affiliations and principal purpose in 
each village – preferably at a village meeting, and reiterated this fact throughout my stay in 
each village. I also deconstructed my notion of community participation and analyzed how 
my positionality affects the way that I perceive things before venturing into the field in order 
to gain awareness of my biases and temper them. I maintained some degree of flexibility dur-
ing implementation of the research design in order to adequately deal with any unexpected 
situations. 
Ethical Considerations 
To ensure that informants took part in the research voluntarily and understood the 
purpose of the interviews, I explained who I am, a Ph.D. student gathering data for a disserta-
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tion research project, that their responses will be kept anonymous (use of pseudonyms and 
codes) and that I would like to take notes/record the interviews. I provided participants with a 
card bearing information about the research and my contact information. Land is a sensitive 
topic in Cameroon and local people are wary of talking about their land and signing legal 
documents. To minimize suspicion and discomfort, I verbally obtained informed consent, 
rather than asking participants to sign a paper copy. 
The Dissertation Ahead: Presentation of Chapters 
The remainder of this dissertation contains four chapters. Chapter 2 “Community Fac-
tors, Negotiation Processes and Land Acquisition in Cameroon” explains the need to take 
into consideration place specific factors when examining the processes of community partic-
ipation in negotiating the transfer of land. I use a capitals and capabilities framework 
(Bebbington 1999) integrated with theory of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003) to argue how 
variations in asset stock of these negotiating communities shape the inclusiveness and quality 
of village participation.  Chapter 3 “Gendered Resource Relations and Changing Land Val-
ues: Implications for Women's Access, Control, and Decision Making over Natural Re-
sources” looks at how processes of transferring land-use rights are gendered. I use Schwalbe 
et al.’s (2000) generic processes that create and reproduce inequality to explain how wom-
en’s land rights are interrupted or redefined within the project affected villages. I argue that 
these processes negatively affect women in particular and the communities to which they be-
long. Chapter 4 “Policy Spaces for Land Negotiations in Cameroon: Negotiation Forums as 
Invited Spaces” focuses on how community negotiation outcomes reflect variations in power 
within newly created spaces - Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon Project Affected Vil-
lages (SGSOC-PAV), on large-scale agricultural land transactions. I use Cornwall’s (2002) 
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categories of ‘participatory governance’ to understand how this association shapes imple-
mentation of the project. The last part is a concluding chapter that draws on empirical evi-
dence from the study to consider prospects for policy and future research.  
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CHAPTER 2: COMMUNITY FACTORS, NEGOTIATION 
PROCESSES AND LAND ACQUISITION IN CAMEROON 
Abstract 
Land deals can involve multiple and nested claims by communal groups, traditional authori-
ties, households and individuals. Inclusive decision making regarding natural resource man-
agement and large scale land transactions can enhance positive community outcomes. Such 
decision making can also boost the sustainability of results. Our research focuses on village-
level factors that influence negotiation processes and shape responses within and among 
communities. 
Our study draws on group and individual interviews conducted in 2014 and 2015 with mem-
bers of four rural communities in Cameroon. We examine the information and institutional 
capabilities that communities access to accept or reject land transactions and effectively ne-
gotiate terms. Bebbington’s pioneering work exploring the role of community capitals as as-
sets—his ‘capitals and capabilities’ framework (Bebbington 1999)—informed our analysis. 
So, too, did Ribot and Peluso’s ‘theory of access’ (Ribot and Peluso 2003)——their empha-
sis, that is, not merely on property ownership but on people’s ability to derive benefits from 
resources. 
Our analysis indicates that land investors are complying with guidelines specified in Came-
roonian law for community consultation and negotiations. Nonetheless, we found serious ob-
stacles to meaningful informed consent. Such obstacles included uncertainty regarding deci-
sion making authority over the transfer of land, low or non-existent community assets, and 
deficiencies in structural and relational mechanisms. Our conclusion: the inclusiveness and 
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quality of village participation depends on the villagers’ access to social, political and finan-
cial resources.  
Keywords: community participation, negotiation, access, agricultural investment 
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Overview 
Increased investment in the agricultural sector in the Global South could be a trigger 
to jump start economic growth and enhance wellbeing. Development literature has proposed 
as essential the involvement of local people in development plans that affect their communi-
ties (Chambers 1983, 1997; Bebbington 1999). The creation of new and open spaces for local 
participation is important in ensuring sustainable development. Power relations, social rela-
tions, and knowledge within a community shape people’s participation in negotiations over 
the transfer of land rights to foreign investors. The aim of this paper is to analyze how varia-
bility in those factors influences outcomes. The paper is subdivided into four major sections; 
(1) processes of land acquisitions in Africa; (2) land acquisition in Cameroon; (3) conceptual 
and theoretical frameworks to understand community participation and access; and (4) meth-
odology and results.  
Background 
The late 2000s have witnessed a surge in foreign direct investment (FDI) in the agri-
cultural sector of developing countries (Hallam 2009; FAO 2013). The main driver of this 
surge is diverse and complex, but it can be linked to the rise in commodity prices between 
2007 and 2008. This rise in food prices prompted countries that are heavily dependent on 
food imports, such as China and Saudi Arabia, to invest in countries where land and other 
natural resources were ‘abundant’ or ‘underutilized’ with a view of securing their future food 
supply (Cotula 2013). Coupled with high energy prices and the move to renewable sources of 
energy, this has triggered an increase in foreign investment in the production of feedstock 
crops for biofuels (Dauvergne and Neville 2010; McMichael 2010). Other drivers of this 
surge in investment in the agricultural sector include the continuing rise in global popula-
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tion,55 expectations of future rising prices, increase of consumption rates and demand pat-
terns for food, biofuels, and raw materials (Hallam 2009).  
Land transfer processes in the Global South vary based on statutory provisions, cus-
tomary laws, and social, political and legal institutions within a particular society (Lewis et 
al. 2008; Cotula 2009). Transfer of land use rights in Africa involves not only a contract be-
tween the investor and national government – as custodian over land, but also involves con-
sultations and sometimes negotiations between foreign investor representatives and local 
communities.   
Community participation in the transfer of land rights is an ongoing, socially con-
structed and negotiated process (Leeuwis 2000:938). Local communities are heterogeneous 
comprising different and sometimes conflicting interests. Communities have diverse problem 
situations (forest management, unsustainable management of fisheries, grazing of land, etc.) 
and differing community capabilities (community assets). Consequently, they interact with 
foreign land investors differently and realize differing outcomes from land transactions. The 
existence of variability of access mechanisms56 within local communities creates different 
outcomes for different communities faced with the same situation or social action.  
We focus on examining the following questions: a) What are the key social dimen-
sions of community negotiations on transfer of land use rights, and how do these factors af-
fect the negotiation process and its outcomes? b) How are community negotiations over 
transfer of land use rights shaped by structural and relational mechanisms such as power, so-
cial relationships and access to knowledge? 
                                                
55 Population prediction of 9 billion by 2050 (FAO 2013). 
56 Theory of Access* (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
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Land Acquisition in Cameroon 
Land acquisition processes depend on the legal structures and political institutions 
within a country (Moyo 2000; Banerjee 2006; Colchester et al. 2007; German et al. 2011). In 
most African countries, the government owns most of the land except when it is titled, which 
is infrequent. In Cameroon, the sale of land is permitted though the formalization of title is 
different for nationals and non-nationals. Foreign investment in land is done through pur-
chase, long-term leases, or through multiple contracts with local farmers. Long-term leases 
over land are the most typical arrangement of land transfer, partly because several countries 
have regulations that prohibit the sale of land to foreigners.57 Cameroon has a long history of 
land acquisition for agricultural motives as far back as during its colonial era. Cameroon’s 
appeal as a target country for agricultural land investment can be attributed to its agro-
ecological diversity, easy access to the Atlantic facilitating exportation, huge opportunities 
for irrigation, and ‘availability’ of land.58 There has never been a national land audit exercise 
in Cameroon to determine how much land has been formally registered, how much land is 
held under customary tenure, compared to land that is Public or National lands. Only a small 
percentage of Cameroon’s land is held under formal title and according to MINDAF, 60% of 
all titles in 2009 were over urban areas (African Development Bank 2009). Only approxi-
mately 3% of rural land is held under formal title and this is usually by large commercial 
farms (AfDB 2009; World Bank 2009; Nguiffo and Djeukam 2008). 
                                                
57 Usually foreign investors might acquire leasehold titles ≤ 50 years (Ghana), provisional certificates ≤ 5 years (Mozambique), derivative 
rights ≤ 99 years (Tanzania) or a provisional certificate ≤ 14 years (Zambia) (German et al 2013:4-7). 
58 According to FAO Statistics (accessed 06/01/2015), Cameroon has approximately 6.2 million hectares of arable land, with only 20% 
currently under cultivation (landportal.info). 
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Landmatrix59 data shows that 133,743 hectares of land was allocated to transnational 
agro-industrial investors between 2006 and 2014 (land deals where a written or verbal con-
tract exist with the State). According to data from Ministry of Economy, Planning and Man-
agement (MINEPAT) (2013:78) 400,563 hectares was allocated to domestic and transnation-
al agro-industrial investors before 2005. By 2012, Cameroon had issued mining and drilling 
permits over approximately 10 million hectares of land (Republic of Cameroon and Extrac-
tive Industries Transparency Initiative 2013). 
Procedure 
Formal law recognizes ownership, usufruct,60 and leasehold rights depending on the 
categorization of land. Land in Cameroon is categorized into public, private, and National 
land. Public land encompasses all land that cannot be acquired such as forest reserves, wild-
life sanctuaries, etc. Public land cannot be the subject of a land transaction. Private land in-
cludes land that is owned by private persons (covered by land certificate), and land privately 
owned by legal entities such as local communities, regions, and the State. National land is 
land that is not privately owned and therefore includes all other land that is neither public nor 
private. The vast majority of untitled land in Cameroon is found in rural areas and used by 
rural communities. Untitled rural lands would be categorized as National land, neither private 
nor public, and administered by the State (Javelle 2013). Privately owned land and National 
lands are the main focus of most large-scale land transactions in Cameroon. Cameroon does 
not have a National land-zoning plan that divides the available arable land into spaces for 
agro-industrial activities and/or small-scale farming (Nguifo and Watio 2015). 
                                                
59 A global and independent land monitoring initiative. 
60 A civil law term that refers to the right of one individual to use and enjoy (such as draw profit) the property of another, provided its sub-
stance is neither impaired or altered. In the case of land the usufructary can enjoy without altering the substance, though use and time land 
might diminish or deteriorate naturally (legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com). 
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Land identification and allocation is investor-driven in Cameroon. It is the potential 
investor that proposes the location and quantity of land needed, and how it will be used. A 
request for agricultural land-use is processed by the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment (MINADER) and forwarded to the Ministry of Domains, Cadastres and Tenure 
(MINDCAF), and other Ministries relevant to the acquisition (e.g. Ministry of the Environ-
ment, Nature Conservation and Sustainable Development – MINEPDED; Ministry of Forest-
ry and Wildlife – MINFOF; Ministry of Economy, Planning and Management - MINEPAT). 
After this procedure, there are three main channels through which land can be ac-
quired. Firstly, land can be acquired from the government through a direct request for a con-
cession. This acquisition applies to National land. Secondly, land could be acquired from a 
company that holds land rights to the particular concession.61 Lastly, local communities can 
be consulted as a first step in obtaining legal contract from the State. There have been cases 
in Cameroon where consultation of local communities was the only procedure entered into to 
acquire land (primarily done by nationals). Based on statutory provisions, this is questionable 
- especially when National land is involved in the acquisition since local communities usual-
ly have limited (use) rights over National land (Nguifo and Watio 2015). 
Land could be made available through a sale, assignment, or an allocation of rights to 
enjoyment over land. The principal actors in the land acquisition process are the inves-
tor/purchaser/leasee, and the government. When National land is involved, the State engages 
in a bilateral process with the investor with little input from local communities. The investor 
usually determines the amount of land to be assigned with support from the local administra-
tion, which in turn is supposed to deliberate with local communities through Land and Con-
                                                
61 This type of acquisition is infrequent (Nguifo and Watio 2015). 
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sultative Boards. Some investors instigate consultation and negotiation processes with local 
communities during the identification phase in order to reduce the likelihood of resistance 
and conflict during the project implementation phase. Even though there is no legal require-
ment for investors to consult or negotiate with local communities, Cameroon’s engagement 
in Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)62 places pres-
sure on the State to increasingly include local forest communities in the design and imple-
mentation of forest policy. Thus, procedures of acquisition vary significantly from one in-
vestment site to another. The land acquisition process can result in a provisional or definitive 
concession to the investor.  
The Case of Herakles Farms in South West Cameroon 
In 2009 Herakles Farms as Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC (SGSOC)63 
obtained authorization to gain concession over 73,086 hectares (ha) of land in Ndian and 
Kupe-Manenguba Divisions of South West Cameroon under a 99 year lease. The company 
planned to develop a large industrial palm oil plantation and refinery. Activities of Herakles 
Farms were suspended in 2012 because the land acquisition process to obtain leasehold was 
not statutory.64 In 2013, the President of Cameroon issued a decree granting provisional con-
cession65 and requiring that the company consult and negotiate with the affected local com-
munities to arrive at a contract that reflects the needs of all stakeholders. Though Land Con-
sultative Boards in the respective divisions created maps that defined the legal concession66, 
the actual area to be used by Herakles Farms will be determined after it has engaged in nego-
                                                
62 REDD+ is a UN programe that aims to incentivize developing countries to reduce emissions from forested lands by creating a market 
value for carbon stored in forests. 
63 Owned by Herakles Farms, an affiliate of Herakles Capital, an American investment company, henceforth referred to as Herakles Farms. 
64 See Djoyum, 2013 
65 See Presidential Decrees No 2013/418 of 25 November 2013 granting a provisional land lease to Herakles Farms in Mundemba; No 
2013/416 of 25 November granting a provisional land lease to Herakles Farms in Nguti; and No 2013/417 granting a provisional land lease 
to Herakles Farms in Toko. 
66 Block “A,” - Nguti block, and Block “B,” - Mundemba and Toko block. 
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tiations with each village over its current and planned land-uses and establish what land can 
be made available for the project. The company is currently in negotiations with local com-
munities to decide how the project will be implemented and what benefits will accrue to local 
stakeholders. 
Conceptual and Theoretical Frameworks to Understand Community Participation 
and Access Maintenance 
This paper examines the land acquisition process related to Herakles Farms in the 
dense and high biodiversity forests of Southwest Cameroon. It builds on writings on the pro-
cesses and context of current large-scale land transactions (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010), 
theory of access (Ribot 1998; Ribot and Peluso 2003), and capitals and capabilities frame-
work (Bebbington 1999). 
Access Theory 
Access theory (Ribot and Peluso 2003) posits that households and communities are 
positioned differently in relation to resources at various geo-spatial scales with varying bun-
dles of power, which evolves over time, affecting forms of access to resources. This is done 
through the use of access mechanisms which could be rights-based, illicit, and structural rela-
tional.67 
According to Ribot and Peluso (2003) rights defined by law, customs and conven-
tions that designate power and shape the ability to benefit from a particular resource repre-
sent rights-based mechanisms - the property structure, enabling laws and institutions for en-
                                                
67 Structural relational mechanism include social identity (status based on gender, age, or nobility – Berry 1993:16-17); social relations 
(friendship, family, lineage, historical ties among individuals and groups – Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; Platteau 1996); coercion and 
trickery (misinformation, threat of violence or even theft); material wealth (financial and material capital); or physical circumstances (loca-
tion) (Ribot 1998:310; Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
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forceability of rights, etc. Illicit mechanisms or rights-denied mechanisms operate through 
coercion and stealth to influence who gains and controls access to resources.68 The structural 
relational mechanisms are the socio-political institutions that shape the effectiveness of ac-
cess generated by rights-based and illicit mechanisms, such as local infrastructure, 
knowledge, labor opportunities, social relations, and power relations.69  
Though theory of access explains how particular mechanisms affect the ability to 
gain, or maintain access to particular resources, it does not necessarily explain how asset vul-
nerability could diminish this possibility. In order to explain how low asset stocks could 
shape local people’s notion of what is being negotiated, what is at stake, and what are the 
tools available to them to empower the decision making process, we incorporate a capitals 
and capabilities framework.  
A Capitals and Capabilities Framework 
Asset-based frameworks view people in communities as capable of organizing to ex-
ert power to articulate and advance their interests by identifying and mobilizing existing as-
sets (Bebbington 1999), thereby responding to and creating local opportunities to ‘change the 
world.’ Assets form the basis of community power to act and to reproduce, challenge, or 
change the rules that govern the control, use and transformation of resources. Five important 
assets (or capitals) have been identified; human, social, financial, physical, and natural. Ca-
pabilities represent the different combinations of resources (assets) that a community can 
draw from to instigate growth (Sen 1993), it refers to the available opportunities. Sen (1993) 
                                                
68Ribot and Peluso (2003) examined illicit mechanisms as an individual level factor that occurs when individuals cultivate relations with or 
posing counter threats to those who control access, we extend this mechanism to the community level in relation to community mobilization 
– threats, violence, and collective action (Nesman 1981).   
69Ribot and Peluso (2003) describe knowledge, technology, and information as separate structural and relational mechanism, here we have 
aggregated them as mechanisms of power. 
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distinguishes between ‘doing x’ and ‘choosing to do x and doing it.’ This project analyzed 
how variability in community assets shape community capabilities to act or exert power over 
the negotiation process for each village. Community capabilities shape local community 
member’s understanding of the negotiation process and also the Free, Prior and Informed 
Consent (FPIC) of these villages. FPIC is a principle based on the collective right of commu-
nities to participate in decision-making and to give – or withhold – their consent to activities 
affecting their lands, territories and resources. Consent must be given freely, i.e., without co-
ercion or manipulation. It must be obtained before activities are implemented. It must also be 
founded on an understanding of the full range of issues arising from the activity or decision 
in question (Colchester and Mackay 2004). International law recognizes FPIC as a legal 
norm that imposes clear duties and obligations on States. Cameroon has ratified all interna-
tional laws related to the provision of FPIC. 
We therefore require a notion of access to resources that helps us understand how 
people in rural communities give meaning to the consultation/negotiation over the transfer of 
land rights, how their perceptions of these processes are related to their livelihood choices 
and strategies; and the ways in which peoples capabilities both add to their quality of life and 
also enhance their abilities to confront the social conditions that they might encounter, such 
as negotiations of land transfer. The assets to which communities have access are not merely 
the means through which they make their living, but also give meaning to their world.   
Using access theory, or a capitals and capabilities framework as a single analytical 
tool would not be sufficient to provide a complete picture of how the decision making pro-
cess is shaped. We blend access theory and capitals and capability framework to examine 
  
 
84 
how structural-relational mechanisms such as social relations, power relations, and 
knowledge are weakened by asset deficiencies and in turn shape community capabilities to 
negotiate access maintenance over land.  Emphasis is placed on the underlying power rela-
tions (community power structure) and how it shapes the decision-making process. 
Methodology 
I use a case-study design to investigate the complex and dynamic socio-political pro-
cesses that are inherent and affect the negotiations over the transfer of land rights. The units 
of analysis are communities. Community is defined based on geographic location – a village. 
Cases were identified and selected from villages currently engaged in negotiating access 
maintenance with the investor. A second selection criterion was based on accessibility of the 
villages in terms of transportation infrastructure, and access to gatekeepers to facilitate entry. 
The four ‘cases’ were also close enough to facilitate access between villages, but far apart 
enough to reduce a spillover effect.70 Drawing on empirical data collected in mid-2014 in 
four rural communities in Southwestern Cameroon, Africa, which are in various stages of 
negotiating the transfer of land use rights to a multinational corporation; Herakles Farms. 
Data Collection 
Each village was an individual case study. Data from audio recordings of open-
ended,71 in-depth interviews with key informants such as village authorities, government rep-
resentatives, investor representatives, and informed villagers was collected. Focus groups 
were also organized to corroborate facts that might have been established through interviews 
                                                
70 Situation in village A directly affecting situation in village B. 
71 In order to adequately document the connections that exists within each case.  
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or previous empirical research. Data were also collected through observations of village 
meetings, transect walks,72 visits to the projected site of agricultural investment in order to 
add new dimensions for understanding the context of land rights transfer. Documents such as 
news clippings, formal studies (e.g., ESIA), administrative documents, memoranda, GIS 
maps, correspondence relevant to the specific land right transfer, and public land inventories 
were collected.  
We conducted 64 individual interviews, 8 small group interviews (Net-Mapping) 
each comprised of 4 individuals, and 2 large focus groups each with 20 individuals. See Ta-
ble 1 on social demographics of community members interviewed.  
Data collected was analyzed based on the theoretical propositions that frame the case 
study – capital assets analysis as described by DFID (2000) and access analysis as proposed 
by Ribot and Peluso (2003). The case study will (a) show how community capital assets can 
shape village-level negotiations, (b) how structural and relational mechanisms can shape the 
negotiations of the transfer of land rights in foreign agricultural investments and (c) explain 
interaction between community capabilities and access maintenance, given the legal provi-
sions for participation. NVIVO and manual coding was used and word tables created to de-
termine general trends.  
To measure social capital, this study used the mechanisms identified by Grootaert 
(2004): the types of groups/institutions and networks that exist within the community, and 
perceptions of trustworthiness of community members towards these groups/institutions 
                                                
72 A tool for describing and showing the location and distribution of resources, features, the landscape and main land uses along a given 
transect (worldbank.org). 
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(measured using specific open-ended questions during interviews)73. Social capital consists 
of bonding (ties within communities) and bridging (ties between organizations and communi-
ties) social capital (Narayan 1999; Daasgupta and Serageldin 2000). The study also measured 
‘linking’ social capital (Woolcock 1999) – ties to authority figures (police, local leaders, 
ministers, political parties), a specific component of “bridging” social capital, which is allud-
ed to by Ribot and Peluso’s (2003) theory of access (access to authority). 
To measure human capital, I determined the number of educational institutions, voca-
tional training, and health facilities in the community. Illiteracy impedes community mem-
bers’ ability to access information, or understand written, legal or technical documents. 
While investors use GIS to map out areas that are of interest, a local community’s bargaining 
endowment is weak due to lack of access to and inability to understand the full implications 
of such mapping. 
To determine financial capital, I measured the availability of logging royalties, avail-
ability of commodity institutions of credit for farm inputs (cooperatives), and formal (credit 
unions/banks) and informal (tontins, njangis, merry-go-rounds) financial institutions for cash 
credit. This affects local peoples’ ability to carry out their own projects if formal financial 
institutions are non-existent. This might result in communities being dependent on investors 
for agricultural inputs or cash advances. 
The fourth type of capital, physical or built capital, is measured by the availabil-
ity/accessibility of physical and technical infrastructure such as communication lines (roads 
and telecommunication), electricity, and water systems. Access to information is very im-
                                                
73 See interview guide on Social relations. 
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portant to understand who can benefit from a particular resource (Gaventa and Cornwall 
2006; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Access to privileged information, higher education, and spe-
cialized training can facilitate individual or group ability to benefits from resource access. 
Informed consent requires effective multi-directional communication. Consent cannot be 
given if the villagers have not received and understood all the necessary information on 
which to base their decision. 
Finally, natural capital, the community’s assortment of natural resource stocks, is 
measured by the amount of community land available for present and future transfer negotia-
tions, percentage of total land with standing volume (forest) to cultivated land, number of 
year-round flowing rivers and streams for irrigation, and geographic isolation from nearest 
urban area (implications for availability of labor force and wage rate). This has implications 
on present and future bargaining over natural resources. 
The next two mechanisms, power and knowledge, are a result of a combination of in-
dividual and community capitals resulting in more or less power and, in turn, to ac-
cess/restrictions to relevant information. Power - Power relations were measured using spe-
cific in depth interview questions, Net-mapping and observation.74 Power may involve influ-
encing others to act against their own best interests (visible power); restricting participation 
in decision making and excluding others’ interests from getting on the agenda (hidden pow-
er); and influencing, shaping or determining the very wants of others (invisible power). 
The three dimensional framework of power (Lukes 1974) is used to understand the 
underlying power relations within land transactions. Village leadership structure, the formal 
                                                
74 Please see Appendix X: Interview Guide on Power relations and Net-Mapping – Qualitative data Protocol. 
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rules or laws that govern forest management and the tenure system, represent visible power 
(formal title over land would be an important source of visible power). Hidden power can be 
characterized by the cultural/belief systems within local communities, and personal relation-
ships within the political system that influence what gets on the agenda. Such as when nego-
tiation meetings are held in English even though the majority of villagers do not speak or 
comprehend English. Invisible power is evident when negative stereotypes that limit the roles 
of certain groups exist within the community, e.g., entrenched attitudes towards women and 
youth, feelings of subordination, apathy, self-blame, powerlessness, unworthiness, hostility, 
anger, etc., and when crucial information is concealed or inaccessible to members of the 
community. This paper focuses on the first two dimensions of power. Questions aimed to ex-
amine; what agendas dominate? how is information gathered and used? how are spaces cre-
ated to negotiate decisions? and by whom? 
Knowledge - Knowledge will be measured within the context of social capital and 
how it strengthens power within a community. Questions asked would be: who has infor-
mation relevant to the land transfer? where do they get it from? how is this information 
shared? 
Results 
The South West region is located in the moist forest zone with one rainy season, 
which in turn determines the length of the growing season. This equatorial zone is home to 
the Bayang Mbo Sanctuary, the Bakossi Mountains, the Rumpi Hills, and the Korup National 
Park – four protected areas of High Conservation Value (HCV). Communities are dependent 
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on forest livelihoods – hunting and gathering, and a rural agrarian economy based on forest 
products – seeds, leaves, barks, and fruits. 
In the case of the villages examined, the majority of local community members fa-
vored letting the investor implement its project within their community. Even though there 
were questions surrounding how the project would be implemented and the implication for 
the future generations’ access to land, the majority of community members felt that the de-
velopment opportunity was greater than the risk, assuming that their village situation could 
not get worse. Villages that had resisted the land deal were not included in the study since the 
scope was to understand the decision making process over the transfer of land use rights. 
(a) Community Assets 
An asset indicator sheet was created to measure the five capital assets at the commu-
nity level; categories used were mostly available, slightly available, slightly unavailable, 
mostly unavailable, and non-existent. Three members of each village – the chief or repre-
sentative, head of the traditional council, and head of the women’s council, were asked to 
rate key indicators on the asset indicator sheet, total scores for each asset was calculated and 
adjusted to percentage values. Asset pentagons for each village was created using standard-
ized calculated values (see Fig 7).  
In community A, all capital assets are higher than any of the other three villages, with 
physical, human, natural capitals considerably higher than financial and social assets. Defi-
ciencies in social assets in community A reflect distrust due to conflict over chieftaincy suc-
cession. 
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When asked to describe trust within the community, a male respondent said, 
The people of [Community A] are now in two camps [Fig. 6], there is a camp 
that says they are for the present chief and there is a camp that says no to the present 
chief. These groups are always at loggerheads. If there is any problem that concerns 
the village there is always dispute. There is no trust. 
 This is not particular only to A since there are a number of cases where indigenes 
have contested the legitimacy of the ruling family and/or individual resulting in a division in 
village allegiance. There are also situations where quarters within the village have been de-
clared chiefdoms seceding from the larger group giving rise to chieftaincy disputes.  
 
Figure 5. Mapping Influence 1: Network of relationships showing dual authority (2 
camps) and possible implications for how community negotiates the transfer process. 
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A series of events had highlighted corruption by certain elites in reserving benefits 
from village negotiations for their personal use and misappropriation of community funds 
from a logging company’s use of community land. This community is off the national elec-
tricity grid; where electricity is available, it is rationed or individually generated. This limits 
access to media in general (television, radio and newspapers), restricting access to communi-
cation relevant to this decision making process. 
Community B is characterized by high natural assets, low social and human assets, 
non-existent physical, and financial (formal) assets. The low/non-existent nature of assets in 
B erodes the bargaining endowment even though there are abundant natural assets to entice 
investor interest. 
Similarly, community C is characterized by high natural assets, but low physical and 
social (bonding) assets, and inadequate human and financial assets. The abundance of natural 
assets gives C a strong bargaining position since the investors see the potential for future ex-
pansion within this area. The low/inadequate nature of all other community assets puts this 
community in a precarious position in terms of accessing and using legal and technical re-
sources that might be available to them. 
The poorest community was D in which all assets were extremely low. D is character-
ized by low natural assets, low social assets (bonding), non-existent human, physical, and 
financial (formal) assets. D borders large stretches of public land, limiting its natural asset-
base in terms of land. D’s capital endowment is extremely low given that all assets are low or 
non-existent.  
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None of the local community members interviewed who were resident in these com-
munities had formal title over the land they farmed or on which they resided. Under formal 
law, these communities have recognized usufruct rights but neither rights to exclusive pos-
session nor rights to mortgage or transfer land. Visual representations of community capitals 
through asset pentagons show a clear distinction of capital endowments among communities. 
All villages, except D, have mostly available stocks of natural assets, but with limited 
financial, human and physical assets. B, C, and D have similarly low stocks, with community 
B having more physical and human assets. Communities C and D show low physical, human, 
and financial assets, but higher social and natural assets. This reflects the weak communica-
tion infrastructure (poor roads, no telecommunication service), lack of energy infrastructure 
(electricity), poor sanitation, inadequate health and educational facilities and no formal fi-
nancial institutions.  
 
Figure 6: Asset Pentagons 
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These three villages, B, C, and D are smaller and tightknit, with very strong and uni-
tary leadership structures, which is typical of most of the villages affected by this land trans-
fer. The poorest village was D in which all assets were extremely low. Villages in the Kupe-
Muanenguba area (A and B) have higher endowments of physical, financial, and human capi-
tal assets than villages in Ndian (C and D), where bonding social capital was greatest even 
though bridging social capital was very weak.  
These communities are plagued with poor transportation linkages and inadequate 
technology, which consequently affects linkages to market and labor opportunities.  
A female respondent said,  
To go to neighboring villages is by foot. For example, to go to Barika, a bike 
can take you there but the other villages is by foot. I go there when I have something 
to do there, like last Sunday we went to Mokango for a parish meeting. We went there 
on Saturday, and came back on Sunday. I put my child on my back and walked with 
the other women. Although the distance is far, we don’t have a choice we just have to 
walk. It usually takes us two hours walking to arrive Mokango. But people who walk 
fast can use an hour thirty minutes. 
In the villages identified for this study, there is no electrification or pipe borne water, 
and inadequate health care and educational facilities. When asked how they get information, 
one respondent said, “We don’t have electricity so we don’t watch television nor listen to the 
radio. We get information through the town crier. He passes the announcement to the whole 
village”. Asset vulnerabilities and low asset stocks can shape community perceptions of 
  
 
94 
needs, deriving meanings that differ markedly from a situation with full knowledge of the 
investment project and possible strategies that support viable local livelihoods.  
Another male respondent explained, 
Has a contract been signed? I don’t know, only those who are in the negotia-
tion team can tell us that. But in the community you only hear of rumors but you can-
not tell whether it is true or false. We just hear them passively. I am not a member of 
the government neither am I a member of the traditional council. There are some that 
say that [Herakles Farms] has been given land in this [village] and others say that 
SGSOC has not been accepted because of the preservation of wild life. So we are 
confused. 
Herakles Farms has signed Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) with these com-
munities groups under two blocks – Nguti and Toko blocks. A review of these MoUs reveal 
that the conditions are the same for these different communities even though the communi-
ties and villages have different needs. The greatest opportunity guaranteed by the MoUs is 
employment of local community members without specifying what type of employment, for 
how long, and at what remuneration. Given the low levels of human capital within some of 
the communities guarantee of employment would not necessarily mean development espe-
cially if community members would loose access to farmland. Generally employment would 
differ depending on stage of implementation with higher number of laborers needed during 
early stages of implementation (clearing and planting), compared to during growing or pro-
cessing phases. More skilled employment might be required in the later phases such as food 
scientists, marketing, and accounting opportunities compared to planters, harvesters, fertiliz-
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ers, especially if production is mechanized, which is typical of most commercial farms. Em-
ployment type would differ based on where refinery would be located with more processing 
specialized labor in this community. 
All villages were guaranteed a standard monthly stipend even though some villages 
are transferring more land than others. There is no provision for the stipend amount to in-
crease as the risks incurred by the investor (uncertainty of production) might decrease and 
profits might increase. 
Standard services promised include health and educational facilities, and provision of 
electricity and road. There is no provision on who will benefit from these facilities and how, 
though locals assume that these services would be free and accessible by everyone. In most 
cases, such as in PAMOL – a palm plantation agribusiness found in Toko Block, only em-
ployees of the plantation can access company schools, clinics, and electricity and at reduced 
costs. 
The promise of basic amenities that are deficient in all villages in these MoUs was 
enough to convince village members to consent to the land transfer and support a petition to 
the president in favor of the land deal even though the MoUs represent no contractual obliga-
tion on Herakles Farms.  
Based on data collected using asset indicators, secondary sources describing the to-
pography and socio-economic situation of these communities, and personal observation I 
conclude that asset deficiencies within these villages could limit their bargaining endowment. 
In terms of technical knowledge (human capital), bonding/bridging social capital, and finan-
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cial and physical capital, Community A, which had the most asset endowment, was the slow-
est in implementing the president’s decree. Community members were most informed, had 
the highest number of consultative meetings with Herakles Farms preceding and following 
the EIA process, and had the most open opposition to and voicing of worries about the pro-
ject. The community was willing to contest the presidential decree demarcating land to Hera-
kles Farms and wished to identify alternative land for this investment. On the other hand, for 
communities B and D, the idea of having basic public infrastructure such as hospitals/clinics, 
schools, community halls, and wage employment was too good to resist given the low asset 
stocks that existed in their communities. There were fewer questions raised, and community 
members spoke more of the opportunities and less of the risks associated with the project. 
These communities were accepting of the land demarcated for this investment in their com-
munities and waited with apprehension for the project to be implemented. Though communi-
ties B and D were the most willing for implementation to start, the lack of infrastructure 
(road, telecommunication, and labor) and difficult terrain deterred the investor from starting 
implementation. Nurseries that had been started in these areas were over-grown and by mid-
2015 the investor was selling these plants to any buyer who was willing to evacuate the 
young trees out of these communities. Community C can be described as an anomaly, in the 
sense that though it had moderate asset stocks compared to all four communities there was 
little questioning of the presidential decree and project implementation was the furthest 
along. This could be attributed to the strong hierarchical power structure that exists in the 
community and how this results in the moderation of information streams to all community 
members. Thus, we are justified in integrating an asset and capabilities framework with a 
structural relational approach to further understand the negotiation outcomes. 
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(b) Structural and Relational Mechanisms and Access  
Power Relations  
All respondents interviewed referred to the importance of power within the negotia-
tion and decision making process. All three dimensions of power were evident within these 
communities; the dimensions illustrated here are visible power and hidden power, since in-
visible power goes beyond the scope of this paper. Visible power – power by the government 
in the decision making process clearly shapes the land acquisition process. The lack of for-
mal title over the land being transferred provides local people with only usufruct rights, while 
the State has decision-making power over these lands since they can be categorized as Na-
tional land. All respondents expressed uncertainty regarding the role of local communities, 
given that specific pieces of land (within specific GPS coordinates) had been allocated to the 
investor. A male respondent explained that “the [Senior Divisional Officer] made us to un-
derstand that we are not the owners of the land. He told us that whether we like it or not 
[Herakles Farms] will come and we are not going to disturb them.” All interviewees declared 
the irrefutable nature of the presidential decree allocating the provisional concession, even 
though they believed that the land belongs to their various villages. A female respondent 
said, “We do not have powers more than the government but if the government has signed 
they should also meet us to negotiate. They should see the community.” 
Power wielded by village customary rulers and their notables over their constituents 
echoed within the decision making process over the transfer of land is a clear reflection of 
visible power.  
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A male respondent said, 
When [Herakles Farms] comes [to the village] they meet with the chief 
[and]/or quarter heads. When they [traditional authorities] have finish with the white 
men [Herakles Farm representatives], the message will then be delivered to the entire 
village - whether good or bad we do not have a say. For me it is needless. 
In three (B, C, D) of the four communities, there was a distinct hierarchical structure 
of power with the chief at the top.75 Even in the single community (A) that had a dual power 
structure,76 the majority of meetings involving the investor were held at the chief’s palace.  
 
Figure 7. Traditional Hierarchy. Source: Monographic Study, Nguti Rural Council 
(2009) 
                                                
75 Customary powers based on tradition and cultural beliefs (sacred societies and mystical powers).  
76 Due to a dispute over the Chieftaincy lineage.   
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Though there is a hierarchical structure of power with the chief and traditional coun-
cil at the top all members of the traditional council do not have equal power. Some are trust-
ed by the chief and thus enjoy more influence, and others are liked by the community and can 
exert their will on the decision making process.  
 
Figure 8. Mapping Influence 2. 
In this case (Fig 8.) community members believed an individual who is not the chief 
controlled decision making. There was also strong influence from the ‘juju’ – a spiritual be-
ing that communicates only with a chosen few. 
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Information related to the transfer is sent to the chief, he then informs his notables 
and traditional council (if separate), and they are in turn supposed to share this information 
with members of their families (immediate and extended) and neighborhood. The majority of 
respondents stated that more often than not this information is not circulated to the rest of the 
community. A female respondent described; 
Information does not get to everybody, because it is not all cases that [village 
authorities] tell us. The ones we are supposed to know about they will tell us by send-
ing out the town crier to announce it and when we go there they will tell us. Some-
times even when we argue the decision is not changed.  
Another female respondent explained, 
The town crier goes around to pass the message at about 4am in the morning 
if a meeting has to hold on a particular day or if [Herakles Farms] has inform the 
chief that they will be coming to meet them. [The chief] does not send out the town 
crier for meetings that will benefit him and the traditional council, he has a different 
way of letting the [Traditional Council] know that they are going to meet. 
Threads within Fig 9 Net-Map show how influence (reporting) is concentrated on the 
chief illustrating that the chief holds the most information in the network since everyone re-
ports to him, while the key players in the decision-making process are the SDO/DO, Herakles 
Farms and the Chief (represented in the size of their node). This was the only group that had 
heard about SGSOC-PAV – a forum created to represent all affected villages in the negotia-
tion process. 
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Figure 9. Mapping Influence 3.  
Non-traditional council members had little or no information of the negotiations. In 
describing the compensation process a female respondent explained, 
The chief sent village men to the ‘bush’ to go and [evaluate] what had been 
damaged so that [Herakles Farms] can pay. [The men] went there when the [ma-
chines] had already destroyed some of the crops.  So they managed to count just the 
ones they saw. We were asked to bring our damage book and [Herakles Farms] paid. 
We were paid one after another, without any community discussion. They paid us for 
the damage but not for the ground rent and the head bush. [Herakles Farms] has been 
having meetings with the traditional council members. We don’t know how many 
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meetings they have been having, my husband went there and the chief drove him 
away.  
 Without the necessary power relations it is difficult for local community members to 
influence the negotiation or compensation process. On very rare occasions communities have 
mobilized as a group and visited their District Officer (DO, local administrator) to influence 
the process. On some of these occasions, DOs have intervened on behalf of local community 
members and gotten redress; a female respondent described a situation where a DO intervene 
to get local people compensated, “it took about three years before they could pay the money 
because this thing did not start today it started about six years before they paid me. They paid 
some people and they did not pay others even though they destroyed our crops at the same 
time.” 
The process through which information is gained, shared, and used also depicts the 
influence of hidden power.  
Hidden power – another common theme within the interviews was elite power to in-
fluence the discussion and the decision making process. In all communities, there were fre-
quent references to elite involvement in the process or the need for their expertise during the 
negotiations such as in formulating binding contracts between the investor and the communi-
ty. One group of respondents complained about the lack of involvement by their elites in the 
process, while a second group deplored the involvement of their elites, referring to attempts 
to redirect benefits for personal gain: “They have no role to play concerning this, in the past 
they have mismanaged community money” (male respondent).  
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A village authority explained when asked about the negotiation process; 
Everybody is fighting for his own personal interest. They [elites] have not 
come to tell us that when Herakles comes, say this or say that. They are looking first 
at their own interest and put the interest of the village next. It is their place to come, 
since they are more enlightened, and meet the local population, make us understand 
the importance of Herakles, the advantages and disadvantages. Though we are local 
people we also have our own knowledge, we can ask questions, what about this? or 
that? then we all agree, so that whenever Herakles comes we will put the message 
across – one message.  
But our elites are not thinking like that, they are thinking in a negative form. 
Our elites are putting their personal interest first - for money. They claim that they are 
the mouthpiece of the community and what they say is what the community will ac-
cept. They want Herakles to negotiate more with them and less with the villagers. 
…We have elites, what is important is identification. Have they identified themselves 
with the community? Not all the elites are working in this negative form, not all elites 
are talking directly with Herakles Farms. 
Nonetheless, all respondents stated that elite involvement could reinforce community 
decision making if elites genuinely use their resources and influence for community gain. 
Hidden power was also expressed through the constant referral to traditional sacred beings 
(juju) in influencing the process – See Figure above. These ‘jujus’ were supposed to guide 
the decision making process such as in the ‘breaking of Kola nuts’.77 The fear of severe re-
                                                
77 The gods reveal their desires through the Kola nuts. 
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percussions from these sacred beings could also illustrate invincible power since the mere 
idea of a curse being put on an individual and a family is sufficient to interrupt the daily ac-
tivities of a multi-million dollar company.78  
All of the above indicators demonstrate that the village authorities and elites of each 
community shape the agenda in community discussions. Information is readily available on 
the Internet, and shared with the chiefs. Information that is shared could inform the decision 
making process and facilitate or hamper a consensus. Government authorities wield most of 
the power within the land acquisition process (backed by law), consequently the spaces for 
negotiation are initiated and created by the investor who is backed by government and sup-
ported by local chiefs.  
A male respondent when asked about the negotiation process explained, 
Half of the community was for and half was against giving land to [Herakles 
Farms]. Since then till now we have been waiting for them but they have not come [to 
negotiate]. They left two months ago and when they came they brought a map that 
was already plotted and showed us a certain decree signed by the president of the re-
public that they are supposed to own this potion of land in the community. But they 
did not show the dimension only the surface area. 
The strength of influence of village authorities or the structure of power also plays an 
important role in determining consensus within these communities. In community A, where 
there is a dual structure of power with two opposing ‘camps,’ there are a wide variety of so-
cial groups (youth, women’s, men’s, religious, tribal, age, and farm groups) with more debate 
                                                
78 Based on researcher observations of a specific event not related to Herakles Farms. 
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over the risks and opportunities that will impact the village. Most of the village members, 
especially men, are aware of the negotiation process and feel that they are part of the decision 
making process. On the other hand, in the other three communities where there was a hierar-
chical power structure with the chief or chief’s representative wielding all or most of the in-
fluence in the village, there were fewer social groups in existence within the village, commu-
nity members had less interface with the investor or government authorities, and felt they 
were more distanced from the negotiation process. In these cases, there seemed to be com-
munity consensus in favor of the land transfer even though most village members were not a 
part of the decision making process. 
Social Relations 
Bonding social capital was abundant in all communities with the availability of vil-
lage social groups (membership based on age, gender, religion, and tribe), and in one com-
munity; a farmer’s cooperative and credit union. When asked where villagers get information 
relevant to the transfer process, a female respondent said; “from our neighbors and also in the 
market where the Herakles Farms workers come and buy, they tells us what they are do-
ing.… The chief also tells us when he comes to the village since he does not live here.” In-
formation is circulated amongst villages through informal networks between villagers, and 
village social organizations. 
Bridging social capital was weaker or non-existent in all communities. There was lit-
tle indication of ‘linking social capital’ since a majority of respondents did not know the 
name of the local government authorities (Divisional Officer, and Chief of Po-
lice/Gendarmerie), could not count the number of times they had seen them, and most have 
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never talked with these authorities because administrative offices are located in towns far 
away from their villages and these administrators rarely visit these communities. Most of the 
interaction with authority figures, investor representatives, and other influential stakeholders 
is limited to the chief and his representatives. Strong bonding capital and weak bridging capi-
tal is indicative of the meager information flow capability within these networks. The same 
limited information is available to the majority of community members while more infor-
mation lucrative networks are closed to community members or unattainable. Given that 
most community members have little or no relevant information, it is very difficult for ‘ordi-
nary’ local people to influence the process. Because all power is in the hands of village 
chiefs, coupled with the fear of repercussion from ancestors and mystical beings if this power 
is opposed, community mobilization to influence the process can only occur at the bidding of 
the chief or exceptionally when the general population is affected negatively and elite capture 
is obvious.  
Knowledge 
Knowledge and information can enhance the opportunities available to local commu-
nities by strengthening their bargaining endowment.  
A male respondent explained,  
During the last [Traditional Council meeting] we had, the deputy mayor and 
[another] told us that they saw [documents related to Herakles Farms] at a meeting 
they had in Kumba. They called all the quarter heads in a room and briefed us on all 
these things - that the land has already been given to [Herakles Farms]. And that the 
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area they want has already been drawn in that map and in other documents. We asked 
them this question; how did they know about that land that has been mapped out? 
A combination of power and social relations intersect to restrict the amount of rele-
vant information available to the majority of community members. Communities in Ndian 
division, unlike communities in Kupe Muanenguba, have previous experience of plantation 
agriculture and the implications to local communities given that PAMOL has existed in Ndi-
an since 1910.79 Previous knowledge might shape the discussion and the demands made by 
these communities since we believe they have learned from the mistakes of the communities 
who negotiated with PAMOL. Though these communities might have previous experience 
with such an investment, this had little or no impact on the outcome since they all favored 
implementation of the project and were apprehensive about the delay in the project com-
mencing. Also, some civil society organizations have been working in the area to provide 
information on the land transfer. A female respondent explained how access to information is 
enhanced through a local NGO: 
They have never met with us it is only Mr. Nassako whom through an NGO 
[SEFE] helps to give us information about what SGSOC is doing. He was the one 
who took our men to Limbe, gave them food, paid their transport and even kept them 
in a hotel when they went for the meeting. And the chief was very angry when he saw 
our men in the meeting and did not allow them to say a word until the meeting ended 
and since then we had not gotten any information. 
                                                
79 http://pamol-plantations.com/pamol_history.htm 
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The Director of Struggle to Economize Future Environment (SEFE) was later arrested 
for defamation of Herakles Farms and after a year in jail, he was sentenced to three years im-
prisonment or a fine of $2000, and damages of $20,000 to Herakles Farms (Farmland-
grabs.org). Some national NGOs have been restricted from entering two of the villages in the 
study area, and when they were granted access community members were discourage from 
attending these informational meetings for fear of negative repercussions.80 Most of the in-
formation (Environment and Social Impact Assessment report, etc.) pertaining to the invest-
ment is found online. Unfortunately, the majority of respondents indicated that they did not 
know what the Internet is. All information relevant to the transfer process, when available, is 
written only in English; most respondents were illiterate (especially women).  
A female respondent said, 
[Herakles Farms] usually paste information on the wall, if you don’t know 
how to read how will you know what it is talking about? I can’t read it. 
Often even when information is made available, local community members lack the 
educational capability or technical know-how to comprehend fully what the information 
means, and how it could affect the negotiation process. Sometimes vital information is not 
fully explained to local people, having severe implications for Free, Prior and Informed Con-
sent (FPIC). 
 
 
                                                
80 One national NGO was banned for carrying out sensitization activities within the project affected villages. 
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A Male respondent said, 
[Herakles Farms] brought a map [during one of the meetings] to show all the land 
that we have, but they did not show the area they wanted. So now we have to decide. The 
map indicated where the town is and where the forest is too. They did not show us where 
they wanted, we are just saying that if they come we will show them where they can go. 
The mechanisms of power and social relations that exist in these communities illus-
trates the ‘bundles of power’ that define the community’s bargaining endowment in relation 
to the land transfer process between Herakles Farms and the project affected villages. 
Conclusion  
Large-scale land transactions present opportunities and risks to local communities 
(von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Cotula 2009); and the inclusion of local people in the 
decision making process over the transfer of land rights to private investors is crucial to en-
sure long term sustainable development (McCarthy 2010). Development research has ex-
panded on the concept of community participation; more recently, emphasis has been fo-
cused on community participation in natural resource management (Cornwall 2002; Hickey 
et al. 2004; Maginnis et al. 2004). We extend this argument by adding that a community’s 
asset base will influence their capability to negotiate with these investors. Higher levels of 
community capitals (assets) and access to resources are positively related to a community’s 
capacity to respond to its access maintenance needs over land.  
Our analysis indicates that in a context in which communities have customary use 
rights, this could lead to uncertainty regarding decision-making authority over transfer of 
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land. Given the procedures implemented by Herakles Farms, local communities’ informed 
and voluntary consent in the transfer of rights is questionable and meaningful compensation 
can be problematic. Consultation with the chief and village authorities reflects foremost the 
strategic interests of these individuals, then possibly the interests of the community, if at all. 
In this case there are competing interest for power and how it affects the decision making 
process. Firstly power consolidated in the village authorities and senior government officials 
generates consensus within the villages that a hierarchical structure exist. The stronger the 
level of influence of the chief, the more likely the village members are going to have consen-
sus. The more divided power is within a village such as in the example of the community that 
had a dual power structure, the less likely will there be consensus with villages members be-
ing more willing to question and debate over the process. Furthermore, asset vulnerabilities 
and low asset stock might shape community perceptions of their needs, deriving meanings 
that would be very different from those in another community with full knowledge of the in-
vestment project and possible community integration strategies (outgrower schemes, etc.). 
Asset deficiencies (low human capital) also hamper the bargaining endowment of local 
communities because of the technical knowledge used during the negotiation process. Their 
access to information relevant to the negotiation process is curtailed due to low bond-
ing/bridging social capital, and low capital needs (financial and physical capital). Given this 
backdrop in order for villages to ‘negotiate,’ In the case of the villages examined, the majori-
ty of local community members favored letting the investor implement its project within their 
community. Even though there were questions surrounding how the project would be imple-
mented the majority of community members felt it was more development opportunity than 
risk, given that their village situation could only get better and not worse. Given this back-
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drop in order for villages to ‘negotiate’ most effectively, there is a need for information rele-
vant to the land deal to be made available to all community members. Also the creation of 
infrastructure to monitor and evaluate this land transfer process, provide services for griev-
ance reporting and ensure that redress is provided to affected community members is crucial 
to ensure effective participation within this process. We conclude that particular distinctions 
and variations in resource access within local communities shape the quality of village partic-
ipation in the decision-making process over the transfer of land rights to a land investor. The-
se place-based variations are crucial in understanding the negotiation processes over the 
transfer of land. 
Even though in Cameroon the laws and regulations concerning FPIC are weak and do 
not refer to ‘consent’ from local communities,81 we should not overlook the potential for 
agency from local communities to resist or consent to an interruption of their use rights over 
land. Rights defined by law, customs and conventions designate power and shape the ability 
to benefit from a particular resource. Agency, on the other hand, instigates the use of mecha-
nisms such as community mobilization82 that can influence the decision making process. In-
adequate ‘access’ combined with meager community capitals shape local capabilities to act 
collectively and also shape the meanings they give to their existence, impacting community 
agency to act or exert power within the negotiation process. 
 
                                                
81 Cameroon’s forest law (1994) provides an example of a community forest concession model that recognizes use rights of local communi-
ties over specific forest types (usually small and degraded areas). To meet the strict safeguards for REDD+, Cameroon requires FPIC of all 
forest communities potentially affected by REDD+ activities (Carodenuto et al. 2014).  
82Ribot and Peluso (2003) examined illicit mechanisms as an individual level factor which occurs when individuals cultivate relations with 
or posing counter threats to those who control access, I extend this mechanism to the community level in relation to community mobiliza-
tion – threats, violence, and collective action (Nesman 1981).   
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CHAPTER 3: GENDERED RESOURCE RELATIONS AND 
CHANGING LAND VALUES: IMPLICATIONS FOR WOM-
EN'S ACCESS, CONTROL, AND DECISION MAKING OVER 
NATURAL RESOURCES 
Abstract 
The processes by which transfer of agricultural land use right is planned and imple-
mented in the Global South are diverse, based on national contextual factors and involve 
multiple stakeholders. These processes depend on the statutory provisions, customary laws, 
and social, political and legal institutions within a particular society. Drawing on empirical 
data from semi-structured interviews conducted in mid-2014 in four communities in Came-
roon, I examine systemic processes that create and reproduce gender inequality within rural 
communities, shaping negotiation over the transfer of community land rights to a multina-
tional corporation. My research shows that current processes of transferring land-use rights 
are gendered and that these processes negatively affect women in particular and the commu-
nities to which they belong.  
 
 
 
 
Key Words: gendered resources; land transfer; land rights; rural development  
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Overview 
The rate and scale of large-scale land acquisitions (LSLAs) globally have increased 
exponentially in the past decade, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia (Borras et al. 2010; 
Cotula 2013; Cotula et al. 2009.). According to the Land Matrix database (Jan. 2014), global-
ly there were 870 large-scale land transactions concluded by November 2013 over 31.8 mil-
lion hectares – with a potential size of 54.5 million hectares. There are 186 additional deals 
(transnational deals where there has been an expression of interest, or the deal is under nego-
tiation) with a prospective size of 14.6 million hectares; while another reported 74 deals 
failed (negotiations failed or contract cancelled) with a projected size of 6.9 million hectares. 
A large proportion of targeted land, which was formerly under smallholder agriculture, stand-
ing volume (forest) or savannah, is converted into commercial large-scale agriculture.  
These investments bring with them social, economic and ecological opportunities and 
risks (Brklacich et al. 1997; Shiva 1997, 2002, Cotula et al. 2009; Byerlee 2013; Spieldoch et 
al. 2013; German et al. 2013). According to Cotula et al. (2009), land transactions could 
mean a development opportunity or investment risk for local people depending on the con-
text and processes involved. As a development opportunity, such transactions could mean 
employment creation, development of social infrastructure such as schools, health care facili-
ties, transportation linkages, and improved access to markets for local communities through 
access to value addition technology and supply chain networks (Cotula et al. 2009; Byerlee 
2013). There are also national level impacts such as GDP growth and increased government 
revenue in the long-term due to multiplier effect created within country and through interna-
tional trade. A majority of these agricultural investments, coupled with structural factors such 
as policy deficiencies regarding land tenure systems and property rights, have generated 
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changes in land use, rural livelihoods and property relations by transforming the agricultural 
landscapes – subsistence mixed-cropping to plantation mono-cropping (Byerlee 2013). In-
vestments have also increased economic vulnerability of smallholders and landless house-
holds through the elimination of small- and medium-scale farms, and restricted access to crit-
ical livelihood resources (Spieldoch et al. 2013).  
The displacement and resettlement of communities on new lands that are potentially 
less fertile or topographically inferior for crop production and land conflicts can increase the 
vulnerability of rural livelihoods, impede rural economic growth, and disrupt livelihood 
strategies and consequent food insecurity. The transfer of land rights to foreign investors may 
also result in the subordination of local labor, transforming their roles from landown-
ers/farmers to wage laborers/farm hands on plantations. Such agrarian transformations, in 
turn, have serious implications for marginal groups such as women and children who are im-
pacted disproportionately by these changes (Dauvergne et al. 2010; Borras et al. 2012; Peters 
2013). 
Legal Framework and Land Rights  
While most developing countries have ‘progressive’ land rights laws on paper, in 
practice they lack legal and procedural mechanisms to protect local rights and interests, live-
lihoods and welfare (Cotula et al. 2009:7). In most countries, rights to own and control land 
are gender neutral and in some cases specific provisions are made to ensure access to land for 
both men and women. On the other hand, Cameroon’s laws of succession and marital proper-
ty allow for patrilineal control over property (USAID 2010). Even though the statutory 
framework might exist guaranteeing access to land, the reality is usually very different with 
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social norms and customs interfering with the enjoyment of these rights for women. Consul-
tation with affected communities is required in most recent large-scale land acquisitions to 
take into consideration their demands concerning where and how such an investment will be 
executed, and to mitigate adverse effects on project affected populations. However, socio-
cultural norms and gender roles within society usually results in women being excluded in 
the decision making process over land and management of natural resources. The power im-
balance within traditional/customary settings effectively excludes most affected people from 
participating in the land deal consultation process (Behman et al. 2012:50) especially groups 
such as women, new in-migrants and the youth. According to Nhantumbo and Salomão 
(2010), in Mozambique community consultations on proposed land acquisitions “tend to be 
gender biased. Despite being the majority of the workforce in rural lands, women are rarely 
involved in the consultation processes and they almost never sign the respective re-
ports/documents” (2010:35). 
According to Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure’s Land Division 
(MINDAF), in Cameroon 60% of all formally registered land is found in urban areas with 
only 125,000 title deeds being issued between 1884 and 2008 (African Development Bank 
2009). Between 1980-2010, 86.6 percent of titled land in the South West and North West 
Regions was held by men, 9.6 percent by women; and 3.8 percent was jointly held (Sone 
2011). Land deals pose serious risks for local communities in general, but due to pre-existing 
gender and land dynamics; women are disproportionately affected within these communities. 
This paper examines the processes through which women are excluded from the negotiation 
process over the transfer of land use rights from local communities in Cameroon to a transna-
tional investor. How do local cultural beliefs interact with traditional gender hierarchies to 
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limit access to decision making processes at the village level?  More specifically, what are 
the daily interactional mechanisms that continue to reinforce exclusion of women from par-
ticipating in decision-making processes about land transactions? 
Gender, Land Transfer and Women’s Land Rights 
A growing body of research on large-scale land transactions shows that inclusive de-
cision-making regarding natural resource management and large-scale land transactions en-
hance positive and sustainable community outcomes (Colchester et al. 2007; Taylor 2007; 
Robinson 2008; Cotula et al. 2009). Few studies, however, have examined the processes by 
which women are included in or excluded from the consultations or the implications of wom-
en’s involvement in these processes (Chu 2011; Daley 2011; Julia and White 2012; Behrman 
et al. 2012; Piacenza 2012). Four factors, according to Daley (2011), contribute to women’s 
vulnerability during large-scale land transactions. Firstly, women encounter multiple con-
straints and forms of systemic discrimination in their efforts to access, own, and control land. 
Governmental authorities, for example, may not uphold women’s land rights. Secondly, gen-
dered socio-cultural and political relations contribute to women’s vulnerabilities, particularly 
in everyday tasks, family decision-making, and other decisions that affect their lives and live-
lihoods. Thirdly, women’s relative (cash) income poverty vis-à-vis men increase women’s 
vulnerability. Women’s relative income poverty is tied to but not fully determined by the dis-
crimination they face in relation to productive resources and to participation in decision-
making, both of which contribute to poverty, but it is an important different dimension of 
their vulnerability. Fourthly, women’s physical vulnerability, as manifested in gender-based 
and sexual violence against them is an important contributing factor.  
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Land tenure systems, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, involve nested claims that are 
based on use rights that have been transferred from one generation to another (Cousins 2009; 
Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Cameroon’s legal system is based on common and civil law, a 
bi-jural system reminiscent of its colonial history. Cameroonian statutory provisions guaran-
tee every person the use, enjoyment, and ability to dispose of property (Preamble Constitu-
tion; Land Ordinance, Ordinance No. 74-1 of 6 July 1974). The 1996 Constitution mandates 
equality of the sexes in the right to own property. In theory, this means both men and women 
can inherit, or purchase and own land in Cameroon. In practice, the reality is very different 
from these gender neutral non-discriminatory provisions on accessing land. Customary law 
derived from over 250 ethnic groups with diverse customs and religions accompanies Came-
roon’s legal system. According to Whitehead and Tsikata (2003), land in sub-Saharan Africa 
has been historically subject to multiple uses and multiple users, which recognizes the pres-
ence of different interests and claims in land vested in different persons. Though women can 
access land in sub-Saharan Africa, men and women seldom, if at all, have identical types of 
claims to land. This is as a result of the differentiated positions within society based on gen-
der that organizes access to land (Razani 2003; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003).  
According to Lastarria-Cornhiel (1997) individualization of property rights, especial-
ly over land in Africa, can lead to the concentration of land in the hands of those who can 
successfully assert ownership, such as community leaders and male household heads, often to 
the detriment of the access and use rights of poor rural women or ethnic minorities. Land ti-
tling in Cameroon falls under the authority of the Divisional Land and Consultative Board 
(DLCB) as stipulated in article 16 of Law No. 74/1 of 6th July 1974 (1974 Land Ordinance). 
The Board is under the supervisory control of the Minister of Land and State Properties, and 
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presided by the Divisional Officer (representative of the Minister of Territorial Administra-
tion). The DLC Boards of divisions are comprised of government officials (Divisional Dele-
gates), the village Chief and two notables from the particular area affected by the registration 
exercise and are usually all men.  
According to World Resource Institute (2013) there are 12 steps in the current land ti-
tling process in Cameroon. These 12 steps can be organized into three main stages: 
1. Preparation of the application and its local publication; 
2. Establishment of a local consultative committee, comprised of five local administra-
tive officials and three representatives of local traditional authorities to review the ap-
plication, resolve any contestation, and initiate a land survey; and 
3. The regional Ministry of State Property and Land Tenure (MINDAF) Delegation re-
views the application, signs the land survey report, DLCB meeting minutes, and pub-
lishes the demarcation notice in the regional Lands Gazette. If approved, the applica-
tion is transferred to the Lands Registrar and a title is issued. 
Given the composition of the DLCB, the land titling process is inadvertently gov-
erned by customary law since it relies on traditional rulers and village authorities to provide 
recommendations on the registration process. Peters (2004:277) comments that customary 
tenure ignores “considerable social inequality” and “evidence of encroachment by some 
groups on others for livelihood and/or commercial benefits, of state appropriation and illegal 
sales by traditional leaders.” Customary law and cultural prescriptions result in land policy 
that is perpetually discriminatory in shaping women’s access, use, and control of property. 
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Local Belief Systems and Exclusionary Forms of Governance 
 The belief system in most villages in Cameroon incorporates mysticism − traditional 
and religious beliefs. There are fundamental beliefs regarding leadership structure and power 
relations within local communities. These beliefs are expressed in a variety of specific prac-
tices and behaviors such as the attribution of awe-inspiring powers to certain individuals or 
households by a spirit or divinity. This ensures that power is handed down from generation to 
generation and shapes community members’ agency to resist exclusionary governance. The 
concentration of powers in the hands of a few depends on the shared assumption that they 
possess bodies of esoteric knowledge unavailable to the rest of the population (Haverkort et 
al. 2002). The investiture of Chief, nobles, and elders within local communities illustrates the 
underlying belief system of who has decision-making power in local communities. In each 
community, the Chief lays out the system of governance. These ‘laws’ are fluid and dynamic, 
depending on the power needs of his institution. The belief system underlying decision-
making in local communities also underlies other core sectors with importance attributed to 
hierarchical gender roles.  
For village notables, power to control outcome in one sphere (adjudication) is not dif-
ferent from that which is applied in another (marriage); that is, there seems to be a coherent 
and unified belief about the nature of power and who wields it within these communities. To 
understand why women are not included in the decision making process and why they do not 
resist disruptions in their access to land, we must appreciate how the belief system institutes 
structures of power that are based on secrecy and mysticism and are inherently gendered. Be-
cause these belief systems render even the idea of acting in a manner that contradicts the laws 
of local governance established by the Chief, women in these villages may not believe that 
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questioning their own exclusion from community decision-making processes is a viable op-
tion. 
We use three frameworks to analyze women’s access to land and the processes 
through which their exclusion from land transactions are perpetuated. The paper integrates 
the social relational approach articulated by Kabeer (1999) for defining gender relations as 
based on power, Rocheleau and Edmunds’ (1997) approach to the complexity and dynamism 
of gendered resource tenure regimes, and the framework of Schwalbe et al. (2000) which is 
especially useful for understanding the daily reproduction of gender inequality and women’s 
marginalization from land transactions. 
Social Relational Structures and the Reproduction of Gender Inequality through 
Social Interaction 
Kabeer’s social relational approach sets out to promote an understanding of the deep-
ly entrenched institutionalized nature of gender inequalities and the power relations that they 
express. It focuses on the relations of power within and between organizations and how une-
qual social relations result in unequal distributions of resources, claims and responsibilities. 
Kabeer (1994) emphasizes five dimensions of institutional social relations that are crucial in 
reinforcing inequality: rules, resources, people, activities and power. The approach points out 
that distinct actors and institutions may differentially reproduce relations of inequality across 
diverse institutional sites including households, families, the community, the market and the 
state. At the same time, these relations are potentially shaped and mediated differently, across 
these different sites. Individuals and/or groups who can define and interpret rules, mobilize 
resources etc. across a range of organizations, exercise most power. In this context, institu-
tions such as market, community, family/kin, state, ensure the production, reinforcement and 
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reproduction of social relations that result in social differences and inequality within society. 
Though the Land Ordinance is neutral regarding who should own property, the composition 
of organizations such as the DLCBs and its procedures inadvertently bias access to land with-
in Cameroon. The spiritual belief systems of these communities shape community members’ 
perceptions of ‘viable’ options regarding whether they can challenge decisions made under 
the customary structures of governance. The relative positions that women and men have in 
community economic, social and political institutions, in turn, shape their interests and struc-
ture their opportunities in decision making about access, use, and control over community 
resources. 
We also use a feminist political ecology conceptual framework (Rocheleau, Thomas-
Slayter, and Wangari 1996) in examining the critical role of gender in shaping resource ac-
cess and control, and how this phenomenon interacts with social structures and institutions 
(such as class and marital status) to shape the negotiation process over the transfer of land 
rights. We emphasize Rocheleau and Edmunds’ (1997) gendered spaces and places approach, 
which conveys the complex and fluid nature of resource access and control within communi-
ties. This approach highlights differences between men and women regarding: (i) rights to 
own land with formal title; (ii) spaces and places for using trees and forest resources and in 
exercising some control over management; and (iii) access to trees, forests and their products 
through several nested dimensions (gendered spaces). Gender differences in access to and 
use of resources in sub-Saharan Africa are shaped by ideologies, customs and norms regard-
ing ‘appropriate’ social and political relations between women and men. Based on institu-
tions of adjudication (customary and statutory) and the prevailing social ecological norms, 
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women and men have differing access to an array of landscape spaces and resources (Roche-
leau et al. 1995; Rocheleau and Edmunds 1997; Bassett 2002; Wooten 2003).  
We use Schwalbe et al.’s (2000) theorizing of ‘generic processes’ through which ine-
quality is created and reproduced to illustrate the mechanisms by which women are excluded 
from decision-making processes regarding the management of local resources, dispossessed 
of land and access to forest and forest products. Schwalbe et al. (2000) conceptualize four 
processes (othering, boundary maintenance, emotion management, and subordinate adapta-
tion) as being most central to the creation and maintenance of oppressive situations. These 
four processes, they argue, are ‘essential and generative’ in that any situation of inequality 
will inevitably depend on them for its existence. We will focus on these generic processes as 
mechanisms by which women are excluded from the land transaction process, lose access to 
land, forest and its resources. 
Othering refers to “the process whereby a dominant group defines into existence an 
inferior group” (Schwalbe et al. 2000:422). Othering can be direct and blatant, as well as sub-
tle. Schwalbe and his colleagues (2000) identify three sub-processes of othering: oppressive 
othering, implicit othering, and defensive othering. Oppressive othering entails dominant 
groups gaining advantage by defining other groups as inferior, reaffirming ideologies of dif-
ference, and commodifying subordinates through classification schemes and identity codes. 
Those in power (e.g., village authorities) can use their resources to present superior self-
images that by implication create and denigrate supposedly inferior others. Implicit othering 
and creating powerful virtual selves occur through obscuring realities, through fostering im-
pressions of competence and trustworthiness, and through fashioning moral identities. Sub-
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ordinates in claiming to be exceptions to group stereotypes carry out defensive othering. 
Thus essentially saying there may be others who are like this but I am different. 
To maintain their positions of power and to protect their resources, dominant groups 
use boundary maintenance. Boundary maintenance shows that differences between groups, in 
terms of resources and privileges, are not self-sustaining even after they are in place. It takes 
interactional work to secure the symbolic borders. Boundaries between the powerful and the 
less powerful are maintained by: i) transmission of cultural capital; ii) operation/controlling 
of network access; and iii) use (or threat) of interpersonal violence. The transmission of cul-
tural capital entails passing advantageous skills, habits, values, and tastes through socializa-
tion in families, schools, and workplaces (Schwalbe et al. 2000). By limiting access to cultur-
al capital, inclusion in and exclusion out of a group and stratification within groups can be 
justified. Controlling access to key networks can also reproduce inequality. Restricting ac-
cess within communities to those networks through which information is traded, decisions 
and deals are made, and rewards are disbursed reinforces inequality. The threat of and use of 
violence is a more active and aggressive mechanism in maintaining boundaries within collec-
tives. 
Subordinate adaptation refers to strategies used by members of a secondary group to 
adapt to their inferior status. Schwalbe et al. (2000) propose three main strategies that rein-
force inequalities; trading power for patronage; forming alternate subcultures; and hustling or 
dropping out. The first strategy involves accepting inferior status, while seeking ways to gain 
from relationships with members from the dominant group. The second strategy occurs when 
collectives or groups with similar subordinate status collaborate to create alternate prestige 
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hierarchies, and forms of power. While dropping out could mean the withdrawal of participa-
tion by people who are fed up with powerlessness and disrespect. All of these strategies 
aimed to adapt to situations of inequality, in turn foster the existence of divisions between 
dominant and subordinate groups.  
Emotion management refers to the strategies used to deal with the emotions generated 
due to inequality. Schwalbe et al. (2000) explain how inequality is reproduced intentionally 
and unintentionally through three types of emotion management: regulating discourse, condi-
tioning emotional subjectivity, and scripting mass events. Regulating discourse is accom-
plished by using language (both speech and writing) as an ‘emotional anesthetic’ and as a 
‘rationalist discourse’ (Schwalbe et al. 2000:435). Emotions such as shame, anger, resent-
ment, and hopelessness generated in the less powerful due to inequality can be dealt with by 
regulating discourse that could arouse emotions and mobilize action. This strategy involves 
the careful use of metaphors by village authorities to desensitize subordinates from their neg-
ative feelings and encourage them to act to maintain inequality. Conditioned emotional sub-
jectivity refers to an individual’s acquired habit of attributing meaning and making sense of 
events. Emotional work is used in interpreting events in a way that seems logical or justifies 
inequality. While ‘scripting’ of emotion inducing events refers the orchestration of meaning 
(e.g., through rituals), interpretation, or discourse to bring about an intended emotional re-
sults. 
Women and Changing Value of Land 
There are two arguments concerning women’s land rights that are important in struc-
turing our discussion. The first argument holds that community members hold a bundle of 
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rights over natural resources and that these rights are hierarchically organized with men hav-
ing primary rights and women holding secondary rights (Agarwal 1994; Rocheleau et al. 
1995; Lastarria-Cornhiel 1997; Kevane 2004). Therefore, when the value of land changes or 
there is economic transformation within society, women’s lesser rights are interrupted and 
they lose access to land. On the other hand, another argument on women’s land rights hold 
that there is no hierarchical structure in the organization of rights over natural resource man-
agement (Gray and Kevane 1999; Razani 2003; Whitehead and Tsikata 2003; Ribot and 
Peluso 2003). Women and men hold similar rights of access, use, and control over land but 
during periods of transformation such as national land reforms, women’s rights to land are 
redefined based on fluid social and economic rules and norms within local communities. 
Moser (1993) has pointed out that state-codified, individual forms of land allocation and re-
settlement often unintentionally weaken women’s rights to land. Recent studies of the gen-
dered dynamics of land tenure have further explored the systematic discrimination that wom-
en have experienced in the process of globalization (Tsikata and Golah 2010), and in land 
reforms (Jacobs 2010). We believe that these two arguments complement each other. Wom-
en’s land rights vary between regions, countries, and even within countries. There are situa-
tions where women have secondary rights to land based on social relations such as through 
marriage; but there are also circumstances where women possess ‘rights’ of control, and al-
ienation based on kinship or familial lineage. “The question of who gains access to land and 
on what terms can only be understood by seeing how control over land is embedded within 
the broader patterns of social relations” (Toulmin and Quan 2000b:6). 
Patterns of resource use are changing under the growing number of large-scale land 
acquisitions for commercial production, and this is changing the relative access to resources 
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(land) of women and men. Changes of one type, e.g., in the market value of a particular re-
source, may affect other aspects of resource management (Leach 1992:17). Changes in the 
use of land and the values of products can affect ways in which access to resources is divid-
ed, with differential effects on women and men. During times of rapid economic transfor-
mation, in this case a large-scale land transaction, relations of access and control can seem 
very elusive to individuals and groups who wield little power within the community. This 
elusiveness typically gives men more control over natural resources within local communi-
ties (Rocheleau et al. 1996). These gendered relations change and are constantly renegotiated 
at the inter- and intra-household levels, thus leading to fluid interpretations and implementa-
tion of the rules of resource access and control (Rocheleau et al. 1996; Piacenza 2012). Pia-
cenza (2012) illustrates how women in Kalangala, Uganda, faced several constraints in ac-
cessing arable land during and after the implementation of an oil palm project. The underly-
ing power relations, and women’s lack of access to social networks, limited control over fam-
ily income, and their relative weakness in addressing authority and accessing political circles 
vis-à-vis men shaped the negotiation over access, control and use of land. This caused most 
women to rely on intra-household negotiations over land use rights, which were in turn influ-
enced by the woman’s social status in the community, and the degree of inequality in terms 
of asset ownership and participation in household decision-making. 
Several studies show that with changing uses for land, particularly with new crops 
and forms of agriculture, contestations take place between men and women (Davison 1988b; 
Carney and Watts 1990; Moore and Vaughan 1994). This is a dynamic process of changing 
rights. When land becomes scarce or rises in value, or when rights are formalized through 
titling or registration, rights to access and use land can become secondary and tenuous (Gray 
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and Kevane 1999:16). Changing values of land are the proximate causes of the erosion of 
women’s land rights, and diminishing access to land. As land increases in value, individual 
men and local village authorities find it in their interest to renegotiate and challenge the di-
rect and indirect ties that support women’s rights to land. Although there are examples where 
women do maintain their land access in these contestations (Piacenza 2012), the weight of 
evidence suggests that economic changes have resulted in women’s diminished access to 
land. Carney (1988, 1993) and Carney and Watts (1990) have documented a particularly vis-
ible example of gender conflicts over land in the Gambia, where men re-labeled as ‘house-
hold’ land farms that had once been women’s ‘private’ fields, thereby wresting control from 
women of rice lands for a new irrigation project. Here men use the language of custom to 
dominate a new economically rewarding form of agriculture. Fortin (2011) records similar 
experiences of women in Cempaka Village, Indonesia, who lost rights to their inherited land 
when their husbands registered themselves as smallholder farmer candidates using their land.  
The desire to establish palm oil plantations on land formerly held and cultivated un-
der customary tenure brings a swift and radical transformation of the social, economic, and 
political structure of the local community as well as the environment (Colchester et al. 2006; 
Julia and White 2012; Piacenza 2012). Carney’s (1996:183) case study demonstrates how 
socio-spatial relations and rights to resources are not ‘a codification of immemorial tradition’ 
but are continually being renegotiated under changing circumstances. The customary land 
tenure system is based on history; it is flexible and embedded in local social relations, and 
conflicting claims can be negotiated on the basis of a series of principles and not on a series 
of rules (Whitehead and Tsikata 2003). Research has highlighted the power relations and 
bargaining processes that affect decisions about resource use, and the ways that social and 
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economic changes (in the commercial value of particular products) can alter the terms on 
which such negotiations take place (Whitehead 1990; Gray et al. 1999). 
Methods 
Drawing on empirical data collected in mid-2014 in four rural communities in Came-
roon, Africa, the paper provide insights on the negotiation process over land and the process-
es through which the changing value of land affects women’s access, use and control over 
land. Data were collected using individual and group interviews, participant observation, and 
documents related to the land transfer. Data collection processes were guided by feminist po-
litical ecological approaches for understanding how micro-politics of gender interact with 
meso- and macro-level agroecological and political economic processes affecting women’s 
poverty and empowerment (Rocheleau et al. 1996; Kabeer 1999; Razavi 1999; Whitehead 
and Lockwood 1999:549-552). Data analysis involved deductive logic – coding based on the 
concepts identified by Schwalbe et al. (2000) for reproducing social inequities in everyday 
social interactions. Analyses also were conducted inductively, allowing for the identification 
of new categories and mechanisms derived from the data.  
We examine four case studies involving communities in the South West Region of 
Cameroon, which are in various stages of negotiating the transfer of land use rights to a mul-
tinational corporation. The South West region is located in the moist forest zone with mono-
modal pluviometry. This equatorial zone is home to the Bayang Mbo Sanctuary, the Bakossi 
Mountains, the Rumpi Hills, and the Korup National Park – four protected areas of High 
Conservation Value (HCV). Communities are dependent on forest livelihoods – hunting and 
gathering, and a rural agrarian economy based on forest products – seeds, leaves, barks, and 
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fruits. Some of the farmers (majority male) grow cocoa and palm trees as cash crop in addi-
tion to subsistence farming for staples such as plantains and cassava (‘women’s crops’). 
Cameroon has a long history with oil palm plantations with the first commercial plan-
tations established in 1907 under German colonial administration around Mt. Cameroon 
(South West region) and Edea (South region). The South West region is home to the largest 
agro-industrial (oil palm) companies in Cameroon – the Cameroon Development Corporation 
(CDC) and PAMOL Limited (previously of Unilever). Cameroon is the world’s 13th largest 
producer of palm oil (Hoyle and Levang 2012) and produces approximately 200,000 MT of 
palm oil per year and exports 35,000 MT (Achobang et al. 2013). The Cameroonian govern-
ment has instituted a development plan – Vision 2035, which has given the development of 
agro-industrial plantations a high level of political and economic priority hoping to promote 
the creation of employment, and subsequently economic growth and development (Came-
roon Vision 2035). 
In 2009, the Cameroonian government (represented by the Minister of Economy, 
Planning and Regional Development)83 signed a contract with SG Sustainable Oils Came-
roon PLC (SGSOC) – a subsidiary of Herakles Farms, an affiliate of Herakles Capital, an 
American private investment company with an Africa focus (Nguiffo and Schwartz 2012). 
The contract gave SGSOC claims over 73,086 hectares of land in Ndian and Kupe-
Manenguba Divisions of South West Cameroon through a 99-year land lease. The project 
would produce approximately 400,000 MT of crude palm oil and 40,000 MT of palm kernel 
oil per year. By December 2012, SGSOC had planted four palm nurseries and cleared over 
                                                
83 Provisions of article 7 of decree no. 76/166 of 27 April 1976 on state lands hold that land leases of below 50 hectares are 
signed by the Minister in charge of lands and land leases of above 50 hectares are authorized by Presidential Decree 
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60 hectares of forest. Amid international and domestic criticisms of the socio-ecological im-
plications of the project and the procedures of consultation, acquisition and implementation, 
the President of Cameroon signed three decrees84 (November 2013) granting SGSOC a tem-
poral concession of 19,843 hectares of land for three years in the South West region.  
Results and Discussion – Mechanisms of Gender Subordination 
There are three types of land use rights within this region - state, community, and 
family. State land refers to delineated conservation areas such as forest reserves and nature 
sanctuaries. Community land refers to land that is under the control of the community and is 
being managed by the Traditional Councils. Family owned land refers to land that historical-
ly has been assigned to families within a particular village. This land can be passed from one 
generation to another; it can be titled or can be sold to non-family members with the consent 
of male members of the family and approval of the Traditional Council. When asked to de-
scribe their village’s interactions with Herakles Farms a female community member said; 
We only heard from people [from another village] since our village did not 
like the idea of [Herakles Farms] coming here; most of our lands are hilly and the on-
ly [flat] land we have is this place that [Herakles Farms] has taken. We kept this place 
as a reserve forest that our children can use even if we are not here tomorrow. We 
were not ready to sell it to anybody but they have already taken it without seeing us. 
In every community, there are distinct actors involved in the negotiation processes. 
Actors can be categorized from most powerful to least powerful: powerful men, less power-
                                                
84 Decree n. 2013/418 of 25 November 2013 attributes 5,384 hectares in the Mundemba Sub-division, Ndian Division; De-
cree n. 2013 2013/416 of 25 November 2013 attributes 13,195 hectares in the Nguti Sub-division, in Kupe-Muanenguba 
Division; Decree n 2013/417 attributes 1,264 hectares in Toko Sub-division, Ndian Division. 
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ful men, powerful women, and less powerful women. The powerful men are usually village 
notables and elders who have authority within the village through their affiliations to secret 
and mystic social groups and access to socioeconomic and political resources. These men 
have decision-making power within the community and also influence how outside forces 
interact or impact other community members. They have extensive rights over natural re-
sources within their villages. Less powerful men also have rights to land, but this is limited to 
their familial designated land assignments. This group includes men with weak social net-
works, non-natives, and youth. Powerful women are women who are married to, mothers of, 
and children of village authority figures or members of women’s secret and mystic groups. 
Less powerful women include women with limited social networks, limited political and 
economic resources, and youth. The negotiation over access to land takes place at three dif-
ferent levels - national, community, and household levels. Women lose out in all three levels 
because they are not involved in the decision making process. Even when bargaining within 
the household, they lose out if they have limited access to resources and face inequality in 
decision making. 
In all four communities, women have always had access to land. When asked if they 
own the land they farm, all women who were interviewed said yes, but when asked if they 
could sell or lease their land, 90% responded that women could not sell land or they would 
require permission from male relatives, in-laws or traditional council. 
Since I was born here we just use to go into the bush and start working and automati-
cally the place will belong to you. The other [piece of land] is the one my father died 
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and left. Yes a woman can own land… No, a woman has no right to sell it. But my 
child can take it and continue. A woman is not allowed to sell land. 
Another woman said, 
A woman has no power to own land; if you see a woman who owns land it should be 
somebody that [inherited] from the father. A woman can go into the forest and start 
working her own ‘bush’ but it does not mean that she owns the land. She has no right 
to sell or give it out for anything. 
And another responded, 
[A]s a woman you have no right to sell land; only men can do that. 
Women engage in the cultivation of annual crops, while men engage in planting tree 
crops, i.e., palm, cocoa, and coffee trees. Women gather fruits and seeds from forest trees and 
leaves from vines in the forest, and can cut down branches (with permission from a male au-
thority figure) but cannot cut down a whole tree. Men, on the other hand, are able to gather 
and cut down trees within familial land or with the permission of the Traditional Council if a 
tree is found on community land. Women can inherit land from their father or husband but 
can only dispose of it with the consent of a male family member and sometimes the in-laws 
(if the husband’s property).  
A widowed respondent said, 
…if I have to give [my land] to another person, I will have to consult my husband’s 
people first. If they agree, then I will [sell] but there are conditions.  
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As previously noted, we focus our results on an analysis of the qualitative data that is 
guided by Schwalbe et al.’s (2000) theorizing of ‘generic processes’ through which inequali-
ty is created and reproduced in everyday life. These processes include othering, boundary 
maintenance, subordinate adaptation, and emotion management. As our discussion below 
illustrates, the exclusion of women from decision-making processes regarding local resource 
management, their dispossession of land, and their reduced access to forest and forest prod-
ucts involved multiple subtle practices in addition to the overt acts of exclusion that the 
women experienced. 
Change in access and control over natural resources is intentional when men actively 
take over spaces that were previously utilized by women, restrict women’s access or trans-
form the landscape by incorporating agricultural systems that are very different from how 
women previously used the space.  As an old woman explained, 
There are a lot of women whose farms are found in this area that the 
company wants, land that women got after their husbands died and left cocoa 
farms. They [SGSOC] said they would pay cash. We have a lot of land around 
[the designated area] and they have taken it. I don't know who gave them. 
There is nobody who has come to talk to me about the land. We don't have a 
lot of land. There are other people who have larger farms. The SDO [Senior 
Divisional Officer] and DO [Divisional Officer] … are aware that we do not 
want to give our farmland. 
Coupled with these overt acts of dispossession, were many subtle and cumulative ac-
tions that helped to solidify men’s control while severely limiting women’s participation in 
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decision-making process and, in turn, control over community natural resources. When asked 
who is involved in the negotiation and compensation process, a female respondent said 
“They are going to negotiate with the men. When they are through with the men they may 
want to talk to individuals then maybe they will meet us.” 
Othering 
Women who participated in interviews and focus groups reported that land on which 
they had previously planted food crops or left to fallow was taken over by men in the village 
who planted palm trees beginning after the drawing up of a Cahier de Charges between the 
investor and the localities. The men in the village hope to take advantage of the potential 
market for palm products that would be created by the establishment of a palm plantation 
nearby. The data collected for this study indicate that processes of ‘othering’ were instrumen-
tal to the process whereby village men successfully took over lands previously used by wom-
en.  Men’s ‘othering’ practices involved the redefinition of personal rights and social identity 
for locals according to whether they were cast by powerful village men as ‘natives’ or 
‘strangers’. These categories were then became a part of local hierarchies of status, influence 
and power in community decision-making. Othering entails the invention of categories and 
systems of meaning about what mark people as belonging to these categories. Meanings are 
created that shape consciousness and behavior, such that inequality is directly or indirectly 
reproduced (Schwalbe et al. p.423). Within these communities, both men and women engage 
in selective othering to categorize groups that have less right to participate in the decision-
making process. As a female community member said, 
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How could they say that I am not an indigene of […….]? Just because 
of money? So they think they can say I am not a [native] woman and give my 
land away? …“Since they say I am not a [native] woman, my father was Dou-
ala [non-native], and he ran the estate [PAMOL] here. My mother was [na-
tive]. Because my grandfather gave a piece of land for the estate [PAMOL] to 
build…, now they think they can go back there and build a camp [SGSOC] 
without asking me? And call me a stranger? 
Through the creation of these categories non-natives are locked out of the negotiation 
process even though they might own land that would be affected by the transfer. Identity 
codes are formed that make it impossible for members of a subjugated group to signify fully 
creditable selves. The definition of non-native is fluid; both parents may not be natives of 
that village, or one parent might not be a native of the village. The label of non-native is used 
selectively on men and women who are in turn locked out of the negotiations. This has se-
vere repercussions for these individuals or households because a dominant group determines 
access to land and compensation for loss.  
The dominant group within these communities uses the process of othering through 
the creation of powerful virtual selves. These virtual selves are based on the underlying spir-
itual belief system of these communities. In some villages, the notables have created a sub 
group from the traditional council with extraordinary powers over decision-making. As a fe-
male community member explained, 
They have a special group that is informed when the investors are 
coming for a meeting. In every community there are nobles and common peo-
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ple. … Sometimes when the chief is around, it’s just the men. Like what I said 
before about the noble people. Sometimes some of us have no idea about what 
is going on. We just hear the decisions that have been taken. Like this compa-
ny some of us are not informed… 
This induces feelings of awe and fear that help to legitimate inequality and deter dis-
sent. The links between power and secrecy run deep in these communities, and the necessity 
of mystification, is an important facet of village power relationships. Other labels have been 
created within these communities to justify the exclusion of women from the process. A 
number of respondents explained that women were not invited to meetings ‘because they talk 
a lot’ or because they are ‘too angry and cannot control’ what they will say. A female re-
spondent explained, “They don’t tell us everything, they tell us some and some they say that 
it is only for the men because women talk a lot.” Another female respondent from another 
village said, “Only men attend these meetings [women] are not part of it. I think because 
women talk a lot, [the men] think that we can say things that are not correct.” The categoriza-
tion that is generated and identity codes developed are recreated, and reinforced through oth-
er generic processes such as boundary maintenance. 
Boundary Maintenance 
There are two processes through which boundary maintenance occurred in the villag-
es, by controlling network access and the threat and use of violence. Reports of ‘boundary 
maintenance,’ for example, are evident when village authorities (principally men) respond to 
changes in land value without involving women (as a group) in negotiations over resource 
rights. In each community studied, women’s roles in the decision making process were min-
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imal or non-existent. Women were left out of the consultation and negotiation process; they 
were either not invited to consultations, or meeting times and places effectively eliminated 
the participation of women given their roles within the household and community.  
In some cases the ensuring dispossession is unintentional, especially when women's 
resource use, knowledge and practices are unrecognized, unacknowledged, and by-passed. A 
female respondent explained concerning their village negotiation, “Because the women were 
angrier than men, they were not called to the meeting that is why they worked mostly with 
the men.” For example during resource mapping activities in some communities, the invita-
tion specifically called ‘men’ to attend, essentially excluding women from decisions regard-
ing the land they use. As an interviewee put it, 
The meetings are strictly on invitation. If you are not invited you can't 
go there. The meeting of today [resource mapping meeting] we were not in-
vited. They have never said that ‘there is a meeting if any one has something 
to say they should attend.’ They will say the DO [District Officer] has called a 
meeting and it is strictly on invitation. If they don't invite you how would you 
go there? 
An older woman said, 
Only men were called for the meeting that concerned the demarcation 
of our land, only men were sent out to do the marking [GPS coordinates]. 
This resulted in a resource use map that did not adequately reflect women’s use of 
land and forest resources. During subsequent validation meetings with the community, the 
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NGO facilitators had to probe the largely male attended meeting to think in terms of wom-
en’s resource use. The absence of women in such meetings could lead to women’s use of 
community resources being made ‘invisible’ by poorly drawn maps. Not only will women 
lose out, but the whole community loses when using such a map as a bargaining tool with the 
government or investor. In Julia and White’s (2010) study of palm oil deals in Indonesia, 
‘consultations’ over land were conducted exclusively with male chiefs and, as a result, the 
perspectives and needs of local women were left out of the negotiations. Boundaries are also 
created and maintained by institutions in ways that privilege those with the most resources. 
Schwalbe (2015) notes that boundaries can be created through symbolic processes in which 
shared expectations hold group members accountable for enacting specific behaviors, or risk 
repercussions from the group. For example, World Bank and IFPRI (2010) reported that 
preferences of women may be overlooked or ignored because women do not own land or be-
cause of the pervasive misconception throughout Africa that ‘women don’t farm.’ In our 
study sites, a general theme was that ‘woman no get palaver for land’ meaning women are 
not concerned with land matters. Thus justifying women’s minimal involvement in the con-
sultations and negotiations processes.   
Through exclusionary governance, access to the key networks through which infor-
mation is traded, decisions and deals are made, and rewards are disbursed, is regulated. The 
chiefs, and notables (which are usually all men) of each village make up the traditional coun-
cil. The traditional council in all of these villages interacts directly with the investor, and 
government representatives. There is a network that has been created that is predominantly 
male which determines what land will be given, how much land, at what price. Members of 
this network choose who should be invited to participate and who not. To be cut out or left 
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out of this network is to lose influence and power over the land transfer decision-making 
process. A young woman described, 
We hear them talking about it when they are leaving their meeting, 
when they are discussing in the bars, when they are talking amongst them-
selves about what happened in the meeting. That is how we know what was 
discussed in the meeting… “They do not call these women [the women who 
have land in the affected area]. The women will only know when the Caterpil-
lar is there to bulldoze the forest, that is when they will know. 
In some cases, there were reports of threats and intimidation being used to discourage 
women’s participation. When people get ‘out of place’ because inequality becomes too much 
to bear, violence or the threat of violence, and intimidation can be used (Schwalbe et al. 
2000). Violence, defined as the application of damaging force to human bodies – may be 
necessary to protect male power and privilege, and to ensure that boundaries do not break 
down. An interviewee explained, 
When it has gotten to the stage of consultation, when you want to dis-
agree, they will say ‘sit down, SIT DOWN’. They don’t even know what you 
want to say. Allow everyone to talk, when they do that I feel very inferior and 
I stop talking. 
In this case – degrading remarks, threat of violence, imprisonment, and even punish-
ment by cancelling social benefits to children of particular households has been used to keep 
women in their place. 
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They kept saying that they should not take my son [for holiday em-
ployment]. People in this village wrote. My son is in the second year at the 
University of … studying science and technology. They wrote a report that I 
originate from [a different village], that my son’s father is [a non-native] so he 
is not supposed to have a scholarship from SGSOC… They cancelled his 
scholarship; they did not give him a holiday job. 
Bending and Taylor (2009) reported the use of intimidation in the acquisition process, 
while Daley (2011) in the case of Zimbabwe reports that women household heads who do not 
have access to men’s social networks are particularly at risk, especially when the land admin-
istration bodies are male dominated. The effect is that it limits women’s access to people and 
places from which they might acquire the resources needed to challenge men for power 
(Chafe 1977; Gardner 1995).  
The next two generic processes − subordinate adaptation and emotion management − 
illustrate why women or subordinates do not resist exclusionary governance and instead rein-
force inequality. 
Subordinate Adaptation 
Instead of challenging these exclusionary processes, women often accept less in-
volvement in exchange for the satisfaction of being called upon once in a while – subordinate 
adaptation. In two communities, an alternate women’s adjudication group had been institut-
ed. These groups were in charge over the adjudication of ‘women’s matters,’ domestic dis-
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turbance, quarrelling between women, gossiping etc. Matters of land were left clearly in the 
hands of the men within the ‘men’s’ Traditional Council.  
I am the president of the Women’s Council, but I don’t take a lot of 
decisions about anything. Most of the decisions we as women make, we have 
to go back to our men; husbands, brothers, male in-laws. 
In some sense this is reproductive of inequality because now problems are classified 
as important and non-important, thus women’s problems and concerns are not important to 
be brought up at the Traditional council. This reinforces the subordinate role of these women, 
and preserves this exclusive structure of decision-making. In some cases the women’s group 
may not challenge the men hoping that they will be integrated into the larger decision making 
hierarchy. Powerful women can gain additional benefits by agreeing to play the ‘rules of the 
game’; rules that disadvantage all women. This hegemonic bargain between the powerful 
men and the powerful women within the community circumvents opposition, which in turn 
perpetuates the role of dominant and subordinate (Kandiyoti 1988). 
Through the hegemonic bargain, a few women (powerful women) may have succeed-
ed in creating alternative prestige hierarchies, and forms of power. Thus the adaptation that 
allowed these women to earn respect can also engender perceptions, habits, and circumstanc-
es that virtually ensure the reproduction of inequality. Adaptive subcultures have a reproduc-
tive effect in part because they allow psychic needs to be met, despite subordination 
(Schwalbe et al. p.428). The dominant group often tolerates or even encourages the formation 
of such adaptive subcultures, since they function to mitigate overt resistance and to stabilize 
relations of inequality.  
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Sustaining a system of inequality, one that generates destabilizing feelings of anger, 
resentment, sympathy, and despair, requires that emotions be managed. This involves manip-
ulating the cognitive processes through which individuals and subordinate groups make sense 
of events, with dominant groups orchestrating the process and generating meaning and inter-
pretations that justify inequality. 
Emotion Management 
Emotion management was evident through regulating discourse. There are fears and 
worries about the land transfer, 100 percent of the women interviewed opposed the land 
transfer or had worries based on the uncertainty of transgenerational transfer – transfer of re-
sources (land) to future generations (children, grandchildren, great grandchildren etc.). But a 
majority of the women are resigned to the inevitable, mainly because of fear of being pun-
ished for protesting or social exclusion for being the ‘odd one out’. As a female respondent 
explained, 
When men have decided, we just follow their decision. Who am I to 
say that I do not like the decision? When a man says it is correct, I do not op-
pose. If not for the fact that women have been educated now, and are involved 
in some issues, it is the men who know good and bad things for us. Who am I? 
You cannot oppose someone who is above you. You cannot oppose the ‘big’ 
man, even when you know that he is wrong. If someone wants to take your 
land by force you pray to God, what can you do? 
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Another woman explained, 
… some of us are not informed, if you want to ask for explanations, 
then they will say, ‘you are one of those who are against the company,’ 
whereas you just want information. 
Inequality is reproduced as emotions are subtly shaped by symbolic and material cul-
ture through the use of discourse that justifies inequality. Discourse is more than talking; it is 
a way of talking. To regulate discourse a set of formal or informal rules about what can be 
said, how it can be said, and who can say what to whom, can be imposed (Schwalbe et al. 
2000). The discourse in these villages is a rationalist one “for the good of our people.” The 
traditional council uses a language of returns – ‘development opportunity’, ‘for the good of 
our people’ – that keeps individual strategic interests at bay and facilitates the pursuit of this 
general developmental interest. Consultation meetings are organized and discussion is 
framed within the general discourse (development opportunities) preferred by the investor 
and the Traditional council. Individuals who are unwilling to accept this discourse are labeled 
selfish, discredited and excluded. This discourse has become a powerful tool for reproducing 
inequality, because it can serve not only to regulate thought and emotion, but also to identify 
‘others’ and thus maintain boundaries as well. 
In some cases, even when women were angry about their ‘exclusion’ from the deci-
sion making process, it was counter to cultural prescriptions for them to voice their concerns 
about ownership, access, and use of land.  
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We talk about it [land transfer decision] in our women's group meet-
ing. We grumble, we grumble, we always grumble. … we don't have the op-
portunity to talk about it to the DO, Mayor, or the Chief. We just grumble and 
keep it in our heart. 
According to Oxfam (2010:4), women often lack the confidence to ‘voice’ their con-
cerns about ownership, access and use of land. A young female respondent said,  
This land transfer has directly affected me so badly that I don’t know what to do. 
Those evil people have put their lines and their mapping thing in my farm and that is the 
only place where all my farms in this world are found…What is negotiation? they are 
not doing anything neither have they said anything, they have not said anything to me… 
Haa! Who am I? Do I have money? Don’t you know that in Cameroon those who have 
money are the people they listen to? They have been holding so many meetings but I 
have never attended even one because I don’t know what I will go and do [at a meet-
ing]? 
Even though she clearly has a problem, she prefers to stay back and not express her 
frustration and anger over her dispossession of 20 ha of land she inherited from her father. 
Village authorities have not sought to invite her into the negotiation forum especially since 
her farm is found within the GPS coordinated specified by the presidential decree. Another 
female whose farm is also affected and did attend a meeting explained,  
I attended the first meeting they held and I cried to those white men. I explained 
that I don’t have a place to go and that my family will die if they take that farm from me 
  
 
148 
but nobody listened to me. Mr. […] and Dr […] were all there and the white man who is 
the manager. Even after I cried they had no interest. [Herakles Farms] has no interest in 
human beings, they have interest only in planting their palm nuts. I do not go to any 
more meetings even though they announce it… If I had money I would hire 20 lawyers 
to fight against [Herakles Farms] but since I don’t have money, what can I do? 
Scripting mass events entails ritualizing behavior to condition people to respond ac-
cording to the situation with appropriate emotions. Nhantumbo and Salomao’s (2010) study 
in Mozambique indicates that in consultations, certain topics (such as job creation or reset-
tlement) are positively emphasized, whereas others (such as potential environmental effects) 
are scarcely discussed. The point is that when mass events are scripted and controlled by the 
dominant group, emotional responses and connections are crafted in its interest. A misrepre-
sentation of information has potential gender dimensions if perceived benefits of land deals 
will primarily benefit men (such as job creation in the formal sector) and negative ramifica-
tions of the projects that will particularly affect women (that is, increased difficulty in access 
to water and fuel) are overlooked or downplayed (Behrman et al. 2012). 
Conclusions 
No one explanation can perfectly illustrate how gendered process within communities 
shape outcomes for women especially regarding land. A broader understanding of the socio-
political and economic challenges hampering women’s participation in decision-making over 
the management of resources requires a mix of different perspectives from scholars and prac-
titioners. This paper illustrates mechanisms through which women are ‘locked out’ of the de-
cision making process using Schwalbe et al.’s mechanisms integrated in a context where so-
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cio-cultural and religious beliefs play an important role in preventing women from question-
ing this process of exclusion. Women’s exclusion has serious implications for community 
wellbeing and for women’s wellbeing, especially in the face of agrarian transformation fol-
lowing large-scale agricultural land transactions.  
Our research shows that current processes of transferring land-use rights are gendered 
and that these processes negatively affect communities, particularly women. The results of 
this study indicate that systemic overt forms of gender discrimination as well as unintentional 
gender subordination operate in a complementary manner. Excluding women from the nego-
tiation process affects the community’s bargaining capability since women’s knowledge is 
left out. Women being dispossessed of the land and sole means of livelihood can result in a 
reduction in food crop production, worsening food insecurity within these communities. 
Most of the women who were dispossessed were widows and mothers, increasing their vul-
nerability to poverty. Our analyses show that although there are differences across the four 
villages studied in the extent to which systemic ‘legalized’ discrimination and unintentional 
gender subordination occur, both forms exist simultaneously.  
Our results indicate further that the subtle mechanisms of othering, boundary mainte-
nance, emotion management, and subordinate adaptation help to reinforce gendered hierar-
chies of power while also minimizing women’s perceived options for resisting their own 
subordination. The creation and justification of an ‘other’ category becomes legitimized and 
normalized after a period of time. Resulting in a social stratification within these communi-
ties with natives at the top of the hierarchy with access to more resources, and non-natives 
(strangers) at the bottom with fewer resources. Keeping women out of the information loop 
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relevant to the transfer process reinforces the notion of men being superior and thus sole de-
cision makers within these communities thus justifying why women should be excluded. 
These mechanisms of exclusion can led women to adapt by creating separate ‘women’ only 
organizations that further impedes their access to information especially concerning compen-
sation for loss of land. The development narrative is reinforced within these women’s only 
groups. Their anger and frustration from being physically excluded and their perspectives 
omitted from the process is expressed with a sense of helplessness and fear of being heard, 
with hopes that a higher spiritual power will resolve their problem. These generic processes 
combined to maintain the status quo, recreating the gendered resource relations that exist 
within these rural communities. I incorporated a new subcategory – hegemonic bargaining to 
illustrate the heterogeneity within women and how powerful women act to maintain the sta-
tus quo and further subordinate those who are less powerful. Our finding provide a basis for 
identifying steps that could be taken to help communities understand how women’s direct 
participation in land transaction negotiations would benefit the community as a whole.   
Gender equitable and inclusive local involvement in the management of natural re-
sources, according to past research, has positive implications for sustainable community de-
velopment. Women have specific indigenous/local technical knowledge of foods, medicinal 
herbs, fibers, and fuel. These natural resources are often denigrated in local communities as 
‘women’s crops’ or materials. The management of women’s working spaces and places, in 
turn, often remain ‘invisible’ in men’s accounts of land use, and subsequently in community 
maps when women are excluded from mapping processes (Peluso 1995; Rocheleau et al. 
1996). Provisions for monetary compensation may also devalue women’s spaces, which 
means that compensation goes directly (and entirely) to husbands or other male community 
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members. Involving women in each phase of land-transaction negotiations could address 
each of these problems. Alternatively, if local communities continue to classify areas where 
women gather uncultivated resources as ‘unused,’ local men may inadvertently justify the 
transfer of such lands to a multinational agribusiness.  
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CHAPTER 4: POLICY SPACES FOR LAND NEGOTIATIONS 
IN CAMEROON: NEGOTIATION FORUMS AS INVITED 
SPACES 
Abstract 
Using data collected in 2014 and 2015 from a survey and semi-structured interviews 
in southwestern Cameroon, we examine how negotiation is carried out within Sithe Global 
Sustainable Oils Cameroon Project Affected Villages (SGSOC-PAV). SGSOC-PAV is a pol-
icy forum created in 2011 for negotiating the terms of a large-scale land transaction in Came-
roon’s South West region. We use Cornwall’s (2002) categories of ‘participatory govern-
ance’ to understand how this forum shapes implementation of the project. We explore the 
following questions in the context of SGSOC-PAV: Who is involved? How are decisions 
made? Who influences decisions within this forum? What is the intensity and quality of 
community members’ participation? What structures are in place for bottom-up and top-
down accountability?  
Our paper highlights negotiating opportunities for communities in this policy space − 
pooling bargaining power, prioritizing local decision-making and reinforcing responsibilities, 
and community empowerment. We argue that negotiations can legitimize investors’ demands 
when policy spaces are manipulated to introduce and promote agendas, which reflect outsid-
ers’ interests. We find that land transfer negotiation processes reflect differentials in power 
within these emerging spaces for decentralized governance. We argue that decision-making 
within this forum is geared towards legitimizing investor strategy with limited integration of 
community needs and provide policy recommendations for ensuring veritable participation. 
Keywords: Cameroon, land transfer, land deal, participation, policy spaces
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Overview 
Foreign investment in land connotes the lease or outright purchase of land by a for-
eign corporate or state investor for agricultural production (food or cash crop) or extraction 
(minerals, rare earth, etc.). Large-scale agricultural land investments can involve multiple 
and nested claims by communal groups, traditional authorities, households and individuals. 
There are differing processes through which transfer of agricultural land use rights is planned 
and implemented in the Global South. These processes involve multiple stakeholders depend-
ing on the statutory provisions, customary laws, and social, political and legal institutions 
within a particular society (Lewis 2008; Cotula 2009). 
Land contracts define the terms of an investment project, and distribution of benefits, 
risks, and costs. A land transaction could consist of multiple contracts and relate to bodies of 
law at the local, national, and international level (Cotula 2011). These contracts are typically 
signed between a central government agency (land provider) and an investor (acquirer). Even 
though there are usually only two parties to land deals, local communities also have a stake 
in the contract since legal transfer of use rights from the State to the land investor means re-
stricting community access to this resource. We study the negotiation process between Cam-
eroon’s government and a transnational company, Herakles Farms, over a forested region in 
the South West region of the country. Herakles Farms, a New York based investment com-
pany was operating under Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon (SGSOC), which was a 
recognized company in Cameroon. The company planned to establish an oil palm plantation 
in land concessions in two administrative divisions: Kupe-Muanenguba, and Ndian. In 2013, 
a presidential decree awarded the company 19,843 hectares (ha) of land on leasehold over a 
probationary three-year period with the possibility of a 99-year extension if certain condi-
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tions85 were fulfill during the probation period. In this case, the land deal also involves local 
people who have use rights based on customary law.  
Using data collected in 2014 and 2015 from a survey and semi-structured interviews, 
we examine how negotiation is carried out within Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon 
Project Affected Villages (SGSOC-PAV). SGSOC-PAV is a policy forum created in 2011 
for negotiating the terms of the large-scale agricultural land investment between Herakles 
Farms and affected local villages in Cameroon’s South West region. We use Cornwall’s 
(2002) categories of ‘participatory governance’ to understand how this forum shapes imple-
mentation of the project. We explore the following questions in the context of SGSOC-PAV: 
Who is involved? How are decisions made? Who influences decisions within this forum? 
What is the intensity and quality of community members’ participation? What structures are 
in place for bottom-up and top-down accountability? 
Large-scale agricultural land investments, coupled with structural factors (policy de-
ficiencies regarding land tenure systems and property rights) and personal greed have gener-
ated changes in land use, rural livelihoods and property relations (elimination of small- and 
medium-scale farming, restricted access to natural resources, land tenure conflicts, displace-
ment and resettlement of communities in new areas) (Cotula et al. 2009; Dauvergne and Ne-
ville 2010; White et al. 2012). In other instances, large-scale agricultural land investments 
can enhance know-how for agricultural production (Mackey 2011), technology transfer, ac-
cess to financial resources, wage employment, and incorporation in agri-food regimes 
through value chain development, development of transportation infrastructure, health care 
                                                
85 Conditions of the lease extension included, conducting an environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) in the new concession, 
the development of social facilities (schools, hospitals etc.), and payment of land rents totaling 200,000,000 FCFA into the divisional treas-
ury. 
  
 
160 
services, provision of educational services and basic utilities. This is especially true when 
indigenes are fully informed and consulted during Environmental and Social Impact Assess-
ment (ESIA), participatory mapping of customary lands, and included in negotiating the 
terms of the land transaction (what quantity of land is involved, where, sale or lease, and for 
how long). Community participation in the decision making process can generate inclusive 
incorporation such as cooperative, contract farming, out-grower schemes, that reflect the 
needs of local people (McCarthy 2010).  
This paper is sub-divided into four parts. The first part is on community participation 
and the social organization of SGSOCPAV, which highlights negotiating opportunities for 
communities in SGSOCPAV - pooling bargaining power, prioritizing local decision-making 
and reinforcing responsibilities, and community empowerment. The second part explains my 
research design and analysis. The third part describes the results, which illustrate the power 
differentials that exist within this emerging policy space for decentralized governance. I ar-
gue that negotiations can legitimize investors’ demands when policy spaces are manipulated 
to introduce and promote agendas, which reflect Herakles Farm’s interests. Lastly, I provide 
recommendations for transforming participation. 
Community Participation and SGSOV PAV 
The United Nations (1981:5) defined participation as ‘the creation of opportunities to 
enable all members of a community and the larger society to actively contribute to and influ-
ence the development process and to share equitably in the fruits of development’. Agenda 
21 (1.3) extends this definition and calls for “broadest public participation and the active in-
volvement of the non-governmental organizations and other groups” in environmental deci-
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sion-making. These definitions are vague and only explain what participation should look 
like. Community participation is defined as the direct involvement of ‘ordinary people’ in 
local affairs (Midgley 1986:23). This could mean anything that involves people and their in-
volvement could be reflected in many different levels of participation such as informing, 
consulting, etc.  
Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation is the best-known illustration of the inten-
tionality of participation. In her approach, participation is illustrated as a graduated scale 
along an axis of  ‘good’ to ‘bad’ (Fig 10), on one extreme there is ‘citizen control’, which is 
at the top of the hierarchical scale, while at the other extreme ‘non participation’ is depicted 
by ‘manipulation’ and ‘therapy’. In the middle of this hierarchy she places ‘tokenism’, in 
which she includes activities such as consultation, informing, and placation. Other similar 
normative typologies of participation exist such as those of Pretty (1995) and White (1996).  
 
Figure 10. Arnstein’s (1969) ladder of participation  
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Development practitioners and researchers recommend community driven develop-
ment and advocate that decisions are made by the people to be affected (Cernea 1985; 
Chambers 1997, 2014; Bebbington 1999; Roark 2015). Local stakeholders, if involved, are 
more likely to make decisions that will lead to their sustainable development. The proposi-
tion of participation is also backed by a rights-based approach to examining community in-
volvement in decision making over the transfer of land use rights in land deals (Cornwall and 
Nyamu-Musembi 2004; Colchester et al. 2013). Law No. 96/12 of 5 August 1996 relates to 
environmental management in Cameroon and is very important in providing insights regard-
ing community participation. According to Njamnshi et al. (2008) this law requires consulta-
tion of local communities in decisions relating to the environments and resources that they 
use. It also requires that relevant information should be made available to these communities 
in relation to the consultation process over environment and natural resource management 
decisions. This rights-based approach is also based on a structure of international and region-
al rules and principles such as the United Nations Declaration on Rights of Indigenous Peo-
ples (UNDRIP),86 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,87 the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa’s (UNECA) Land Policy Initiative that 
provides best practices in land policy, and the African Union’s Framework and Guidelines on 
Land Policy in Africa, which all mediate national policies to ensure local participation in the 
decision making over natural resource management.   
 The intentionality of participation in the land transfer process has been examined by 
a number of researchers (Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Ger-
                                                
86 UNDRIP was adopted in 2006. Its provisions, especially articles 8, 10, and 32 present a structure of rules protecting the rights of local 
peoples in relation to their access to natural resources (FPIC) and right to food. 
87 Article 11 requires States to respect, protect and fulfill the right to food. 
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man et al 2011; Yaro and Tsikata 2013). Concerns have been raised in relation to the quality 
of participation within the land transfer process (Borras et al. 2010; Oya 2013; Edelman 
2013; Scoones et al. 2013), but very little research has focused on the ‘how’ of the process; 
mechanisms involved within the process to ensure that all stakeholders are similarly involved 
in influencing decision making have hardly been documented within the issue of large-scale 
land investments88. 
Collective Action: Community policy spaces 
A number of working definitions exist on policy spaces exist.  McGee (2004:16) de-
fines it as ‘actual observable opportunities, behaviors, actions and interactions ... sometimes 
signifying transformative potential’ while Gaventa (2006:26) sees it as ‘opportunities, mo-
ments and channels where citizens can act to potentially affect policies, discourses, decisions 
and relationships that affect their lives and interests.’ In this article policy space refers to the 
scope local communities have for shaping their own livelihood strategy and their relationship 
with outside forces: markets.89 My focus in this paper is to understand the dynamics of par-
ticipation within a policy space where a few community members represent the villages af-
fected by this land transfer.  
While the creation of spaces of participation is powerful in engaging stakeholders, it 
is not sufficient to ensure effective participation i.e. participation that reflects ‘citizen con-
trol’ (Cornwall 2008). The notion of community participation has been criticized for ignoring 
the contradictory tensions in which most forms of governance are embedded (Swyngedouw 
                                                
88 See Hall et al 2010; McCarthy 2010; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Smalley and Corbera 2012; Fairbairn 2013; Nolte and Voget-Kleschin 
2014. 
89 A policy space “is about the freedom to choose the best mix of policies possible for oneself, given ones unique social, political, econom-
ic, and environmental conditions” (South Centre 2005). 
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2005), issues of power agency and accountability are not addressed (Newman 2001; Cooke 
and Kothari 2001), and fundamental inequalities in bargaining positions different partners 
bring to the table are neglected (Hickey et al. 2004). Cornwall (2002) categorizes these new 
governance initiatives or policy spaces into closed, invited, and claimed spaces. These new 
spaces for community participation can be spaces into which communities are invited by var-
ious types of authorities; government, supranational agencies or non-governmental organiza-
tions. Often, participants are selected to meet a particular need, and the agenda within the 
space has already been set. Empirical research suggests that the scope for communities to 
exercise real influence in these spaces has been limited and sometimes masks new forms of 
control (Cheyns 2011; Cotula et al. 2008; Taylor 2007). Stakeholder involvement mentality 
could give rise to ‘invited spaces’90 which are not sufficient to ensure veritable participation 
because this space is usually marked by considerable differences of status and power among 
participants. The character embodied by such groups is strikingly different from groups that 
are created by people themselves − ‘claimed spaces’. These new spaces can also be closed to 
the general public – ‘closed spaces’, where decisions are made by a set of actors behind 
closed doors, without any pretense of broadening the boundaries for inclusion.  
Land Acquisition in Cameroon 
Cameroon has a long history of large-scale agricultural land investments as far back 
as 1800s. In Cameroon, 67.8% of the investors in large-scale land transactions are from In-
dia, 24.7% from U.S., 4.1% from France, and 3.4% from China (GRAIN 2012). According to 
data from Ministry of Economy, Planning and Management (MINEPAT) (2013:78) 400,563 
                                                
90 ‘Invited space’ – depicts the origin as an invitation to speak or act. It could be created as a response to popular demand, donor pressure or 
shifts in policy. Such spaces maybe transient – temporarily opened up for public participation but eventually reverts to being closed again. 
Alternatively, these spaces could be durable taking on an institutionalized character (Cornwall 2004). 
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hectares was allocated to domestic and transnational agro-industrial investors before 2005. 
By 2012, Cameroon had issued mining and drilling permits over approximately 10 million 
hectares of land (Republic of Cameroon and Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative 
2013). These land arrangements overlap each other creating tensions between mining, timber 
extraction, and agricultural landscapes. Land Matrix data shows that 133,743 hectares of land 
was allocated to transnational agro-industrial investors between 2006 and 2014 (land deals 
where a written or verbal contract exist with the State). Cameroon’s appeal as a target coun-
try for agricultural land investment can be attributed to its agro-ecological diversity, easy ac-
cess to the Atlantic facilitating exportation, huge opportunities for irrigation, and ‘availabil-
ity’ of land.91 This notwithstanding, there has been an increase in land investments in Came-
roon since its development of a National Growth and Employment Strategy (GESP, 2010-
2020), which prioritizes diversifying the economy, attraction of FDI, and other accompany-
ing programs92 aimed to increase land reserves for agro-industrial activities from 400,000 ha 
in 2012 to 3,000,000 ha in 2017. 
Social organization of SGSOC-PAV 
In 2009 Sithe Global Sustainable Oils Cameroon PLC (SGSOC) owned by Herakles 
Farms, an affiliate of Herakles Capital, an American investment company (henceforth re-
ferred to as Herakles Farms) obtained authorization to gain concession over 73,086 hectares 
(ha) of land for palm oil plantation and refinery in Ndian and Kupe-Manenguba Divisions of 
South West Cameroon under a 99 year lease. This concession was later reduced to approxi-
                                                
91 According to FAO Statistics (accessed 06/01/2015), Cameroon has approximately 6.2 million hectares of arable land, with only 20% 
currently under cultivation (landportal.info). 
92 Support Project for Modernization of Land Registration and Improvement of the Business Climate (PAMOCCA) a pilot project aimed at 
supporting the Government to strengthen governance in land registration and management through modernization of land registration. Pro-
gram was launched in 2010 with African Development Fund (ADF) funding. (www.afdb.org). 
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mately 21,000 ha,93 with a provisional renewable lease of 3 years and a requirement for the 
company to consult and negotiate with the affected local communities to arrive at a contract 
that reflects the needs of all stakeholders. The Land Consultative Boards for the two divi-
sions involved each created a map that defined the legal concession within their administra-
tive unit representing concession blocks (Block “A” Nguti block, and Block “B” Mundemba 
and Toko block). However, the actual area to be used by Herakles Farms will be determined 
after Herakles Farms has engaged in negotiations with each village over its current and 
planned land uses and established what land can be made available for the project. 
  
Figure 11. Land Ceded to Herakles Farms by Block ‘A’ – Nguti Block 
  
                                                
93 See Presidential Decrees No 2013/418 of 25 November 2013 granting a provisional land lease to Herakles Farms in Mundemba; No 
2013/416 of 25 November granting a provisional land lease to Herakles Farms in Nguti; and No 2013/417 granting a provisional land lease 
to Herakles Farms in Toko. 
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Figure 12. Land Ceded to Herakles Farms by Block ‘B’ – Mundemba/Toko Block 
Though the Cameroonian government specifies its role in protecting the interest of 
the agri-business by ensuring that its citizens do not interfere in the concession area, and 
pledging to provide security for the company, its personnel and property, Cameroon has 
made no provision for monitoring and evaluation of this or any large-scale agricultural land 
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investment to ensure long-term effective and inclusive project implementation. Sithe Global 
Sustainable Oils Cameroon Project Affected Villages (SGSOC-PAV) was created by local 
elites, village authorities and Herakles Farms’ representatives in 2012 to serve as a platform 
for a common voice of the 24 villages affected by the company (SGSOC-PAV 2013). The 
purpose of the association is to “jointly oversee the implementation of the obligations of both 
parties contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the indigenes 
of Nguti sub-division and SGSOC on 27 July 2010 and the MoU between the indigenes of 
Mundemba and Toko Sub-Divisions and SGSOC on 30 July 2010” (SGSOC-PAV Articles of 
Association). According to local media (The Sun 2013), it aims to provide oversight and en-
sure effective implementation of commitments detailed in the MoUs, common commitment 
and future agreements entered into between Herakles Farms and the local affected villages. 
SGSOC-PAV appears to be an innovation because it sets the stage for meaningful discussion 
with the investor and strives to provide some monitoring of how the agricultural project will 
be implemented and make sure that it complies with contracts entered into by Herakles 
Farms and local communities.  
SGSOC-PAV is comprised of 24 small villages whose land is involved in the land 
concession to Herakles Farms and are divided into concession blocks. These villages are lo-
cated in a forested region with livelihoods dependent on forest products such as leaves, seeds, 
fruits, and animals for home consumption and commercial use. The designated land conces-
sions are bounded by high conservation value (HCV) forest and wildlife reserves94 such as 
Mount Bakossi National Park, and Bayang Mbo Wildlife Sanctuary in Nguti sub-division 
                                                
94 Forest that has one or more of the following attributes: significant concentrations of biodiversity values, large landscape-level forest, 
contain rare/threatened or endangered ecosystems; provide basic services of nature in critical situations; used to meet basic needs of local 
communities and/or critical for traditional cultural identity (FSC-STD-01-001 2004) 
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(Kupe Muanenguba Division); and Korup National Park, and Rumpi Reserve in 
Toko/Mundemba sub-divisions (Ndian division). Membership in SGSOC-PAV is based on 
three categories; original members, other members, and Herakles Farms representatives. 
Original members are from villages where Herakles Farms had operations on the ground as at 
November 2012 namely Talangaye, Nguti in the Nguti Sub Division and Lipenja 1 and Fabe 
in the Toko and Mundemba Sub Divisions respectively. Other members are from villages in 
which Herakles started operations after November 2012. 
The association has four main bodies: General Assembly (GA), Executive Board, 
Board of Governors (BG), and six issue Committees. The GA meets bi-annually and is repre-
sentative of the two concession blocks. It consists of four representatives from each of the 24 
villages – the chief, an adult male, an adult female, and a youth. Representatives are appoint-
ed by the chief and could change based on one’s relationship with the chief. The Executive 
Board is comprised of the President, Vice-president and Secretary General of the GA. Based 
on the by-laws of the association, the President and Vice-President are rotatory elected posi-
tions, and represent the two project concession blocks (Block 1 – Nguti, Block 2 – Mundem-
ba/Toko). The Secretary General is an employee of the investor and is appointed by Herakles 
Farms as liaison person. Meetings of the Executive Board are flexible95 and occur on a needs 
basis. The Board of Governors meets quarterly and has 19 representatives from the two con-
cession blocks representing the major tribal groups that crosscut village ties. Board of Gov-
ernors members are divided into six (6)96 technical committees that represent the social, eco-
nomic and infrastructural demands of the association such as legal, education, and infrastruc-
                                                
95 These meetings are not based on a calendar schedule, can occur instantly, anywhere and without a set agenda. 
96 Development, Land Use Plan, Agriculture & Economic Development, Legal/Administrative, Social Development, and Infrastructure 
Development committees. 
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ture (roads, energy, water, etc.). The technical committees lay down the ‘principles and crite-
ria’ for implementation of all 24 commitments in the MoUs (SGSOC-PAV 2013). 
The focus of the paper is on the interaction within the Board of Governors, and how 
coupled with the policy environment shape negotiations with Herakles Farms. Focus on the 
BG is justified because this is the body within SGSOC-PAV that meets most frequently, is 
responsible for strategic planning, overall policy and decision-making, implementation of 
policies, resolutions and decisions of the Annual General Assembly, and thus shapes the ne-
gotiation process.  
Research Design and Data collection 
Understanding negotiation processes and outcomes requires taking into account the 
configuration of the negotiation group, relationships among negotiators, and relationships 
between negotiators and the constituents they represent (Kramer and Messick 1995). Based 
on Cornwall’s (2004) definition of policy spaces, community consultation and negotiation 
over the transfer of land rights in SGSOC-PAV could be described as an invited space for 
local governance since the association was initiated by the investor and community leaders 
participation was solicited after its creation. By labeling SGSOC-PAV as ‘invited’ space, it 
draws attention to who is doing the inviting, what are the terms of the invitation, and what 
does this mean for social actions within that space.  
Conrad et al. (2011) evaluated level of public participation in landscape policy pro-
cesses with specific reference to the European Landscape Convention97 in Norway and three 
other European countries. They identified five target areas for effective participation: “i.) 
                                                
97 See Council of Europe (2000). 
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What is the scope of public participation? ii.) How representative is the public involved? iii.) 
At what stage of the process is the public involved? iv.) Are efforts made to render participa-
tion easy for participants? v.) How much influence does public participation have on the re-
sults derived?” (Conrad et al. 2011:29). While they used a five-point score scale to opera-
tionalize these evaluation criteria, we used more qualitative dimensions to understand the dy-
namic of participation within SGSOC-PAV.98 
Data were collected using individual semi-structured interviews, questionnaires, and 
documents related to the land transfer. An interview guide with open-ended questions was 
used for semi-structured interviews, complimented by a short questionnaire comprised of 
questions related to demographic characteristics. The questionnaire was given to respondents 
a week in advance, to allow respondents recall events related to BG meetings, and also to 
keep conversation focused and minimize interview time. Sixteen members of the BG were 
interviewed, with one refusal, and two members not reachable. Interviews generally lasted 
between one and two hours. All interviews were recorded. Data collection tools99 were guid-
ed by Cornwall’s (2004) participation typology to identify the space; and an adaptation of 
Conrad et al.’s (2011) five dimensions of good participation: scope, representativeness, tim-
ing, comfort and convenience, and influence.  Data analysis involved deductive logic – cod-
ing based on themes from literature review (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001; Cornwall 2004; 
Conrad et al. 2011) and also inductive, allowing for the identification of new categories and 
mechanisms derived from the data such as citizenship, resources, and identity. 
 
                                                
98 Given the disparity in level of education, we felt that using the five-point score scale would not be very effective in getting information 
since respondents might understand the questions differently. Also given our study population size of 19, qualitative methods were much 
more adequate in getting rich data regarding the process of participation. 
99 Interview guide and questionnaire can be obtained from the corresponding author. 
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Results 
Defining the Space 
SGSOC-PAV was initiated by a few local elites in conjunction with Herakles Farms 
(investor) to provide a unifying voice for communities affected by the project to participate 
in the decision making process over the transfer of use rights over land and monitor the im-
plementation of the investment project long-term. Apart from the government creating an 
enabling environment for the creation of the association, and authorizing meetings, there is 
very little government involvement in the association even though it is the general overseer 
of the project. The company is the principal financier of the association, proving funds such 
as allowances to executive committee members, travel and boarding allowances for all mem-
bers invited to meetings, meals during meetings, and reimbursements for activities carried 
out in relation to the association.100 This dependence on the investor for financial support 
may have undermined the decision making process within the association. 
According to two male respondents:  
Our main fundraiser is SGSOC [Herakles Farms] but since they had no fi-
nances we had to wait, and PAV has to work with the company, discuss with the 
company after the discussion in the general assembly, then we will see that they can 
do this or might not be able to do that.  
When asked who crafted the by-laws, which are the rules and regulations enacted by 
the association to provide a framework for its operation and management, 70% of respond-
ents did not know how, when, and by whom it was created; a male respondent remarked: 
                                                
100 Article 7 of Articles of Association states ‘The Company will pay for the expenses of SGSOC-PAV.’ 
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“They brought a constitution; who drew it, nobody knows − they are saying that it is the 
board. People don’t want to talk.” 
Even though collective action can be defined as the creation of an institution (system 
of management) by individuals with the aim of preventing a tragic outcome (Ostrom 1990), 
the establishment of such an association does not guarantee ‘citizen control’, which is the 
highest rung of participation illustrated by Arnstein (1969). SGSOC-PAV is completely de-
pendent on the company for funding to convene meetings between board members. This 
means Herakles Farms can prevent or precipitate assemble of members based on the potential 
agenda of the meeting. Also all draft meeting agendas are generated by Herakles Farms rep-
resentatives to SGSOC-PAV, and the final copy is circulated during the meeting. In between 
this process, the draft is submitted to Executive Board members for review and sometimes 
via email to board members with email access (very few). The extent to which board mem-
bers are restricted by this dependence on Herakles Farm is unclear, but it is reasonable to as-
sume that there are strong pressures to adopt strategies that are agreeable to the investor. 
Apart from who controls the budget, we also look at when (timeliness) members were incor-
porated into the association to determine if the association was created by popular action or 
through invitation. 
Timeliness of participation 
Timeliness of participation was measured by the stage of the participatory process at 
which respondent joined the association. Involvement could range from before creation of 
SGSOC-PAV, to early after creation or later in the process. A majority of respondents (60%) 
were involved early after creation or at a later stage. Another 30% of members were involved 
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just before legalization of the association or after the constitution had been created, and the 
rest were involved before creation and worked with Herakles Farms personnel to develop a 
proposal for the association. All members (expect founding members) joined because the 
founders invited them and they in turn invited others. A male respondent in his fifties explain 
how he got involved: 
[One of the founders] called and explained to me that he wanted a forum 
where the affected villages of the project could talk; very old people who are in the 
shoes for a long time101, because sometimes it is like duplicating efforts, time and en-
ergy without bringing out something102. [He] said we could discuss certain issues and 
see how we could form a block and maybe counter the bad side of things and try to 
see the project the other way whether it will have the population at heart. That’s when 
I came in; I said okay, this is a novelty…So we said we should give it a legal frame 
work − backing of some sorts, that’s how we came in to have the association. 
When an individual joined SGSOC-PAV determined how much influence he/she had 
over developing its constitution and By-laws. A male member complained, “The article of 
association of SGSOC-PAV was written by a few people. If they had called all the villages 
involved, some of the errors in the article of association would have been avoided”. A female 
member who was recruited after the creation of the association explained that “…[When] I 
came in [joined] the two chairpersons were already there; I was told that they are the ones 
who started the association”. Most Board members have a vague or no idea about how 
SGSOC-PAV was created or the history of the organization. 
                                                
101 [preference given to people with experience in such negotiations]. 
102 [very little accomplished or realized]. 
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Frequently, members were invited because someone connected to SGSOC-PAV knew 
them. Invitations could be intentionally extended to individuals who hold favorable attitudes 
towards the investment project and its development narrative,103 with participation being no 
more than a ‘therapeutic or rubber-stamping exercise’ (Arnstein 1969), however this might 
not be the case in this association. Though SGSOC-PAV is an invited space, overtime it can 
evolve to emerge as a claimed space in which citizen control is complete and participation is 
transformatory. Expanding this space would mean that members recognize themselves as cit-
izens (owing loyalty and entitled to enjoy all legal rights and privileges) rather than as bene-
ficiaries (Cornwall and Coelho 2007).  
Citizenship 
According to Conrad et al. (2011), citizenship can be articulated as the ‘right to par-
ticipate’. All respondents believed that the land transfer process should involve local com-
munity members. A majority of the members of the Board of Governors held that as custodi-
ans of the land, it was their right to make the final decision regarding whether Herakles 
Farms could implement its project, even though government had already authorized a provi-
sional lease to the company. 
A traditional ruler responded: 
The villagers have the right [to participate in the transfer process] because it is 
their land. Even if the government signed, the company has no right to come and en-
ter [into the forest] because we will fight them…from the time of our forefathers 
                                                
103 There is a complex interplay of narratives underpinning the participation process, promoting or resisting the project, with a dominant 
development narrative inspired by the Millennium Development Goals, Cameroon’s Vision 2035 and its Growth and Employment Strategy 
Paper.  
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when the law was not even there, we were the owners of this land. We are the people 
who know the in and out of the land up-to-date, so they cannot keep us aside and do 
things their own way. 
Another male respondent said that “Yes, they should [involve local people in the 
transfer process] because the 1974 ordinance on land tenure states that individuals or com-
munities who have inhabited a given area of land and explored it over the years have owner-
ship rights over that said piece of land”. 
All respondents strongly believed that even though the government has the rights to 
dispose of land, local people should be involved in the decision making process over the 
transfer of land use rights to an investor since they were the ‘custodians’ of the land.  
A male representative said;  
PAV is an organization and not an individual. PAV does not also represent a 
village. I think I am representing a community within PAV [but] help to fill in the 
vacuum for members within PAV who are not very much educated as some of us. 
PAV is a registered association that has a legal capacity to sue and be sued on behalf 
of the communities. [This puts a] check on [instances when] they [Herakles Farms] 
can go to individual villages to trick them to get what they want. The experiences we 
had with PAMOL are so fresh in our minds, so we can’t just let them come again and 
do the same foolishness. … now we are taking safeguards, …we have come of age. 
All participants strongly believed that it was their legitimate right to participate within 
this process and be a part of the Board (see representation). Nonetheless, uncertainty over 
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what constitutes the legal rights and privileges of local communities (tenure system) and di-
vision in member allegiance (based on village/tribe) might distort this notion of citizenship.  
Identifying Participation 
Representation 
Representativeness of the Board was measured by how members were selected, who 
elected them, and efforts to ensure a cross-section of population participants (including mar-
ginalized groups). On paper, this “association consists of chiefs, women, youths, religious 
and community leaders, and company representatives. It has approximately 100 members 
[General assembly] and membership rotates” (Herakles Farms 2013). All clans affected by 
the project are represented in SGSOC-PAV General assembly consisting of Bima, Ngolo, 
and Batanga (Mundemba-Toko Block); and Upper Balong, Mbo, and Bakossi (Nguti Block). 
Based on the association’s article 3(1) of the article of association “each village will send a 
chief and two representatives to be chosen from among the youth’s, female leaders and reli-
gious authority” to constitute the General Assembly.  
With its emphasis on democratic and inclusive community participation, it was neces-
sary for SGSOC-PAV to establish legitimate representatives of the project-affected villages 
in the Board of Directors. Membership to the Board was based on five criteria.104 The first 
criterion is representation from Herakles Farms – 3 members. Second criterion for selection 
to the Board is based on original membership (four members); these are chiefs of villages 
where Herakles Farms has on-the-ground investments as at November 2012105 and are desig-
                                                
104 See Articles of Association Article 4 
105 These villages are: Talangaye, Lipenja I, Fabe and Nguti. 
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nated permanent members of the Board. A third criterion is being a chief of a clan106 affected 
by the project (six members). Each clan affected by the project will nominate a chief to the 
Board. This means that in some cases a clan chief who belongs to a different village that is 
not affected by the project might represent a village that is affected by the project. A fourth 
criterion is elected representatives of youths, women, and men from affected 
clans/communities (six members). Each block will select one female, one male, and one 
youth as representatives of these groups within the zone. Final criterion was based on surface 
area of land ceded to Herakles Farms. A few members (06) of the Board were nominated and 
chosen through a show of hands in the inaugural General Assembly meeting on March 9th 
2013. Members were not familiar with the nominees, and therefore voted along clan/tribal 
lines. Given that chiefs choose General Assembly representatives for their villages (this rep-
resentation is not permanent depending on relationship with chief), it is unlikely that they 
could have voted contrary to their chief’s vote. Some nominees who were not present during 
that meeting were contacted by the President or Vice-President and invited to join the board. 
This makes it hard to sustain the argument that this process was in essence democratic. Un-
fortunately, this process resulted in a Board of Governors that was socially unbalanced espe-
cially in terms of generational representation: 53% of representatives were chiefs, 11% were 
women, and 16% were representatives/employees of Herakles Farms, with no members be-
low the age of 30.  
 
 
                                                
106 Clan is based on tribe and not village. There can be numerous villages that make up a clan. All clan members might share the same tribal 
language with slight variations based on specific village contexts. These clans are Bima, Ngolo, Batanga, (on the Mundemba – Toko Block) 
and Upper Balong, Mbo, and Bakossi (on the Nguti Block) (6 members) Additional members will be added as the production area grows. 
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A male respondent explained representation within the association: 
When we were building up the PAV and making proposals of composition for 
the various governance structures, we did consider the youths, women and the general 
population to be represented in the sense that those who really use the forest should 
be included in the representation of the general structure. The chief has to come 
alongside with a youth, woman and an adult man − these people represent the village. 
It is the policy making body [General Assembly] that elected members of the govern-
ance structure. In the Board of Governors, there are chiefs, elites, women and [Hera-
kles Farms] management. Given that there are 20 villages divided into two blocks, we 
said that Nguti block will bring eight people, Ndian block should do the same and 
[Herakles Farms] will bring three. This now represents the three major stakeholders. 
We didn’t [select] clan by clan. We [selected based on] administrative divi-
sions that is Nguti, Ndian and Ntoko subdivision; we could not [select based on] 
Balong, Basossi and Mbos [tribes] since they are all represented. We did not take oth-
er sociological components such as religion, party affiliation or ‘stranger’ [non-
native] into consideration because we are dealing here with heritage, which has to do 
with the native land and forest. It is not anything social. 
Members were nominated, appointed, or invited into the forum. A female member, 
explained how she became a member of the Board of Governors; 
They had a general meeting in Kumba in 2013 and it was said that they have 
to nominate one woman from the Nguti block and one from Mundemba block. 
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Among the few women who were there, I am the only one who was a little bit literate 
and that’s how the chairperson appointed me. That is how I became a member in the 
Board of Governors in PAV. 
Given that provisions were made for only two female members (one from each 
block), attention should be paid to the fact that both female representatives have minimal 
levels of education (clear power implication), and live in their villages (making BG attend-
ance very difficult given inadequate transportation services), thus not necessarily representa-
tive of the female population from these project affected communities.  
At least three members of the Board of Governors were appointed in absentia. One 
male member said; “… my case is different because I was elected in absentia by the chiefs”. 
Another female member explained that “I was voted in absentia which means that [it was] 
based on my character traits and the trust vested in me by the community members”. 
Community members on the Executive Board were ‘elected’107 while the company 
representative was appointed. Even though membership in the forum rotates, Chiefs of vil-
lages108 in which Herakles Farms had started operations were designated permanent members 
of the Board of Governors. Even though additional members would be added as the produc-
tion area expands, the President and Vice-president would be selected strictly from chiefs 
who were ‘original members’ of the association and designation will rotate only amongst 
members from the two original zones. 
                                                
107 Their membership and position of authority within the organization was pre-determined given their involvement with the organization 
pre- and post-creation of SGSOC-PAV 
108 Talangaye (upper balong), Lipenja 1 (Batanga), Fabe (Bima), and Nguti (Mbo). 
  
 
181 
SGSOC-PAV is set up to represent a bottom-up accountability structure, with the 
Herakles Farms at the top and the association at the bottom to induce pressure for sustainable 
implementation of the palm project. Unfortunately, there seems to be no built-in mechanism 
to ensure top-bottom interventions, with SGSOC-PAV at the top and local communities at 
the bottom to ensure external control through positive and negative sanctions from below. 
Usually communication with local communities is through the chief, who in turn delivers to 
the traditional council of his village, and a message is sent to the village through a town crier 
convening a general meeting. A male respondent explained, “I make sure every details of 
what happened [in SGSOC-PAV] is told to the community and we exchanged ideas. Some of 
the community members propose points for the agenda of subsequent PAV meetings”. Un-
fortunately, there are breaks in this loop, with information never or rarely reaching some vil-
lage members. When asked if they had heard of SGSOC-PAV, 82% of respondents in four of 
the 21 project-affected villages said that they had not. 
A village authority explained,  
There is a communication deficit between SGSOC-PAV and the villages. The 
people responsible for that deficit are the chiefs because they are not playing their 
role. The reason for their representation is not only because of their position as custo-
dians of our land but they should be able to communicate the decisions taken in the 
board to their communities. Also there is not much to go and tell the people for now 
because the negotiation process is still stagnant and such information will not be wel-
come by the village population. 
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Another village authority said, 
When I come back from any meeting I call the traditional council and the fam-
ily heads to sit down and I explain everything to them. But you know villagers are 
very funny, they will not call their respective families to tell them what is happening. 
So when I saw that, I decided to talk to the women leaders and the youth leader so 
that whatever is discussed they will go and tell their various groups. 
There is no systematic process to relay decisions made in the forum to local commu-
nities, and in turn covey feedback from local communities. Combining bottom-up and top-
down accountability strategies could enhance the effectiveness of the association by not only 
pressuring for inclusive plantation models that are sustainable long-term, but also minimizing 
the likelihood of cooptation of Board members. 
Scope of Participation 
Scope of participation depends on the mission/objectives of the association and this 
could range from informing the participants, consulting with participants, to active participa-
tion in decision-making. Based on survey responses, all respondents agreed that they were 
informed on the benefits of the project, the project implementation process, and encouraged 
to mobilize their different communities (outgrower schemes and cooperative formation). 
However, respondent were given limited data on physical location of proposed site, 
most respondents were not informed on the legal procedures of land transfer, and risks of the 
project.    
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Respondents also made explicit that there were heated arguments between elites on 
how the company was implementing its project, displaying that SGSOC-PAV members also 
actively participated in the decision-making process. 
 
 
Figure 13. Measuring Information made Available to Board of Governors to Facilitate 
Participation. 
A male respondent said:  
Every community is very vocal. For instance, when shall planting start? No, 
everybody is vocal. The company has been hiding issues; that’s why they are going 
through restructuring. We addressed the new shareholders when they said we had 
wasted their time and money; they came here to plant and want to start planting - 
without formalizing their agreement with the communities. It is not because there is a 
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decree listing out a number of land concessions, No! No! They must go to the com-
munity and sit on the table and talk, then sign. So everybody is vocal on this point. 
Though the initial goal of the association was to provide a forum to inform communi-
ties about the daily running of the project, and represent ‘a credible Voice of the 24 villag-
es,’109 it has quickly transformed into a divided space with local representatives voicing con-
cerns on how decisions affect their communities, engaging in backdoor negotiations between 
members, and between individual villages and the investor on decisions regarding when, 
where, and how implementation was going to take place. 
A male respondent provided an example of how communities negotiate in their re-
spective blocks with Herakles Farms. 
For example, the amount of land given by Toko and Mundemba sub-division 
[Block B] compared to the land given by Nguti sub-division [Block A]. The amount 
of land given [by Block B] is not even up to a third of the total amount of land that 
Nguti sub-division has given. In the course of discussion, Ndian people were saying 
that the headquarters should be built in Ndian and we in the Nguti sub-division were 
insisting that it should be built in Nguti. We have to put the land factor into consid-
eration but with the pressure [from Block B] and many other things, some issues are 
discussed at the back. And suddenly everything changed, its official that the head-
quarters will be built in Nguti subdivision. 
Another male respondent explained negotiations between Board members, “I may 
discuss with the chief of [another village in his block] and say this is what I want, that is 
                                                
109 SGSOC-PAV official communication to the President of Cameroon, May 2013. 
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backdoor because I didn’t discuss it in the open.” Other members might be dissatisfied with 
the process and initiate direct communication with the company, 
The community that gives a large amount of land cannot be compensated the 
same as the one that gave a small amount. That is why we need to go back to the 
community for finalization [of the negotiation process].  
Someone who has given more than the other should have different demands. I told 
them that I am going to be a lifetime member in SGSOC-PAV because I can’t give 
more land than any other person and I am not on the Board. When they [Herakles 
Farms] met with me, we discussed and they communicated with America. So if I tell 
them that I need 100 ha palm plantation, I should sit and know that I have it I don’t 
need to go and begin to follow them up. When I said this, they called America, ex-
plained that without [my village] the project can’t continue and recommended that my 
demands should be accepted but they will start with less than 100 ha first. 
Other Board members encourage their elites to talk directly with Herakles Farms es-
pecially if their village authority has very limited influence over the decision making process. 
A female respondent said, 
We have one elite who is in the Whiteman’s country. I don’t know but I think 
the chief is talking with him but I don’t know what they talk about but he will be 
coming anytime from now. When he comes I will like to tell him that he should talk 
to SGSOC since he is a big man too. I think if he talks to them they will listen to him. 
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Board members can organize and govern themselves to obtain continuous joint bene-
fits when all face ‘temptation to free-ride, shirk, or otherwise act opportunistically’ (Ostrom 
1990:29). Given that these communities are in an interdependent situation, Board members 
should learn to identify as one group in order to ensure substantive participation and maxim-
ize the long-term benefits of the project.  
 Identifying Influence 
The most significant threat to such community development actions is elite capture 
(Dasgupta and Beard 2007). In this case, there is a low incidence of elite capture – this refers 
to controlling benefits to be derived, and more of elite control since the major players within 
this forum are elites from the 21 affected villages. Members of the Board represent a mish-
mash of highly educated and illiterate, village leaders and non-leaders, national politicians, 
lawyers, financial analysts, and small-scale farmers, primary school teachers. Nevertheless, 
participants enter into this forum from unequal positions of power (see table 2 below): une-
qual socioeconomic and political positions, dissimilar access to economic resources, varying 
levels of knowledge of protocols and procedures, and different literacy rates. According to 
Cornwall (2002) a holistic analysis of the process of participation highlights the relations of 
power and constructions of citizenship that permeates any site for public engagement.  
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Table 2. Socio-economic indicators of all PAV community members (excludes Herakles 
Farms reps.) 
Characteristic Number of Participants 
Sex 14 males 
2 females 
Age 8 > 50 yrs. (max. 70 years) 
8 < 49 yrs. (min. 39 years) 
Education 8 members had greater than some college (4 had graduate degrees, 3 
had BAs, and 1 had a diploma) 
8 members had high school or less (1 had high school, 6 had second-
ary school, and 1 had primary school) 
Income (monthly) 5 members  > 500,000frs ($1000) 
6 members between 200,000 – 499,000frs ($400 – $999) 
2 members between 100,000 – 199,000frs ($200 - $399) 
3 members between 50,000 – 99,000frs ($100 - $199) 
 
 Spaces are not neutral but highlight the power relations that surround and enter them 
(Cornwall 2002). Sources of elite power may include land holdings, lineage, employment, 
political party affiliation, educational attainment, or tenure in the community. Villages that 
had offered the largest amount of land110 to Herakles Farms were guaranteed a seat on the 
Board, but this did not mean that their representatives were most influential within PAV be-
cause influence depended on factors such as level of education, economic status, political 
affiliations, and access to information. The disparities in level of education among members 
                                                
110 Sikam (3.110 ha), Manyamen/Ebanga (2.720 ha), Talangaye (2.538 ha), Nguti (2.532 ha). See Appendix X for parcel distribution across 
2 blocks. 
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portrayed in the table above has implications on access to information, how people under-
stand the proceedings, reflects who participates, how often, and under what terms.  
A female member responded: “I know that in the meeting everyone speaks at his or 
her own level [meaning socioeconomic status], so I only speak at my own level.” 
 For some members their level of education, economic status, knowledge about the 
project, and degree of comfort speaking in public and in English, might create a drawback to 
participating.  
Another male respondent explained: 
Within SGSOC-PAV, I realized there are a group of people like [the Chair] 
who when talking [other members] sit quiet111 and that worries me a lot. Sometimes it 
is very difficult for somebody who usually speaks in pidgin to express ideas … may-
be for some their English is very poor and you cannot [understand] what they are say-
ing; thus, another may want to translate and the sense will be lost. Like the chief who 
tried to explain to the investor [who cannot understand pidgin] how much he had suf-
fered for the nursery and the implication on his reputation now that the nursery was 
being moved [away from his village] to Talangaye. The people of his village are pro-
testing and [angry about this move], he tries to express this in English, which was an 
embarrassment. 
                                                
111 [Do not oppose]. 
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Even though Board members are not expected to speak in English, interactions gener-
ally occur in English because of the lopsidedness in terms of power generated by one party 
speaking English and another Pidgin. 
A male respondent clarified: “There is no straight cut language; you can speak in 
pidgin if that’s the best mode that you can express your opinion for people to understand. But 
most of the time they might want to speak in English, and they will get their ideas distorted 
and nobody will comprehended exactly what is being said.” 
 Given the disparity in educational level and English proficiency, some respondents 
prefer to share their thoughts with more vocal and literate members (from their Block) rather 
than speak out during meetings. Particular board members have taken on the role of desig-
nated spokesperson, either speaking for other Board members or assisting in clarifying their 
message – when they do speak for themselves. This can award designated spokespersons 
with substantial amount of leverage over the process and the possibility to assert his/her pref-
erences.  
A large body of literature shows that participatory processes could easily be dominat-
ed by elites since these spaces are usually built on pre-existing power structures, thus rein-
forcing them (Chhotray 2004; Mosse 2005). When asked who had the most influence, all 
members agreed on the Chair; because he had a lot of previous experience, he was the prin-
cipal founder of the association, his village had offered the second largest piece of land, and 
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he was charismatic (retired MD, Chief, and politician). The Chair called meetings, the Chair 
drew the agenda, and the Chair moderated discussions within PAV.112 
A male respondent stated that:  
[The Chair] has a lot of influence and by right he is the pioneer landlord. If he 
says [the company] will not work in his village, they will obey him. Again, he went 
into the project wholeheartedly, without mixing words he is the most influential in 
PAV. 
Another male respondent, said that “The board chairman decides the person who 
speaks and the person must lift up his/her hand before talking; we don’t speak disorderly”. 
A female respondent explains further “You can only put up your hand and when you 
are called before you can talk, if not you are not permitted to talk”. 
This can result in a situation where particular individuals who have a different per-
spective on how the project should be implement, who may not necessarily agree with the 
Chair, might not be allowed to talk, or might be allotted very little time to voice discontent-
ment, if at all. 
Another male respondent explained, “Hearing is one thing, writing it down is another. 
There are some SGSOC-PAV members who can come up with a suggestion and they will not 
even write it down in the minutes of the Board… Someone might bring up an idea and the 
high table [Executive Board members] might not write it down.” 
                                                
112 Meetings were called after consulting with Herakles Farms and the agenda was drawn after consulting the Herakles Farms representative 
to PAV. 
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Though the membership composition and procedures of operation reflect everyday 
inequalities, re-inscribing existing relationships, and hierarchies, this does not undermine the 
possibility of deliberative decision-making that takes place within the forum. There are a 
number of members who see participation not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end – 
sustainable development of all communities affected by the project. However in order for all 
members to participate equally, processes of popular education and mobilization are needed 
to enhance the skills and confidence of marginalized groups to engage in SGSOC-PAV fully 
(Cornwall and Coelho 2007). 
Resources 
Most (80%) of respondents agreed that the association needs technical and financial 
support to improve participation. SGSOC-PAV’s dependence of Herakles Farms seriously 
undermines its ability to evaluate objectively the implementation of the project. There are 
decisions that involve expertise in law, agronomy, agricultural economics, engineering, GIS 
and spatial analysis; unfortunately, the association has very limited resources to hire tech-
nical support. There is discussion of setting up farmer cooperatives in all project-affected vil-
lages to institute an out-grower scheme proposed by Herakles Farms but a large majority of 
the communities are lagging in setting up these institutions. This is largely due to lack of 
knowledge or expertise in setting up such a scheme, and other deficiencies in managing such 
as project. Also the lack of technical know-how of all members to fully understand the terms 
of any contract with the investor, and also understand technical information presented by the 
company such as spatial drawings, puts the association on a disadvantage in fully carrying 
out their stated objectives.  
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Figure 14. Representation of Resource Availability in SGSOC-PAV Board of Gover-
nors. 
Majority of respondents agreed that technical support was unavailable, while there 
was least variation of responses in terms of availability of Time with respondents showing 
abundant or mostly available of that resource. Given the fact that a few of the members actu-
ally live in their villages with limited access to transportation, viable roads, or telecommuni-
cation, while a majority of members do not have access to internet, the distribution of infor-
mation concerning the project across all members is restricted. 
On the other hand, the members of the association with expertise in some of these 
disciplines have volunteered their services to facilitate group discussion and decision making. 
Olowu (2003:46) argues that local elites have “resources, knowledge, influence and net-
works” and are therefore crucial to local governance structures.  
A female respondent said “In PAV we have a lawyer, when there is anything he tries 
to put us right because it is his field”. 
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Another male respondent explained: 
Mr. […] is a finance expert. He helps to make a survey of the financial cost of 
running PAV and the available finances for carrying local development by [Herakles 
Farms] in PAV. We also have Chief […], who is an engineer by profession who can 
help us very much in the aspect of constructing roads given that he is the head of in-
frastructure committee in PAV. 
 Local elites possess know-how and can enrich the participation process (Dasgupta 
and Beard 2007). The problem of lack of information is minimal in this situation because 
elites have access to a variety of avenues from which they can source information such as 
personal relationships with government administrators, investor representatives, and media, 
and are based on their previous experience. Unfortunately, almost all Board members work 
full-time with limited time to spend on researching and designing solutions for SGSOC-
PAV.  
Conclusion 
SGSOC-PAV is a relatively new association and an innovative method to ensure con-
tinuous monitoring and evaluation of project implementation, which is lacking in most cases 
related to large-scale land acquisition for agricultural purposes. The members of SGSOC-
PAV symbolize communities affected by Herakles Farms large-scale land acquisition. The 
main purpose of the association is to oversee the implementation of specific provisions in the 
Common Commitments signed between the State of Cameroon represented by the Senior Di-
visional Officers (SDOs) for Ndian, Kupe Manenguba and Herakles Farms in 2011 and other 
past and future agreements between Herakles Farms and these communities. The end goal of 
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intergroup negotiations also reflects the individual/institutional interests of negotiators, which 
may be divergent and not reflective of local concerns. Thus, understanding how individuals 
interact within this forum and mechanisms affecting this interaction is key in comprehending 
the land transfer process and outcomes.  
We found that SGSOC-PAV is an invited space, given that the association was creat-
ed jointly with Herakles Farms and other members invited into it. Also Herakles Farms is the 
sole financier of the association and has a strong presence in setting the agenda and distrib-
uting information (date, time, place of meeting and previous minutes) with possible implica-
tions on what types of decisions can be made within the forum and for whose benefit. The 
majority of SGSOC-PAV members were satisfied with their participation in the association 
and the decisions derived amongst its members. This satisfaction − placed against a backdrop 
of power differentials, and differentiated access to information relevant to the project, cou-
pled with a lack of group identity − reduces the bargaining potential of the association. Par-
ticipation within the Board of Directors could be characterized as ‘tokenism’, representing 
consultation and placation of community members rather than citizen power, which involves 
partnership, delegated power and citizen control in driving the decision making process. In 
this situation, the problem is not elite capture but most probably a lack of resources and train-
ing to strengthen the decision making process. 
Though Board membership is rotatory and ‘open to chiefs, elites, state actors, state 
sector heads, and any other persons of the civil society with relevant competence willing to 
freely offer their expertise’, specific mechanisms have to be put in place to facilitate the rep-
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resentation of marginalized groups – such as allocating a specific number of seats for wom-
en, youth, representatives of civil society organizations, and possibly government actors.   
Simply setting up structures of participation is insufficient to create viable govern-
ance institutions - policy spaces (Cornwall 2004; Cornwall and Coelho 2007; Leach et al. 
2010). A lot depends on the motivations of Board members and what ‘participation’ means to 
them (Cornwall and Coelho 2007:9). Participation in community development is costly in 
terms of time but the members of this forum have pledged to invest time and its resultant 
‘opportunity cost’. The association now has to strive to strengthen citizenship by fostering 
group identity. The members belong to many different tribes, which belong to different clans 
that are divided into two blocks in relation to Herakles Farms’ agricultural project. At this 
stage of the process, members still organize their demands along tribal lines, which could be 
further reinforced by the division into two blocks. If members start identifying as a larger 
group – project affected villages (who possibly face the same future prospects), individuals 
might come to think that their membership in the group is personally significant and thus en-
hancing the quality of participation.  
Lastly, SGSOC-PAV appears to lack a clear accountability mechanism. There is a 
disconnect between what is discussed in the forum and what filters down to community 
members. Since most of the members of the Board of Governors live in towns rather than the 
rural communities that they represent, it is challenging for information to get transmitted to 
the villages in which the project is actually taking place. That this association has no formal 
links with the government is a weakness since the government provides the legal backing for 
exerting control over the land transfer and project implementation process.  
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Though SGSOC-PAV is plagued with a number of weaknesses, this does not discount 
the fact that this is a first step towards making local voices heard within this process. Ostrom 
(1990) and Cornwall (2004) accept that these policy spaces are not static temporally and spa-
tially. The boundaries between these spaces are flexible and permeable as a space could 
transform from being an invited space sponsored by the government (or investor, as in this 
case) to a claimed space driven by popular urging for collaboration or compromise, or to ar-
ticulate dissent (Cornwall 2004). SGSOC-PAV provides local communities with direct ac-
cess to the investor. It also brings all village authorities into the forum. They can, in turn, be 
held accountable whenever they put their own strategic interests before those of their com-
munities. Though underlying power structures shape participation, communities could mobi-
lize local people facing the same fate to act together (Nesman 1981:4). In this case, local 
communities have mobilized and created a top-down accountability forum through outside 
financing. Similarly mobilization could result in enforced collectives, violent revolution, or 
simply everyday acts of resistance (Scott 1985) if the representatives within this forum fail to 
project the interest of their people (Nesman 1981; Scott 1985; Cornwall 2002). 
In order to improve this multistakeholder forum participants need to be trained on 
how to participate, what are the tools that exist to guide this process and how should they be 
implemented such as the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Tenure of 
Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Context of National Food Security (VGGT) and a range of 
other voluntary guidelines and principles directly related to land deals. Coupled with training, 
the organization can also be made autonomous from the investor and the government with a 
funding stream that is outside the control of these two actors. This can also provide the op-
portunity for the SGSOC-PAV sub-groups to be located in every community to provide a 
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feedback mechanism and hold PAV officers accountable. Donor intervention to enhance ca-
pacity building and support the organization long term would be crucial in making this forum 
more effective. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION, IMPLICATIONS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
During the past decade, there has been an exponential increase in the rate and scale of 
large-scale agricultural land investments globally, and especially in Africa and Southeast 
Asia (Borras and Franco 2010; Cotula 2009, 2013). These investments are accompanied by 
opportunities and risks from a social and ecological point of view (Brklacich et al. 1997; Shi-
va 1997, 2002). This study examined the conditions under which communities have adequate 
information and institutional capabilities to effectively negotiate terms in land transactions or 
refuse a land deal. In Cameroon, the State owns and can dispose of most land and only 3% of 
land is formally registered and owned by private individuals (Egbe 2001). In a context of un-
certainty regarding decision-making authority over acquisition of agricultural and forest land, 
local communities’ informed and voluntary consent in the transfer of rights to investors is 
questionable and meaningful compensation is uncertain. This study used qualitative methods 
that yielded important insights regarding social relations at the household and community 
levels given community capabilities, access to information, and the underlying power rela-
tions within local communities, and across the private business sector and government.  
There are important arguments in favor of and countering large-scale agricultural land 
deals (Cotula 2009). The extreme pros versus cons of the ‘land grab’ argument may obscure 
some of the key socio-structural and politico-economic institutions and processes that define 
interactions at household and community levels (Oya 2013a; Edelman, Borras and Oya 
2013). Thus, there is a need to reflect, challenge and reframe existing narratives, portraying 
differentiation that exists within the local context and their interaction with government and 
private business sector. The central research question in this study concerns how variations in 
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community structures, capabilities and relationships shape land negotiations to implement a 
transfer of land use rights involving the Cameroonian government, communities, and Hera-
kles Farms in Ndian and Kupe-Muanenguba divisions in Southwestern Cameroon. The main 
objectives were to: a) Identify key social dimensions – social networks and knowledge − as-
sociated with land deal negotiations and assess how they affect these processes; b) Determine 
the extent to which land deal negotiation processes reflect differentials in power within 
emerging spaces for decentralized governance; and c) Identify social dimensions and power 
relations that are associated with a greater degree of access maintenance. 
Globally, debates over large-scale land transactions for biofuel production have been 
prompted by concerns with biodiversity conservation and climate change. The highly differ-
entiated character of local communities gives rise to a wide range of attitudes towards land 
transactions (Borras et al. 2011; Pye 2010; McCarthy 2010; Fernandes, Welch and Gonçalves 
2010). Contrary to the assumption of homogeneity, local people are affected and experience 
diverse reactions to the socio-political process of ‘land grabbing.’ Responses of local people 
are influenced by socio-ecological factors such as land tenure system, topography, perceived 
value of the land, access to information, local institutions, authority, and local politics 
(Smalley et al. 2012). Empirical research has to probe deeply to examine intra-household and 
community relationships to understand the roots of local support and opposition and reveal 
differences between and within specific land deals (Borras et al. 2012). 
The main empirical findings are chapter specific and were summarized within the re-
spective empirical chapters: Chapter 2, “Community Factors, Negotiation Process and Land 
Acquisition in South West Cameroon;” Chapter 3, “Gendered Resource Relations and 
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Changing Land Values: Implications for Women’s Access, Control, and Decision Making 
over Natural Resources;” and Chapter 4, “Policy Spaces for Land Negotiations in Cameroon: 
Negotiation Forums as Invited Spaces.” This section synthesizes my findings to answer the 
study’s central question: how do variations in community structures, capabilities and rela-
tionships shape land negotiations to implement a transfer of land use rights involving the 
Cameroonian government, communities, and Herakles Farms in Ndian and Kupe-
Muanenguba divisions in Southwestern Cameroon? 
Firstly, my analysis indicates that the land investor is complying with the procedures 
and guidelines for community consultation and negotiations as specified by Cameroonian 
law. Nonetheless, in a context of uncertainty regarding decision making authority over the 
transfer of land, low or non-existent community assets, and deficiencies in structural and re-
lational mechanisms, local communities free, prior, and informed consent in the transfer of 
land use rights is questionable. Particular distinctions and variations in resource access within 
local communities shape the inclusiveness and quality of village participation. 
Secondly, current processes of transferring land-use rights are gendered and these 
processes negatively affect women in particular and the communities to which they belong. 
In examining land negotiation processes we found that women’s rights to land were being 
redefined and they were intentionally and inadvertently being dispossessed of land through 
‘othering’, ‘boundary maintenance’, ‘emotion management’ (Schwalbe et al. 2000). The 
types of negotiations which occur within households (renegotiation of access and use of re-
sources), within and between communities (redefinition of rights over resources) and the dif-
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ferent claims that women and men make in order to pursue their interests, are central to pat-
terns of large-scale agricultural land investment and its impacts on local communities.  
Lastly, I highlight negotiating opportunities for communities in a new and innovative 
policy forum – SGSOC Project Affected Villages association (SGSOC-PAV). Opportunities 
such as pooling bargaining power, prioritizing local decision making and reinforcing respon-
sibilities and community empowerment. Unfortunately, negotiation forums can serve as legit-
imizing spaces for investor demands when participation is coopted. I found that negotiation 
processes reflect differentials in power within these emerging spaces of decentralized gov-
ernance and propose policy recommendations for ensuring veritable participation at the 
community level.  
These findings have important theoretical implications. The quality of local participa-
tion in the management and decision-making regarding the transfer of land rights is key in 
fostering beneficial and sustainable community impacts (Colchester et al. 2007; Taylor 1997; 
Robbinson 2008; Cotula 2009). To understand how various mechanisms, processes and so-
cial relations create ‘bundles of power’ that define community participation in relation to ag-
ricultural land investments, I extended theories of power (Lukes 1974; Gaventa 1980) by in-
cluding the theory of access (Ribot and Peluso 2003) integrated with a capitals and capabili-
ties framework (Bebbington 1999). I also examined the generic process through which mar-
ginalized groups, especially women, are excluded from the decision making process over the 
transfer of land use rights. International guidelines and voluntary standards have been created 
to direct the land investment and transfer process. These standards call for decision making 
over the transfer of land to be relegated to local communities to engender a win-win outcome 
  
 
206 
for all stakeholders. However, my analysis showed that realization of this benefit is improba-
ble, given deficiencies in community assets that influence how local people perceive these 
investments and exclusionary procedures that limit the voices of all stakeholders from being 
heard. My analysis provides insights on how these standards do not translate into actual prac-
tice or are weakened by socioeconomic and political realities in rural communities. The goal 
is to breach the gap between scholarship and practice, using theory to explain occurrences 
that have been alluded to by practitioners within this issue area, and providing evidence to 
substantiate. 
I examined local dynamics pre-production, focusing on the effect of socio-ecological 
and political differentiation on the negotiation process over the transfer of land. My focus 
was on key elements of decision making processes against a standard of inclusive participa-
tory multi-stakeholder processes that represent diverse individual and community interests. 
Raising awareness of these issues could stimulate policy makers to move beyond the limita-
tions of ‘one-size-fits-all’ solutions, which are represented within international voluntary 
standards and take stock of community assets and vulnerabilities to devise context-specific 
measures to shape socio-political interactions of state and non-state actors involved within 
this process.  
Much research has been done on the weaknesses of participation, especially on the 
nature of local power relations and the exclusionary situation of consultation and decision 
making process over land investments. Yet, there is still the tendency to call for participation 
of local people without an accompanying training on empowerment and capacity building to 
ensure that accountability mechanisms are pro-active and responsive. In analyzing the socio-
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economic processes and political dynamics in the local context that affect response to and 
implementation of large-scale land transactions, I provide policy makers with evidence to 
enhance their understanding of the implications for use rights transfer regarding systematic 
changes needed to address vulnerabilities at the local level. Creating effective monitoring and 
accountability structures would start with democratizing the decision making process, train-
ing and empowering local community members by providing them with relevant information 
and building an enhanced sense of citizenship (decision making authority over the process). 
This would mean international and national agencies providing long-term and continuous 
support to create/strengthen social organizations such as SGSOC-PAV to enhance autonomy 
and capability to genuinely represent the interests of local communities. Assistance should 
also enhance the capacity of local communities to define and communicate their priorities 
during negotiation of terms of incorporation that are legally binding and consistent with local 
needs. Cameroon’s REDD+ Secretariat is developing national FPIC guidelines with the sup-
port of national and international environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
and development partners (Carodenuto et al. 2014). Though these guidelines aim to set the 
standard for how potentially affected local communities are consulted during the develop-
ment and implementation of the REDD+ strategy, it could also be extended to establish the 
standard on how affected communities are consulted during a potential large-scale land 
transaction. 
Future research ought to examine effective arrangements in which local people are 
able to voice concerns and seek redress. Understanding how local communities are organiz-
ing to safeguard free, prior and informed consent (pre-investment) and continuous monitor-
ing (post-implementation) can ensure replication in other communities, generating mobiliza-
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tion for bottom-up accountability structures that protect and promote the interests of local 
people. 
Research should focus on smaller pieces of the land deal puzzle such as procedures of 
displacement and resettlement, dynamics of compensation, and fulfillment of long-term 
company commitments. Research on these issues would be particularly valuable by using a 
gendered perspective and recognizing other marginalized groups such as youths, in-migrants, 
and migratory populations (pastoralists) that are usually left out of land transaction processes. 
This research also provides a basis for identifying steps that can be taken to help communi-
ties to understand how women’s direct participation in land transaction negotiations would 
benefit the community as a whole.    
More research should focus on issues not possible to examine in this study such as 
domestic investment (dynamics of investments by nationals), and negotiation and consulta-
tion processes over land investments demands that are non-agricultural such as tourism and 
extractives. This study did not examine differences in outcomes such as consent or re-
sistance. More research should be done to identify the factors (characteristics and processes) 
which might ‘explain’ how and why some communities resisted and succeeded, while others 
(such as the villages examined) were in favor.  
This research examines key elements of decision-making processes against a standard 
of inclusive participatory multi-stakeholder processes that represent diverse stakeholder in-
terests. The results will provide insights regarding the social context of the negotiation pro-
cesses for policy makers and other stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX B: LETTERS OF INTRODUCTION 
Letter of Introduction – Community Meeting 
“Who is Not at the Table? Land Deal Negotiations in Southwestern Cameroon” 
Principal Investigator: Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu (Iowa State University – Tel. xxxx) 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Robert Mazur (Iowa State University – Tel. xxxx) 
Participation: 
We are here today to discuss a new research project that will provide insights on community networks 
and relations that influence the transfer of land use rights negotiation processes for stakeholders and policy 
makers. Community members who participate in the study will be asked to discuss with the researcher the net-
works available to them to obtain information relevant to the negotiation process. These are the principal topics: 
types of networks and groups within the community; the interconnectedness or closeness of community mem-
bers; influence and authority; and access to relevant information. 
The interview will be audio recorded if the participant consents. 
Village residents who are 18 years and older are eligible to participate. Those who do participate may 
take part in two 1½ hour focus group discussion in which ten women and ten youths will meet separately with 
the researcher to discuss those issues about your local community negotiation process. Thirty household heads 
will be invited to have a 1-hour interview conducted at their homes about the types of networks they belong to 
and their access to relevant information. Five smaller groups of three community members will meet with the 
researcher to create drawings that represent who has influence and authority at multiple levels – national, local, 
community; and types of networks that exist within the village and how the village is connected to people and 
institutions outside the village.  
Risk of Social Harm 
Results from this study will be widely shared through publication of articles, presentations at various 
conferences, and so on. Although measures will be taken to keep your identity confidential, those familiar with 
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the community maybe able to identify you based on your comments or if they overhear the discussion, such as 
during a group meeting. You should be aware that the topic we are discussing is a sensitive one. Others may 
disagree with your opinion. This might cause conflict or compromise your position in the community. 
Voluntary 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Feel free to ask any questions at any time. You may re-
fuse to answer any question and may stop at any time without penalty. You can also refuse that the researcher 
does not audio record the interview or ask the researcher to stop recording at any time. There is no immediate 
direct benefit to you from participating in this study. Information gained about how negotiation processes are 
influenced may benefit society by improving the understanding of this practice and may also enhance the capac-
ity of local communities to define and communicate their priorities during the negotiation over transfer of land 
use rights. 
Confidentiality 
Individual information obtained through this study will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. The information will be stored in a 
closed cabinet and only accessed by members of the research team. The principal investigators’ faculty supervi-
sor and Iowa State University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB is the committee that reviews and approves 
research studies with human subjects) may inspect and/or copy records for quality assurance and analysis. The-
se records may contain private information. If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or 
research-related injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, 
(515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA.  
Consent 
By freely giving your consent to participate in this research project, you are acknowledging that all in-
formation in this Letter of Introduction was read to you, and that you understand its contents.
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Letter of Introduction – Head of Household 
“Who is Not at the Table? Land Deal Negotiations in Southwestern Cameroon” 
Principal Investigator: Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu (Iowa State University – Tel. 
xxxx) 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Robert Mazur (Iowa State University – Tel. xxxx) 
Participation: 
We are here today to discuss a new research project that will provide insights on community networks 
and relations that influence the transfer of land use rights negotiation processes for stakeholders and policy 
makers. Community members who participate in the study will be asked to discuss with the researcher the net-
works available to them to obtain information relevant to the negotiation process. These are the principal topics: 
types of networks and groups within the community; the interconnectedness or closeness of community mem-
bers; influence and authority; and access to relevant information. 
The interview will be audio recorded if the participant consents. 
As a community member and head of household you are eligible to be included in the study. You are 
hereby invited to participate in a 1-hour interview conducted at your home about the types of networks you be-
long to and your access to relevant information.   
Risk of Social Harm 
Results from this study will be widely shared through publication of articles, presentations at various 
conferences, and so on. Although measures will be taken to keep your identity confidential, those familiar with 
the community maybe able to identify you based on your comments or if they overhear the discussion, such as 
during a group meeting. You should be aware that the topic we are discussing is a sensitive one. Others may 
disagree with your opinion. This might cause conflict or compromise your position in the community. 
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Voluntary 
Your participation in these activities is voluntary. Feel free to ask any questions at any time. You may 
refuse to participate and may stop at any time without penalty. You can also refuse that the researcher should 
not audio record the interview or ask the researcher to stop recording at any time. There is no immediate direct 
benefit to you from participating in this study. Information gained about how negotiation process is influenced 
may benefit society by improving the understanding of this practice and may also enhance the capacity of local 
communities to define and communicate their priorities during the negotiation over transfer of land use rights. 
Confidentiality 
Individual information obtained through this study will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. The information will be stored in a 
closed cabinet and only accessed by members on the research team. The principal investigators’ faculty supervi-
sor and Iowa State University’s Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research 
studies with human subjects) may inspect and/or copy records for quality assurance and analysis.  These records 
may contain private information. If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-
related injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-
3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA.  
 
Consent 
By freely giving your consent to participate in this research project, you are acknowledging that all in-
formation in this Letter of Introduction was read to you, and that you understand its contents. 
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Letter of Introduction – Key Informants 
“Who is Not at the Table? Land Deal Negotiations in Southwestern Cameroon” 
Principal Investigator: Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu (Iowa State University – Tel. xxxx) 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Robert Mazur (Iowa State University – Tel. xxxx) 
Participation: 
We are here today to discuss a new research project that will provide insights on community networks 
and relations that influence the transfer of land use rights negotiation processes for stakeholders and policy 
makers. Community members who participate in the study will be asked to discuss with the researcher the net-
works available to them to obtain information relevant to the negotiation process. These are the principal topics: 
types of networks and groups within the community; the interconnectedness or closeness of community mem-
bers; influence and authority; and access to relevant information.  
The interview will be audio recorded if the participant consents. 
As someone who is knowledgeable about the transfer of land rights negotiation process, you are eligi-
ble to be included in the study. This part of the research will involve a 1-hour interview conducted in your of-
fice or at your home about community participation in the transfer of land use rights. A total of five key inform-
ants will be interviewed in this community. 
Risk of Social Harm 
Results from this study will be widely shared through publication of articles, presentations at various 
conferences, and so on. Although measures will be taken to keep your identity confidential, those familiar with 
the community maybe able to identify you based on your comments or if they overhear the discussion, such as 
during a group meeting. You should be aware that the topic we are discussing is a sensitive one. Others may 
disagree with your opinion. This might cause conflict or compromise your position in the community. 
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Voluntary 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Feel free to ask any questions at any time. You may re-
fuse to answer any question and may stop at any time without penalty. You can also refuse that the researcher 
should not audio record the interview or ask the researcher to stop recording at any time. There is no immediate 
direct benefit to you from participating in this study. Information gained about how negotiation process is influ-
enced may benefit society by improving the understanding of this practice and may also enhance the capacity of 
local communities to define and communicate their priorities during the negotiation over transfer of land use 
rights. 
Confidentiality 
Individual information obtained through this study will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. The information will be stored in a 
closed cabinet.. The interviews will be transcribed by a transcription service at the University of Buea’s De-
partment of Journalism and Mass Communication (JMC). The principal investigators’ faculty supervisor and 
Iowa State University’s Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research studies 
with human subjects) may inspect and/or copy records for quality assurance and analysis. These records may 
contain private information. If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-related 
injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-3115, 
Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA.  
Consent 
By freely giving your consent to participate in this research project, you are acknowledging that all in-
formation in this Letter of Introduction was read to you, and that you understand its contents. 
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Letter of Introduction – Small group members (Net-Mapping) 
“Who is Not at the Table? Land Deal Negotiations in Southwestern Cameroon” 
Principal Investigator: Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu (Iowa State University – Tel. xxx) 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Robert Mazur (Iowa State University – Tel. xxxx) 
Participation: 
We are here today to discuss a new research project that will provide insights on community networks 
and relations that influence the transfer of land use rights negotiation processes for stakeholders and policy 
makers. Community members who participate in the study will be asked to discuss with the researcher the net-
works available to them to obtain information relevant to the negotiation process. These are the principal topics: 
types of networks and groups within the community; the interconnectedness or closeness of community mem-
bers; influence and authority; and access to relevant information. 
The interview will be audio recorded if the participant consents. 
As a community member and head of household you are eligible to be included in the study. Five 
smaller groups of three community members will meet with the researcher to draw the influence and authority 
structures, and types of networks that exist within the village and how the village is connected to institutions 
outside the village. You are hereby invited to participate in a 1-hour small group interview conducted at a pri-
vate venue. During this interview, you and two friends will draw on paper with colored pens to demonstrate the 
structure of decision making within your village, the social networks that exist within and outside your village, 
and how these relationships shape the negotiation process in your village. I will provide the paper and pens, and 
guide you through the process of drawing these network maps.  
Risk of Social Harm 
Results from this study will be widely shared through publication of articles, presentations at various 
conferences, and so on. Although measures will be taken to keep your identity confidential, those familiar with 
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the community maybe able to identify you based on your comments or if they overhear the discussion, such as 
during a group meeting. You should be aware that the topic we are discussing is a sensitive one. Others may 
disagree with your opinion. This might cause conflict or compromise your position in the community. 
Voluntary 
Your participation in these activities is voluntary. Feel free to ask any questions at any time. You may 
refuse to participate and may stop at any time without penalty. You can also refuse that the researcher should 
not audio record the interview or ask the researcher to stop recording at any time. There is no immediate direct 
benefit to you from participating in this study. Information gained about how negotiation process is influenced 
may benefit society by improving the understanding of this practice and may also enhance the capacity of local 
communities to define and communicate their priorities during the negotiation over transfer of land use rights. 
Confidentiality 
Individual information obtained through this study will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. The information will be stored in a 
closed cabinet and only accessed by members on the research team. The principal investigators’ faculty supervi-
sor and Iowa State University’s Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research 
studies with human subjects) may inspect and/or copy records for quality assurance and analysis.  These records 
may contain private information. These records may contain private information. If you have any questions 
about the rights of research subjects or research-related injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-
4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, 
Ames, Iowa 50011, USA.  
Consent 
By freely giving your consent to participate in this research project, you are acknowledging that all in-
formation in this Letter of Introduction was read to you, and that you understand its contents. 
 
  
 
222 
Letter of Introduction – Focus Group Discussion 
“Who is Not at the Table? Land Deal Negotiations in Southwestern Cameroon” 
Principal Investigator: Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu (Iowa State University – Tel. xxx) 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Robert Mazur (Iowa State University – Tel. xxxx) 
Participation: 
We are here today to discuss a new research project that will provide insights on community networks 
and relations that influence the transfer of land use rights negotiation processes for stakeholders and policy 
makers. Community members who participate in the study will be asked to discuss with the researcher the net-
works available to them to obtain information relevant to the negotiation process. These are the principal topics: 
types of networks and groups within the community; the interconnectedness or closeness of community mem-
bers; influence and authority; and access to relevant information. 
These interviews will be audio recorded if the participants consents. 
As a woman/youth 18years and older, and resident in this village, you are eligible to be included in the 
study. This part of the research will involve a 1½ hour focus group discussion in which ten women and ten 
youths will meet separately with the researcher to discuss those issues about your local community negotiation 
process.   
Risk of Social Harm 
Results from this study will be widely shared through publication of articles, presentations at various 
conferences, and so on. Although measures will be taken to keep your identity confidential, those familiar with 
the community maybe able to identify you based on your comments or if they overhear the discussion, such as 
during a group meeting. You should be aware that the topic we are discussing is a sensitive one. Others may 
disagree with your opinion. This might cause conflict or compromise your position in the community. 
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Voluntary 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. Feel free to ask any questions at any time. You may re-
fuse to answer any question and may stop at any time without penalty. You can also refuse that the researcher 
should not audio record the interview or ask the researcher to stop recording at any time. There is no immediate 
direct benefit to you from participating in this study. Information gained about how negotiation process is influ-
enced may benefit society by improving the understanding of this practice and may also enhance the capacity of 
local communities to define and communicate their priorities during the negotiation over transfer of land use 
rights. 
Confidentiality 
Individual information obtained through this study will be kept confidential to the extent permitted by 
applicable laws and regulations and will not be made publicly available. The information will be stored in a 
closed cabinet and only accessed by members on the research team. The principal investigators’ faculty supervi-
sor and Iowa State University’s Institutional Review Board (a committee that reviews and approves research 
studies with human subjects) may inspect and/or copy records for quality assurance and analysis. These records 
may contain private information. If you have any questions about the rights of research subjects or research-
related injury, please contact the IRB Administrator, (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu, or Director, (515) 294-
3115, Office for Responsible Research, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011, USA.  
Consent 
By freely giving your consent to participate in this research project, you are acknowledging that all in-
formation in this Letter of Introduction was read to you, and that you understand its contents. 
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Letter of Introduction – Community Meeting (pidgin english letter of introduc-
tion) 
“Who is Not at the Table? Land Deal Negotiations in Southwestern Cameroon” 
Principal Investigation: Juliana Nnoko-Mewanu  (Iowa State University) 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Robert Mazur (Iowa State University) 
Participation: 
We dey here today na say make I tell wonna about the work wey I want do am for dis village. I want 
for tok for wonna about the discussion wey this village ei dey get em with Herakle Farms or SG SOC. People 
dem wey go gree for tok for me we go tok na about the connection dem wey people dem get em for this village 
– that is, who wey wonna know and how that person or people dem dey help wonna get information concerning 
Herakle their project. The main thing dem wey we go discuss na about; the kinna group dem wey dem dey for 
this village; who wey wonna know or how wonna connect with people dem for outside wonna village; na who 
dem dey tok people dem hear for this village; and last thing na for know how wonna dey get get news wey ei 
concern Herakles Farms. 
I go like for tok with people dem wey dem dey stay for this village wey dem dey 18 years and older. I 
go do two group meeting wey ei go take about 11/2 hour – one with woman dem and the second one with young 
boy and girl dem; wey we go tok about how the arrangement between wonna village and Herakle Farms dey 
waka. I go tok for thirty other people dem wey na dem stand like head for their family for know the group, and 
association dem wey dem join, and the connection wey dem get for inside this village and also for outside. This 
one na for know how this people dem dey get important news wey ei fit help dem for tok for this arrangement. 
For last end, I go meetup with five small group dem wey dem go get about two or three people for dey. Me and 
this people dem for the different groups dem we go draw how dem dey see the connection dem for this village, 
and also who dey tok people dem hear for inside and outside this village. 
Voluntary: 
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I no dey force any person make ei tok for me. Wonna fit ask me question anytime and person too fit 
deny for answer any question wey I fit ask em or stop say ei no want continue wit the discussion wey me and ei 
fit dey get em. No bad thing no dey wey ei fit happen for any person wey ei gree for tok for me. Person too no 
got gain something directly if ei tok for me, na just say the information wey I go get em from wonna I go write 
book wey ei fit turn ei benefit this whole village because ei fit help Big people dem for understand wetin dey 
happen for village level, and ei fit soso help this village for another kind arrangement wey dem go get for do 
with maybe another people dem or for future. 
Confidentiality: 
All man wey ei go tok with me I go keep ei information for under lock and key as how law for 
whiteman contry ei tok. Na only me, my teacher for school, and some small group of people dem wey dem dey 
call em say Iowa State University ei Institutional Review Board (na dem dey check say I no go play play with 
the tory wey wonna go tell me) go fit read the thing wey wonna go tell me for this village. If wonna get any 
question about wetin wey concern the thing wey I dey do, or fit anything ei hambuck any person for this village 
because of wetin I cam do for here, abeg make wonna contact that small group wey I don tell wonna about for 
this number (515) 294-4566, IRB@iastate.edu or the Director wey na ei dey control this kind work wey I cam 
do for here for this number (515) 294-3115, all dem na for Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa, U.S.A. or wonna 
fit call me for this number xxxx for tell me wetin don happen. 
Consent: 
Person wey ei go like for tok for me for this my work, ei go get for gree say me a don read ei this let-
ter, and say you understand all thing wey ei dey inside. 
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APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW GUIDES AND QUESTIONNAIRE 
Questions for Discussion with Village Head of Households 
Village/Community Name _____________________________ 
Identifying Benefits from Land: 
i. Personal history: How long have you lived here? Highest level of education? What do you do 
for a living? How has community life changed from 5 years ago? How has it changed from 
last year? 
ii. How do you use the village forest? Do you eat forest products (e.g., bush meat, seeds, barks, 
leaves)? Do you sell forest products? Where do you get firewood? 
iii. How do you use water? Are there rules/laws about how to use water? 
iv. Do you farm (if primary occupation is not farming)? Do you own land or rent? If you own, do 
you have title? If not, would you like to have title? How do you get title? (If rental, from 
whom?) 
Information 
Acquiring Knowledge 
i. Where do you get your information? (Probe: how often do you listen to the radio? What pro-
gram do you usually listen to? How often do you watch television? What do you usually 
watch? Which newspaper have you read or had read to you in the last month? 
ii. How do you get information about government policies? How do you get information about 
decisions made by the Traditional Council?  
iii. How often do you travel to a neighboring village, town – or further away? What means of 
transportation do you use? [Probe: where did you go to during your last two trips out of the 
village?]  
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Managing Knowledge 
i. Tell me about the SG Sustainable Oils Company project? How do you know this? 
ii. What do you know about the land negotiations in your village? Where are the negotiations 
carried out? Who is involved in the negotiations? What is the negotiation about? Has a con-
tract been signed? 
iii. When was the village first contacted? By whom? Was the village consulted during the Envi-
ronmental and Social Impact Assessment? Please discuss. Have you read the ESIA report? 
Leveraging Knowledge 
i. What are the benefits of this deal? What are the costs? Is it good or bad for the community as 
a whole? For specific groups? Why? How are you supporting/resisting this deal? 
ii. How do you feel about the possibility of being displaced and resettled? How would/will you 
be affected? 
Participation 
i. Have you or anyone in your household been involved in the negotiations with Herakles Farms 
at any time? When were you or household member involved? Are you currently involved? [if 
currently, involved ask Village authority questions too] 
ii. What determines who participates and who does not in these negotiations? 
iii. Have you participated in any mapping exercise? Who was involved in the mapping? What 
does this mean for villagers? Was your farm or the farm of someone you know involved in 
this mapping? 
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Power Relations 
Access to power authorities 
i. What is the name of the District Officer? Where is the office? When was the last time you 
saw him/her? 
ii. If you had a problem, who would you see to solve it? Would you use the courts? Where is the 
closest court?  
Agenda Setting 
i. What are the key issues and concerns for you and your village? How? by whom? when? 
ii. Do you believe that there are barriers which prevent/affect meaningful community participa-
tion in these negotiations? Please, explain. 
Decision-making 
i. How are decisions made in the village? Who are members of the Traditional Council (TC)?  
ii. If not a member, how do you ‘influence’ decisions that are made? Have you talked with any 
member of the TC in the last week? Month? Please explain. 
iii. Which other institutions affect decisions at the village level? Do you have access to these in-
stitutions? 
iv. Can you give me an example of when you or someone you know made a proposal and it was 
accepted? Or not? 
v. Have you, or anyone you know, worked with Herakles Farms? If so, how was he/she contact-
ed? Were they paid? Is the person still working with Herakles? If not, how long were they 
employed? 
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Shaping of Perceived Needs  
i. Tell me about land in your village? How is land divided? By whom? Who owns the land 
which has not been divided to villagers? 
ii. In your opinion, does the village have the right to make the decision on rights transfer over 
the forest? Please, explain. 
iii. How can the village keep their right to the forest and still have Herakles operate in your vil-
lage? 
Social Capital 
Groups and Networks 
i. Please tell me about any social groups that exist in this village? membership? history? [Probe 
for farmer group or cooperatives, traders associations, professional associations – teachers, 
neighborhood/village committee, religious or spiritual groups, political groups, cultural 
groups or association, youth group, NGO, sports group, and finance, credit or savings groups]. 
ii. Do you or member of your household belong to any group, association or organization? Who 
can become a member? How do you become a member? How long have you/person been a 
member?  
iii. Which two groups/associations/organizations are most important to you? Do you/person ac-
tively participate in the group’s decision making?  
iv. How are leaders selected? What is the main benefit from joining this group? Do these groups 
have overlapping membership? Do they work or interact with other groups with similar goals 
in/outside the village? Do they work/interact with other groups with dissimilar goals 
in/outside the village? 
v. Are there any civil society organizations (non-governmental, international organizations) that 
exist or are working in this area? How long in the area? What are your impressions about the-
se CSOs? How do you and other villagers interact with CSOs? 
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vi. Is there a cooperative in this village? Are you a member? If not, why? Who makes decisions 
in the cooperative about distribution of resources (cash, seed, fertilizers, training etc)? 
vii. Is there a Credit Union in your village? If not, where is the closest? Are you a member? Have 
you ever borrowed from this credit union (or any other?)? Do you plan to borrow in the fu-
ture? What would you use as collateral? 
Trust and Solidarity 
i. Can you trust these groups/associations to not make decisions that will adversely affect you? 
ii. Tell me about trust and solidarity in your community? [PROBE] Who are the people you in-
teract with these days? [close friends] If you needed a small amount of money (4000frs - $8) 
How would you get it? How many people beyond household can you turn to who would be 
willing to provide this money? Can you trust people who live in the village to make decisions 
that will not adversely affect you? [PROBE: different ethnic, status, gender, age]. 
iii. Has the level of trust increased or decreased since Herakles came to this village? Please ex-
plain. 
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Questions for Discussion with Focus Groups  
Village/Community Name _____________________________ 
Focus Group Discussion (with women and youth) 
i. How do people get the rights to land in your village? Who has rights to land in the village? 
And who does not? 
ii. How do you use the forest? 
iii. What do you know about the land investor and the project overall? 
iv. How will this land transaction affect economic life in the community? How will it affect so-
cial life? 
v. What is the implication for the quantity of food that will be grown here? 
vi. Can the negotiations be done differently? How? Please explain. 
vii. How can you impact the negotiation process? 
viii. What are your aspirations in regards to land for the future?  
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Questions for Discussion with Key Informants – Village Authority 
Village/Community Name _____________________________ 
i. What are the major economic and social concerns of your households? What are the major 
concerns of the village? 
ii. Tell me about the negotiations with Herakles Farms/SGSOC. 
Power relations 
i. How was the village contacted? 
ii. Who are the people involved in the negotiations? Are you selected or is it voluntary? How do 
you get selected to participate in the negotiations? Who is the leader? Why is/are these per-
son(s) the leader(s)? Can anyone be a leader in these negotiations? Do participants change 
overtime? Or are the people involved the same from the beginning?  
iii. How are the meetings structured? How often do meetings occur? How often do you attend? 
When was the last meeting you attended? Where? Was there a time when you did not attend 
these meetings? 
iv. Do you have a budget for this process? Where is the budget allocation from? 
v. How are decisions made within the group? Can you describe a situation when you or another 
person suggested something and it was accepted? And a situation when you suggested some-
time and it was overlooked? 
vi. Are the meetings supervised/facilitated? By whom? Please explain. [PROBE: Who do you 
give accounts to? How do you involve other villagers in this process?] 
vii. What is Herakles Farms offering? What are your demands? What are other alternatives to 
agreement? 
viii. Are there any traditional rules or norms on how decision should be reached? 
ix. Will the agreement reached be final or can it be changed? 
x. In your opinion, do you think the village has a legal right to say no to this transaction? 
[PROBE: What would happen if you say NO? What would happen if the village says NO?] 
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Knowledge 
i. Where do you get information relevant to the land negotiation? 
ii. In your opinion, do you think you have enough information about the project to make a valid 
decision? 
iii. How do you share information about this transaction with others in the village? Are there 
some types of information that are not shared with the village or particular constituents? 
iv. Do you know anyone who works for Herakles Farms? 
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Questions for Discussion with Key Informants – Government Official 
Village/Community Name _____________________________ 
i. In your knowledge, what are the steps that have been taken by Herakles Farms to lease the 
land? 
ii. What is the legal backing of this lease? 
iii. What are the benefits of this investment to the Cameroonian government? 
iv. Have you been to any of the affected communities? 
Power Relations 
i. How are the community consultations being organized? How many times? 
ii. How will this project likely impact the community? (positively and negatively) 
iii. Have you talked to the local communities about some of the costs of this project? 
iv. Do the local communities have the right to say no? [PROBE: What would happen if a local 
community says NO?] 
v. If a local community is against this transfer, what are the tools available to them to resist? Are 
there villages that are against this transfer? Is an outside organization, group, or association 
helping them? 
Participation 
i. What, if any, are the current processes and protocols used to facilitate community participa-
tion in land negotiations and consultation? 
ii. Are there barriers to local people’s involvement in the process? If so, please explain. How 
would you recommend they be overcome? 
iii. Do you think it is important/useful to include local communities in the negotiation process 
over the transfer of land rights? 
iv. Can you recommend appropriate processes or mechanisms, which will increase the effective-
ness of local participation in the process? 
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v. Are you aware of any other land deal that is ongoing or concluded in Cameroon? Please dis-
cuss. 
vi. Do you know anyone who works for Herakles Farms?  
vii. Do you know anyone from Nguti/Fabe? 
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Questions for Discussion with Key Informants – Herakle Farms - SGSOC Repre-
sentative 
i. How did Herakles make the decision of locating in the Southwest Region and specifically in 
Kupe and Ndian? 
ii. To your knowledge, what kind of authorizations and contracts does Herakles farms have to 
date? 
iii. How do you make contact with a village for negotiations? 
iv. How are the community consultations being organized? At what phase of the project is Hera-
kles now? How many villages is Herakles in negotiation with?  
v. Why are you negotiating with local communities when you have authorization from the gov-
ernment? 
vi. What are the types of demands being made by the villages? 
vii. What are the types of agreements that have been made by Herakles Farms and local commu-
nities? Are these agreements contractual? 
viii. How is the project being financed? 
ix. Are there barriers to local people involvement in the process? If so, please explain. How 
would you recommend they be overcome? 
x. Do you think it is important/useful to include local communities in the processes concerning 
land investments? How, ideally? 
xi. What opportunities are available for the involvement of local communities in the transfer of 
land rights to Herakles farms?  
xii. What are the costs? benefits? 
xiii. Can you recommend appropriate processes or mechanisms, which will increase the amount of 
information local communities have of your project? 
xiv. What would happen if a local community says NO?  
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Questions for Discussion with Key Informants – NGO Representative 
Village/Community Name _____________________________ 
i. What is your organizations role in Nguti/Fabe? In the negotiation process? Please describe. 
ii. What do you know about Herakles Farms? How? 
iii. How is the Cameroonian government benefiting from this investment? 
iv. In your opinion, is the land lease legal? Why? 
Power Relations 
i. To the best of your knowledge, how are the community consultations being organized? Who 
is involved in the negotiations? What are the demands? What has been agreed? 
ii. How will the project likely impact the community? 
iii. Are there villages that are resisting this land transaction? How are they resisting? 
iv. Do the local communities have the right to say no? 
v. Do you think it is important/useful to include local communities in the negotiation process 
over the transfer of land rights? 
vi. What would happen if a local community says NO? What would happen if they ALL said 
NO? 
Participation 
i. What opportunities are available for the involvement of local communities in the transfer of 
land rights to Herakles farms? What are the costs? 
ii. Are there barriers to local people involvement in the process? If so, please explain. How can 
these barriers be overcome? 
iii. Can you recommend appropriate processes or mechanisms, which will increase the effective-
ness of local participation in the process? 
Information 
i. Are you aware of any other land deal that is ongoing or concluded in Cameroon? Please dis-
cuss. 
ii. Do you know anyone who works for Herakles Farms? Do you know how it is being financed? 
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Net-Mapping – Qualitative Data Protocol (with permission from Dr. Eva Schiffer) 
Net-Map Field Guide: Who influences the decision making process 
Pre-Interview 
-­‐ Write the date, question, and interview partner’s name at the top of a flip chart page. -­‐ Write the names of the links in the corner of the flipchart page, using the color to correspond with links 
(reporting [blue], funding [red], advice [gold]). 
Overview of Research/Intervention:  
-­‐ Introduce project and organization (Who are you?) -­‐ Introduce Net-Map intervention (Why are we doing this? What are our goals and what do we hope to 
learn from you? Briefly describe the steps of Net-Map) -­‐ Introduce main concepts and terms used (What do we mean when we say the decision making pro-
cess?) 
Brief introduction: 
I am a PhD student in the Sociology Department and Sustainable Agriculture Program at Iowa State 
University, Ames, Iowa, U.S.A. I am are here today to discuss a new research project that will provide 
insights on community networks and relations that influence the transfer of land use rights negotiation 
processes. My main purpose is to determine how the decision making process over the transfer of land 
is made, who and what institutions have influence over this process. I will ask about the individuals 
and institutions involved in the decision making process and ask you to rank their level of influence 
over this process. The decision making process involves all interactions with the investor, government, 
traditional authorities, and general community related to the land transfer (such as community meet-
ings, council meetings, traditional council meetings, etc.). 
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Step 1: Determine Actors 
 
-­‐ Ask the interview partner to list organizations and individuals who are involved in the decision making 
process those who could influence it.   -­‐ Write names on sticky-notes, using different colors for different actor categories -­‐ Explain that the different color sticky-notes depict the actor categories: 
o Investor (Green) 
o Government authority (Brown) 
o Traditional authority (Dark Green) 
o Village authority (Fushia) 
o Spiritual authority (Purple) 
o Mobilization authority (Magenta)  
-­‐ Place actors on flipchart sheet, in no particular order. (You can put actors you know to be most ‘ac-
tive’ in the center of the map, but do not spend time doing this with the interview partner.) 
Step 2: Drawing links between actors  
Draw arrows between actors using a different color for each link. Draw one link at a time (e.g., finish all of link 
1 before starting on link 2), but let them draw additional links later if they remember something. 
Links should be ONLY drawn when related to the decision making process! 
Overall Question: "Who influences the decision making?" 
 Who plays a role in the decision making process? 
	  
For the following links, who provides ____________ to whom? 
- Link 1 (Blue)  
- Link 2 (Red)  
- Link 3 (Gold)  
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• Reporting (blue) – this represents information flow from one actor to another. This depicts who gets 
relevant information and through which information streams.  
• Funding (red)  – this includes monetary and non-monetary transfers between actors such as bags of 
rice, boxes of fresh fish, cows etc. 
• Advice (gold) – this represents which actor is aiding another, who guides who in the decision making 
process. 
You can alter the terminology to make the interview partner comfortable.   
Step 3:  Attribute influence 
 
-­‐ Define influence:  
o Ask the interview partner “what are different ways someone could influence the decision 
making process?” Tell them other possible ways of influencing if they leave things out. 
§ Ways of influencing include, but are not limited to: formal supervision, funding, 
technical information, advice, advocacy and pressure, but might go beyond the links 
mentioned above, e.g.  influence because one is respected.  
-­‐ Attribute influence: 
o First ask the influence level of each actor quickly, starting with the most influential actor(s). 
Then go back and ask them to explain each one. Ask the respondent to discuss “Where does their influence 
come from and how do they use it?”, for each actor.  In particular, get explanations about all actors that are very 
high, very low, or seem a bit inconsistent or unclear where their influence comes from. In group interviews: 
Note different views in disagreements. 
How strongly can each actor influence the decision making process? 
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§ For instance, “Actor x and y are the highest influence, where does their influence 
come from?” “Why is Actor w higher than Actor z if actor w doesn’t have many 
links?” “These two actors have the same level of influence – what happens if they 
disagree?” 
§ DO NOT PROMPT THEM TO CHANGE THE INFLUENCE. JUST ASK QUES-
TIONS UNTIL YOU UNDERSTAND THEIR ANSWER OR THEY CHANGE IT. 
o Last, review the entire board, starting by stating the influence level of the actor with the high-
est level all the way down to the lowest.  
o The purpose of doing this in three stages is to allow the interview partner to reflect on his/her 
answers and possibly make changes upon noticing inconsistencies.  
-­‐ THIS SECTION GENERATES RICH INFORMATION; BE SURE TO TAKE DETAILED NOTES 
HERE.  
Step 4: What is the primary goal of each actor?  
 
-­‐ Define the primary goal of each actor on the board. Each actor should only have 1 primary goal. If the 
interview partner insists that the actor has more than 1 primary goal you can add 2, but ask them to ex-
plain how/why they split their focus. -­‐ If the interview partner does not know the primary goal of the actor, tell we are interested in their im-
pression of what it is. If they are not comfortable doing this, then don’t write a goal for that actor.  
For each actor, determine their primary goal with regards to the decision making process -­‐ Pre-define goals and determine symbols or letters to indicate the goals 
Discussion: 
This depends on the content and goals of the Net-Mapping. Define questions as needed, to dig 
deeper into the “How?” and “Why?”, learn about opportunities and bottlenecks, develop future 
strategies or understand past performance. Limit this section to not more than 3 questions. 
Take detailed notes of answers. 
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Community Involvement and Participation in the Project Affected Villages As-
sociation Interview Guide 
Identifying Space 
1. How is PAV structured?  
a. Where does PAV get its funding? 
b. Is PAV affiliated to any other organizations? 
c. How are Executives selected? 
2. What has actually been accomplished? 
3. Which other types of stakeholders (individuals) are involved in this process? (lawyers, govern-
ment officials, etc.) 
a. What is their role? 
b. What do other stakeholders expect to achieve? 
4. Which agencies (Private sector, NGO etc) are involved in the process? 
a. How? (specify name of administrative agency) 
Citizenship 
1. Do you feel that the land transfer process should involve local community members? 
a. Why? 
b. How could this best be enhanced? 
2. Do you feel that the opinions of the different communities are presently being heard in the PAV 
process? 
a. Why? 
b. How could this best be enhanced?  
3. Do you feel that the government generally values input from local participants in this process? 
a. How could this best be enhanced?  
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Representation 
4. Do you think member selection in PAV is representative of actual community social characteris-
tics? 
a. Were there any individuals or groups that play a prominent role in the participatory process? 
If so, explain 
5. In your opinion how can representation of community characteristics be enhanced within PAV? 
6. In your opinion, what part of the participation process in PAV works well? 
7. In your opinion, are there changes that you would like to see in this process? 
8. Do you think all PAV members are involved or represented in this participatory process?  
a. If yes, at what stages were they involved? 
b. If no, how could degree of involvement be enhanced? 
9. Are the results of PAV meetings ever reported back to the public? Yes/No 
a. If No, are there suggestions that you wish to make to ensure that the communities affected 
hear about the process? 
b. If yes, how are results reported? 
10. In your opinion, have there been differences among the desires of PAV participants? 
Identifying Influence 
Influence 
11. Who decides meeting locations?  
a. Who sets the agenda for meetings? 
b. Who takes meeting minutes? 
c. How are those minutes accessible/shared? 
12. Who has more influence within PAV?  
a. If more than one person, what happens when they disagree? 
13. How easy is it for participants to contribute to discussion in the meetings? 
14. Is anything done to obtain opinions from participants who are absent during a meeting? If so, 
how? 
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15. Is the internet used in the participation process? If so, how? 
16. Who has the ‘last word’ in PAV? 
Agenda 
17. How are the rules, constitution, and procedures of decision making set within PAV? 
18. In your opinion, do you think that these rules and procedures are fair or biased towards certain 
stakeholders represented within PAV? 
a.  Please explain. 
Socio-Political Context 
19. How could difficulties be overcome? 
20. How could opportunities be enhanced? 
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                                     Department of Sociology 
Community Involvement and Participation in the Project Affected Villages Association 
I. Community Economy: The first set of questions is on your impression of your community. 
1. Where do you live: _______________________________________ 
a. How long have you lived in your current residence? (in years) _______ 
2. Name of Village you are representing in PAV? ___________________ 
3. Have you lived at any point during your lifetime in your village (community) named in #2 above? 
Yes/No 
a. How much time did you spend in your village (community) in the last year (2014)? 
i. Less than 60 days 
ii. 60 – 120 days 
iii. More than 120 days 
4. How much land ‘belonging’ to your community is being acquired?  ______________ha 
a. What proportion of total land under acquisition ‘belongs’ to your village? 
i. Less than 5% 
ii. 5% - 15% 
iii. More than 15% 
b. Describe land involved in acquisition  
i. National forest 
ii. Community forest  
iii. Cultivated land 
iv. Built land 
5. Does your village get any revenue from forest royalties? Yes/No   
a. If yes, please provide an approximate cash amount ___________F, Month-
ly/Quarterly/Yearly  
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6. How would you characterize your village’s (community’s) economy over the PAST 5 years?  
a. Improving greatly  ______________ 
b. Improving  ______________ 
c. Unchanged  ______________ 
d. Declining  ______________ 
e. Declining greatly  ______________ 
f. Don’t know  ______________ 
7. How would you characterize your expectation of this village’s (community’s) economic future over 
the NEXT 5 years? 
a. Will improve greatly  ______________ 
b. Will improve somehow  ______________ 
c. Will remain the same  ______________ 
d. Will decline somehow  ______________ 
e. Will decline greatly   ______________ 
f. Don’t know   ______________ 
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II. Assets: Please tell us about the availability and accessibility of the following assets in community. 
Key indicator Asset  
code 
Abundant 
(6) 
Mostly 
available 
(5) 
Slightly 
available 
(4) 
Slightly 
unavailable 
(3) 
Mostly una-
vailable (2) 
Non-
existent 
(0) 
Educational Facilities AS11       
Vocational training facili-
ties 
AS12       
Health facilities (hospi-
tals, health units, Red 
cross) 
AS13       
Revenue from community 
forest 
AS21       
Subsidies (legisla-
tive/divisional) 
AS22       
Formal Credit facilities 
(banks, credit unions) 
AS23       
Informal credit facilities 
(njangis) 
AS24       
Farmer Cooperatives AS25       
Water Supply AS31       
Sanitation (Toilets) AS32       
Energy (electricity, solar, 
diesel) 
AS33       
Secure shelter/buildings AS34       
Roads (connecting to ma-
jor town) 
AS35       
Telephone network AS36       
Land (quality/quantity) AS41       
Forest/forest product AS42       
Wildlife & biodiversity 
(Sanctuaries/reserves) 
AS43       
Water & aquatic resources AS44       
Leadership/representation AS51       
Tradition of reciprocal 
exchange 
AS52       
Community work groups AS53       
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III. Participation: The next set of questions measures your participation in PAV. 
8. At what stage of the participatory process were you involved? Explain answer 
a. Before creation _______________ 
b. Early after creation _______________ 
c. Later after creation _______________ 
9. How would you categorize your level of involvement in PAV? 
a. Extremely involved _______________ 
b. Involved  _______________ 
c. Moderate  _______________ 
d. Minimal  _______________ 
e. Not at all involved _______________ 
10. How are people selected to participate in PAV? 
a. Election  _______________ 
b. Appointment ( By _______________________) 
c. What are their claims to legitimacy to speak for others? 
___________________________________________________________ 
11. How many PAV meetings have you attended since inception? 
i. A few 
ii. Most 
iii. All 
a. How often did you attend meetings the last year? 
i. A few 
ii. Most 
iii. All 
b. How do you hear about these meetings?  
i. Media (TV, Radio, Newspaper) 
ii. Internal comms. (phone calls, circular, emails)  
iii. Friends 
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12. What is your level of involvement in the PAV? 
i. Executive board member 
ii. Committee member  
iii. Member 
 
13. Which of the following participation measures are used? (check all that apply) 
a. Information about the benefits of the project 
b. Information about the risks of the project 
c. Information/orientation about the project and implementation process 
d. Data about the physical location of proposed site 
e. Data about community views or interest group views 
f. Information about the legal procedures of transfer 
g. Encouragement to participate in certain measures without reciprocity 
h. Asked for advice 
i. Information about continuous monitoring and evaluation 
j. Encouraged self-mobilization amongst communities 
 
14. In your opinion do you feel that your voice is heard during the decision making process in PAV? 
a. Yes/No         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i. Please Explain 
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
____________________________________________________
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15. How would you characterize your level of involvement in the decision making process in PAV? 
a. No involvement 
b. Little involvement 
c. Somewhat involved 
d. A great deal involved 
16. Please rate the availability of each of these resources during the participation Process (Circle the ap-
propriate number) 
 Abundant Mostly 
available 
Slightly 
available 
Slightly una-
vailable 
Mostly una-
vailable 
Time 1 2 3 4 5 
Money 1 2 3 4 5 
Information 1 2 3 4 5 
Transportation 1 2 3 4 5 
Tech. support 1 2 3 4 5 
 
17. Please rate how satisfied you are with the results/outcomes of PAV? 
a. Thrilled 
b. Mostly satisfied 
c. Slightly satisfied 
d. Slightly unsatisfied 
e. Mostly unsatisfied 
 
 
 
 
i. How could the process be enhanced/improved? 
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
__________________________________________________________
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18. Please rate on a scale of 1 to 7 (where 1 means lowest intensity and 7 means highest intensity) your 
emotions about your involvement in PAV? 
 
 Frustrated Mostly dis-
satisfied 
Slightly dis-
satisfied 
Slightly 
satisfied 
Mostly 
satisfied 
Decision 
making 
1 2 3 5 6 
Agenda set-
ting 
1 2 3 5 6 
Stakeholder 
Interaction 
1 2 3 5 6 
 
III. Demographics: We need to ask a few questions about your background. This information, as with all infor-
mation provided in this survey, will be used for statistical analysis only and will remain strictly confidential. 
19. How old are you? ___________________ 
20. Male / Female 
21. What is your marital status? _____________________ 
22. What is your highest level of education? ___________________ 
23. What is your occupation? ______________________ 
24. If applicable, what is your spouse/s or partner’s occupation? Please indicate occupation, retired or de-
ceased if applicable: __________________________________ 
25. What category best describes your total annual household income before taxes? 
a. Less than 50,000F  _______________ 
b. 50,000F to 99,000F _______________ 
c. 100,000F to 149,000F _______________ 
d. 150,000F to 199,000F _______________ 
e. 200,000F and over _______________ 
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26. Do you have children? Yes / No 
a. How many? ______________ 
b. Are there any children living at home? Yes / No / Not applicable 
i. If Yes, how many children are living at home? _________ 
 
Thank You for your cooperation ☺ 
If you have additional comments, please use the back page. 
Department of Sociology 
103 East Hall 
Ames, IA 50011-1070 
515-296-6480  
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Gendered Resource Relations and Changing Land Value Questionnaire 
Name ___________________________________ Village______________________________, Age_________ 
No. Children __________ 
1. Can you tell me about how land is managed in your village?  
a. Can women own land? (Under what circumstances?). if not, why not? 
b. Do you own land? Do you share ownership of the land? If so, with whom? 
i. How did you acquire your land? 
2. Do you farm?  
a. If yes, how much land did you use in the current or most recent season? 
b. What is the family’s main source of income? 
3. If you own land does this mean you can sell, lease, or bequest without prior permission from another 
person? 
a. If no, how did you gain access to this land? 
4. Does this transfer, directly affect your land, or the land of someone you know?  
a. How are you negotiating? How are they negotiating? 
b. Who are you negotiating with specifically? Are there others involved in this process? 
c. Is there talk of compensation? If yes, please specify. 
5. Are you or someone you know involved in the negotiation/consultation process over the transfer of 
land to SGSOC?  
a. Do you know of how many meetings have been held?  
i. If yes, how many and how did you find out about these meetings? 
6. Have you been invited to these meetings? If yes, who invited you? if no, Why? 
a. Are there other public spaces (market, church etc) where people interact casually where 
you can gain information about this land transfer? If yes, please explain. 
7. Are there other women involved in this process? If no, Why? 
a. Who is allowed to talk, who is not? 
b. Who makes the decisions?  
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8. What do you think about how people who have decision-making power in the village share infor-
mation with other people in the village? 
a. How do they not share information with other people in the village? 
b. Are there other information networks that exist in your village? (e.g. within the family, 
social groups, cooperative etc?) 
c. Do you belong to these networks? Do you gain information from these networks? If so, 
how? If not, Why? 
9. Do you have misgivings concerning this process?  
a. If yes, about what? 
b. If yes, have you ever voiced these misgivings?  
i. If yes, to whom?  
ii. If no, why not? 
10. What are you doing, if anything, to change/influence the process? If you are doing nothing, can you 
explain why you do not feel compelled to try to influence the process? 
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APPENDIX D: ARTICLES OF ASSOCIATION SGSOC_PAV 
ARTICLE 1: Name, Purpose, Objectives and Membership 
1.1. Name: 
The name of the Association is SGSOC-Project Affected Villages Association (SGSOC-PAV). Unless 
stated to the contrary within this document, words and expressions used shall have the same meaning as set out 
in the articles of the SGSOC-PAV. 
1.2. Purpose: 
At the creation, SG Sustainable Oils Cameroon Limited (SGSOC-The Company) and the Project Af-
fected Villages (PAV) have agreed to set up an Association that shall jointly oversee the implementation of the 
obligations of both parties contained in the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between the indi-
genes of Nguti Sub Division and SGSOC on 27 July 2010 and the MoU between the indigenes of Mundemba 
and Toko Sub-Divisions and SGSOC on 30 July 2010. SGSOC-PAV will also oversee the implementation of 
specific provisions regarding the PAV in the Common Commitment concluded by the State of Cameroon repre-
sented by the Senior Divisional Officer for Ndian and SGSOC on the 31st of August 2011 and the Common 
Commitment signed between the Government of Cameroon represented by the Senior Divisional Officer of 
Kupe Muanengoba and SGSOC on the 15th of September 2011 and other past and future agreements between 
SGSOC and the PAV. 
1.3. Objectives: 
The objectives for which the Association is established include: 
1.3.1 Implementation of the different programs  
1.3.1.1. Have oversight and ensure effective implementation of the commitments in the 
MoU, Common Commitment, Business plan of July 2008 and establishment convention of 17th 
September 2009. 
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1.3.1.2. The list of the obligations of the MoU and Common Commitments are an inte-
gral part of these Articles of Association [attached]. 
1.3.1.3. Issues that are specific to one village are subject to the Association’s review 
and opinions and are under the guidance of the Chief and Council of the particular village and The 
Company. 
1.3.1.4. In addition to the items listed in the MoU, Common Commitments and future 
agreements, SGSOC-PAV will review and discuss the following topics: 
1.3.2. Communication: 
1.3.2.1. The Association will periodically communicate information and data obtained 
from monitoring and evaluating the project activities. 
1.3.2.2. Raise awareness amongst PAV members on the Company’s project activities. 
1.3.3. Coordination:  
1.3.3.1. SGSOC-PAV will support in coordinating projects to: 
1.3.3.1.1. Ensure community participation; 
1.3.3.1.2. Access to information; 
1.3.3.1.3. Community capacity building. 
1.3.4. Engagement : SGSOC-PAV will among others support in ensuring: 
1.3.4.1. High Conservation Value areas protection (Areas with endangered species); 
1.3.4.2. Crime prevention; 
1.3.4.3. Oversight, gate keeping and educating the PAV’s; 
1.3.4.4. Interaction with other government programs that will help in implementing this 
objective. 
1.4. Membership 
1.4.1. All villages where SGSOC has its operations on the ground shall willingly be members. 
1.4.2. Categories of membership 
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1.4.2.1 Original members 
Villages where SGSOC has operations on the ground as of November 2012 namely Talangaye, Nguti 
in the Nguti Sub Division and Lipenja 1 and Fabe in the Toko and Mundemba Sub Divisions respectively. 
1.4.2.2. Other members 
Villages where SGSOC has operations after November 2012 
1.4.2.3. SGSOC Representatives 
ARTICLE 2: Head Office:  
The registered head office of SGSOC-PAV [the Association] will be situated in Limbe, Fako Division, 
South West Region, Republic of Cameroon. The postal address shall be: C/O PO Box 64 Limbe. Telephone: 
33332346 Fax: 33332375. The registered office may be transferred to any other place in the Republic of Came-
roon by a decision of the Board of Governors. 
ARTICLE 3: Organization and Functioning:  
3.1. General Assembly: AGM 
3.1.1. Composition:  
The Annual General Assembly shall comprise of representatives of the Chiefs, youths, female leaders 
and religious authority of the PAVs and representatives of The Company. Other stakeholders may be invited 
depending on their competence as need be. The AGM will be made up of 100 delegates. This number may be 
reviewed annually as the project expands. Each village will send a chief and two representatives to be chosen 
from among the youth’s, female leaders and religious authority. 
 
3.1.2. The Chairperson and Vice  
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The Chairperson and Vice shall be Chiefs selected [produced] from the original members and will ro-
tate within the two original zones. 
3.1.3. Roles and Functions  
3.1.3.1. It shall define the general orientations, vision, missions, goals and policies of SGSOC-PAV. 
3.1.3.2. It shall examine and approve annual reports of the Board of Governors. 
3.1.3.3. It shall nominate and approve members of the Board of Governors 
3.1.3.4. It shall approve the annual financial and management accounts of SGSOC-PAV  
3.1.3.5. It shall approve the appointment of auditors of SGSOC-PAV  
3. 1.4 Meetings: 
3.1.4.1. It shall meet once a year preferably in the second week of March.  
3.1.4.2. A minimum of 14 day notice shall be given to delegates. 
3.2. Board of Governors 
3.2.1 Membership 
3.2.1.1. The Board of Governors shall comprise of Chiefs, The Company Representatives, Community 
Youths, Elders and Female leaders.  
3.2.1.2. The Board will comprise of 19 members. 
 
3.2.2. Composition 
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3.2.2.1. The Chairperson shall be a chief from the original members 
3.2.2.2. The Vice Chairperson shall be a chief from the original members 
3.2.2.3. A secretary 
3.2.2.4. Other members as provided for in 3.2.1.1. 
3.2.3. Roles and Functions  
3.2.2.1. It shall be responsible for the strategic planning of SGSOC-PAV  
3.2.2.2. It shall be responsible for the SGSOC-PAV overall policy and decision-making.  
3.2.2.3. It shall ensure the implementation of the policies, resolutions and decisions of the AGM.  
3.2.2.4. It shall develop and approve annual Plans of Actions and SGSOC-PAV objectives 
and purpose. 
3.2.2.5. It shall approve the annual budget and shall examine and approve annual financial and man-
agement accounts of SGSOC-PAV.  
3.2.3 Meetings 
3.2.3.1. It shall meet six times each year; once every two months during the first year of establishment. 
The timing may change as the project expands. 
 3.2.3.2. Extra ordinary meetings may be called as the need arises.  
3.2.3.3. Meeting dates shall be arranged at the beginning of the calendar year and shall be on the se-
cond Saturday of every other month beginning from January. Except in emergency cases, will the dates of the 
meetings be changed. 
3.2.5. Duration of Mandate 
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3.2.5.1. Chairperson and Vice: Five years and rotate every two years between Block A and Block B 
3.2.5.2. Representatives of The Company Permanent 
3.2.5.3. Elected representatives: Rotate every Two years 
3.3. Executive Committee (ExCo)  
3.3.1 Composition 
The ExCo shall [will] comprise of the chairperson (a chief) vice chair (a chief) and the Company’s rep-
resentative of the Board of Governors: 
3.3.2 Role and Functions 
3.3.2.1. The committee will run the day to day activities of the organization; 
3.3.2.2. The Committee will provide administrative support and procedural guidelines for the Board; 
3.3.2.3. The committee will manage personnel, human and financial resources of the association; 
3.3.2.4. The committee will manage the assets of the association; 
3.3.2.5. Educate the communities; 
3.3.2.6. Establish partnerships with other organizations and stakeholders related to the association; 
3.3.2.7. Ensure regularity of agreements between SGSOC and communities 
3.3.3 Meetings:  
The committee will have regular meetings as the need arises. 
ARTICLE 4: Selection Criteria of members of the Board of Governors: 
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4.1. Five criteria guide the selection of the nineteen (19) members of the Board: 
4.1.1. Original members (4 members): These are Chiefs of villages where The Company has on-the-
ground investments as at November 2012 and who are permanent members on the Board of Governors see 
3.2.2.1. and 3.2.2.2. These villages are: Talangaye, Lipenja I, Fabe and Nguti. 
4.1.2. Surface area of land contributed/ceded to the company 
4.1.3. Representative Chiefs of clans: Each clan in the PAV will nominate a Chief who will sit on the 
Board. These clans are Bima, Ngolo, Batanga, (on the Mundemba – Toko Block) and Upper Balong, Mbo, and 
Bakossi (on the Nguti Block) (6 members) Additional members will be added as the production area grows. 
These shall rotate every two years except otherwise agreed by the board of Governors. 
4.1.4. Representatives of The Company (3 members) 
4.1.5. Elected representatives of youth, men and women: (6 members): Each Block of the PAVs will 
select 1 youth, 1 female and 1 male to sit on the Board. These shall rotate every two years except otherwise 
agreed by the Board of Governors. 
ARTICLE 5: Duration of the Association:  
The SGSOC-PAV shall have a life span consistent with the operation of The Company. 
ARTICLE 6: Decision Making Process:  
6.1. Resolutions, recommendations and decisions of the Board of Governors and General Assembly 
will be arrived at preferably by consensus, failing which a vote will be conducted and a simple majority will 
prevail. In case of a tie, the chairperson will have the casting vote.  
6.2. These, however, cannot violate the rights of the state of Cameroon, the Company nor those of the 
PAV’s as enshrined in the treaties to which Cameroon is signatory, the law of Cameroon, the establishment 
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convention, the common commitments, the business plan of the company and the MoU and any future agree-
ments with SGSOC. 
ARTICLE 7: Committee Members Expenses: The Company will pay for the expenses of SGSOC-
PAV [this association].  
ARTICLE 8: Meeting Venue and Quorum: 
8.1. Venue:  
A venue convenient to all will be selected. 
8.2. Quorums:  
8.2.1. General Assembly:  (50 +1 members) ;  
8.2.2. Board of Governors:  2/3 of members  
ARTICLE 9: Transitional Provisions: 
9.1. The organs called into being by these articles of association will elaborate the procedures, the 
guidelines, the regulations, the tools and methods necessary for the implementation of SGSOC-PAV objectives.   
9.2. The initial Board of Governors and the Executive Committee shall not be renewed for 10 years. 
They shall during this period set up the necessary and appropriate organizational procedures, the guidelines, the 
regulations, the tools, processes and methods after which they can be renewed as provided for in the articles of 
association without prejudice to article 3.2.5.1. 
ARTICLE 10; Amendment procedure of the provisions:   
Any amendments to the provisions of this article of association shall be presented by the Board of 
Governors to the General Assembly which shall deliberate in accordance with article 6. 
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